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Lithium-ion battery technologies are increasingly used in electric vehicles as well for
electrical energy storage at residences, businesses and utilities. In a failure event,
these cells may produce large quantities of gas that pose fire, explosion and toxi-
city hazards to building occupants and firefighters. To understand the hazard, it
is important to understand how single cells fail and how that failure propagates to
other cells. Once the quantity and composition of the gas released by a single cell is
understood and the failure process to surrounding cells is understood then models
can be applied to quantify the explosion or fire hazard of the system.
vii
A series of experiments is conducted using single cell and linear 1D arrays of lithium-
ion pouch cells to understand the thermal runaway process for a single cell and
compare it to how thermal runaway propagates through an array of cells. Due to
the difference in heating between single cells and cells failing in an array, there are
differences in failure characteristics. Single cells vent gases faster and more violently
than those failed in an array. This causes damaged cells to look very different. An
idealized process for thermal runaway propagation in an array of cells is presented.
Many systems have complex geometry in which heat transfer via conduction, con-
vection and radiation may cause thermal runaway propagation in 3 dimensions.
Experiments are conducted with individual prismatic lithium-ion cells and modules
comprising 14 cells to study the more complex runaway propagation behavior of
commercially available energy storage modules. The quantity and species of gases
released by a single cell is measured. The propagation of thermal runaway through
the 14 cells in a module is observed for both a module in open air and modules in
a rack. The impact on the temperature and heat flux within the rack and through-
out the room is measured. A computational fluid dynamics model is developed and
used to predict temperatures, heat fluxes and gas concentrations in the compartment.
Gas sensing, ignition and control systems are developed to perform explosion ex-
periments with lithium-ion cells. Explosion experiments are performed at lab scale,
intermediate scale and full-size closet scale. Full scale experiments are conducted in
a closet which reveal that a single 94 Ah cell provides both the fuel and ignition to
cause a partial volume deflagration which breaks the closet door.
Once gas release and propagation behavior are understood, a series of models can
be used to estimate explosion consequences. Simple models are described to predict
viii
possible flammable gas mixing prior to an explosion. Battery vent gas compositions
are used with models to calculate flammability limits, laminar flame speed, maximum
adiabatic pressure and other properties. Gas mixture properties and compartment
geometry is used in a 0D deflagration code to predict pressures and impulses. Sin-
gle degree of freedom calculations are used to predict possible consequences from
the calculated pressures and impulses. Models are validated against experimental
literature and demonstrated in case studies. Flammability properties are calculated
and summarized for a database of gas composition data. Gas properties are used to
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1.1 Overview and Motivation
Lithium-ion batteries are used in a wide range of applications. Lithium-ion cells are
found in consumer electronics such as watches, phones, laptops and drones. Larger
portable lithium-ion battery systems are found in electric vehicles which can range
from single-user scooters to trucks, trains and aircraft. Large fixed location lithium-
ion systems are used in energy storage at residential, commercial, industrial and grid
level installations. Unfortunately, lithium-ion batteries can fail in thermal runaway,
causing the generation of heat and release of flammable gases. These flammable
gases pose serious fire and explosion hazards. When the volume of flammable gas
is significant compared to the volume of the compartment, there is a potential for
enough flammable gas to accumulate to cause an explosion.
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1.2 Notable Incidents involving Lithium-Ion Systems
Firefighters around the world are responding to an increasing number of incidents
involving lithium-ion battery technologies. A review of recent incidents shows a few
of the ways in which the hazard is manifest.
1.2.1 Fire Incidents
In 2017, a containerized lithium-ion battery energy storage system (ESS) burned at
a utility plant near Brussels, Belgium. This system was equipped with fire detection
and suppression equipment which failed to extinguish the fire [16]. Figure 1.1 shows
the unit on fire shortly before fire department arrival.
Figure 1.1: Engie ESS Fire at the time of fire department arrival. [3]
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In the course of less than two years, South Korea experienced 23 fire incidents in-
volving energy storage systems. For example, in 2018 a cement plant in Jecheon,
North Chungcheong Province incurred over $3 million in damage due to an ESS fire.
[17]. An investigation into these fires found that some of the causes included insuf-
ficient shock protection, environmental effects, faulty installation and poor systems
integration [18, 19]. The fire incidents in South Korea have led to serious concerns
about the safety of lithium-ion energy storage systems.
1.2.2 Explosion Incidents
In 2017 the top container on a double-stacked container train car in Houston, Texas
exploded. The container was carrying drums of used consumer lithium-ion batter-
ies to a recycling facility. The explosion was forceful enough to break windows on
buildings 500 feet away. It also threw a man across a room inside a house about 500
feet away from the train. [20, 21].
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Figure 1.2: Top container on double-stacked train car was completed destroyed in
explosion caused by thermal runaway of lithium-ion batteries packed in drums being
being sent to recycling facility (Yi-Chin Lee, Houston Chronicle) [4]
In April 2019, a 2 MW ESS system in Surprise, AZ exploded resulting in eight in-
jured firefighters. [22, 23]. The explosion threw one firefighter 73 feet and another
firefighter 30 feet, causing serious trauma in addition to chemical burns and chemi-
cal inhalation exposure [5]. This incident comes after a 2012 fire involving the same
electric utility [24].
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Figure 1.3: ESS Building After Explosion showing green door which was blown off
of the building [5]
In March 2020 a fire occurred in the battery room on the fifth floor of a Griffith
University office building in Australia [25]. Soon after firefighters opened the bat-
tery room door, an explosion occurred which threw a firefighter about 10 feet. The
firefighter was thrown just a few feet away from a ledge. If he had gone over the
edge, he would have fallen several stories and been severely injured or killed. On
the ground and across the street, onlookers saw a large fireball at the time of the
explosion [6].
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Figure 1.4: Fifth floor battery room explosion at Griffith University caused fireball
visible to onlookers at street level [6]
In July 2019, the battery in a Hyundai Kona electric car went into thermal runaway
and caused an explosion in a garage in Montreal, Quebec, Canada [7]. The explosion
blew a hole in the garage roof and launched the garage door across the street.
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Figure 1.5: Garage after Hyundai Kona thermal runaway caused explosion which
threw garage door across the street and damaged roof (Mathiue Wagner - Radio
Canada) [7]
These incidents highlight the breadth of the fire and explosion hazards due to bat-
tery thermal runaway. Thermal runaway has caused both large and small fires and
explosions in places ranging from homes to large utility installations.
1.3 Lithium-Ion Battery Operation
Lithium-ion batteries are made of several components. The primary components are
the anode, cathode, separator and electrolyte. Graphite and other carbon-based ma-
terials are used as the anode for most lithium-ion batteries. The anode is connected
to the negative electrode using most often a copper foil current collector. Various
formulations are used for the cathode active material. Common cathode composi-
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tions are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), nickel manganese cobalt (NMC), lithum nickel
cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium iron phosphate (LFP). The cathode is
connected to the positive terminal typically with an aluminum foil current collector.
The electrolyte consists of a lithium salt dissolved in an organic solvent. Typical
lithium salts include LiPF6, LiBF4 and LiClO4. Organic solvents are often mix-
tures of ethylene carbonate (EC), dimethyl carbonate (DMC) and diethyl carbonate
(DEC). In between the cathode and anode, a thin separator prevents the two from
coming in contact while still allowing the passage of lithium-ions from one side to
the other. The separator is often made of polyethylene or polypropylene.
As a battery is charged, lithium-ions are passed from the cathode (positive terminal)
to the anode (negative terminal). As the battery is discharged the ions move in the
opposite direction going from the anode to the cathode.
There are a number of form factors for packaging of cells. Many smaller cells are
packaged into cylindrical metal cans. These cans are equipped with terminals on
either end. At one end, a terminal is constructed to act as a pressure relief that will
vent and relieve pressure if the pressure inside the cell becomes excessive. Pouch cells
are packaged inside soft pouches that protect the cell. Pouch material can consist
of an aluminum foil which is coated in plastic such as polyethylene or polypropy-
lene. Prismatic cells are encased in hard metal cans that are non-cylindrical. Unlike
cylindrical cells, prismatic cells generally have both terminals and a separate vent
on the top of the cell. Figure 1.6 shows the various form factors and sizes. This
work uses all of the cells pictured in Figure 1.6 with the exception of the small 18650
cylindrical cell.
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Figure 1.6: Various lithium-ion cell form factors and sizes.
Battery systems often include more than one cell. Multiple cells may be packaged
together into a unit called a module. Modules may be constructed using cylindrical,
pouch or prismatic cells. In an ESS multiple modules may be put together on a
rack. The rack may also include additional equipment such as battery management
system electronics. An ESS facility may consist of many racks. In electric vehicles
multiple modules may be assembled together to create a battery pack. Figure 1.7
shows two modules used in this project.
1.4 Purpose and Objectives
Due to the evolving technology, there is limited understanding of the nature of fire
and explosion hazards associated with lithium-ion battery systems. This is especially
true for large systems and explosions. There are few experiments in the literature
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(a) A module consisting of 48 LFP cylin-
drical cells
(b) A rack-mount capable module con-
sisting of 14 prismatic cells
Figure 1.7: Lithium-ion battery modules
involving intermediate and large systems and even less experiments characterizing
the explosion potential. Although extensive work has been done on the explosion
hazards of dusts and gasses, very little has been done to understand how battery
systems can cause explosions. The purpose of this work is to improve understanding
of how thermal runaway propagates through cells and modules and to apply that
understanding to understand both fire and explosion hazards caused by lithium-ion
battery systems. There are a number of key objectives:
1. Characterize the thermal runaway propagation behavior of pouch cells in a 1D
linear array of cells.
2. Characterize the thermal runaway propagation process and effects for a com-
mercially available ESS module in a compartment.
3. Conduct explosion experiments to observe the processes involved in an explo-
sion of battery vent gas.
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4. Develop models to estimate possible explosion hazard consequences for differ-
ent scenarios.
1.5 Chapter Outline
This dissertation consists of five main content chapters, a conclusion chapter and
appendices of supplemental material. In Chapter 2 experiments are used to under-
stand thermal runaway in a single cell and how thermal runaway propagates in a
1D array of cells in direct thermal contact. However, real systems are often more
complex than simple 1D arrays of cells and can cause fire and thermal consequences
in the entire room. In Chapter 3 commercially available ESS modules are put into
thermal runaway in a compartment to understand runaway propagation in an actual
system and its effects on the room.
Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the explosion hazards associated with lithium-ion
battery thermal runaway. Chapter 4 describes the development and execution of
lithium-ion battery vent gas explosion experiments. Chapter 5 describes a number
of models that can be used to understand whether an explosion can occur in a given
scenario and what it’s consequences may be. Chapter 6 demonstrates case studies
and applications of the explosion hazard models. Chapter 7 provides conclusions.
Appendix B describes experiments done with LFP cells.
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Chapter 2
Thermal Runaway in Single Cells
and 1D Arrays
Much of this chapter was written for and presented at the 1st International Sympo-
sium on Lithium Battery Fire Safety (ISLBFS) held on July 18–20 in 2019 in Hefei,
China. This work was subsequently published in the Journal of Fire Technology [26].
This work was authored by Erik Archibald, Robert Kennedy, Dr. Judith Jeevarajan,
Dr. Kevin Marr and Dr. Ofodike Ezekoye. All of the single cell experiments and the
first few array experiments were performed and analyzed by Erik Archibald. Robert
built the pressure vessel and data collection system and ran the remainder of the
array experiments. Dr. Marr and Dr. Ezekoye assisted with direction and editing.
Dr. Jeevarajan assisted with editing and review.
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2.1 Introduction
Although the quantity of gas released by a single cell battery in a large space may
not pose any explosion risk, propagation of thermal runaway from one cell to oth-
ers can release enough gas to create serious explosion hazards. Thermal runaway
propagation from cell to cell occurs as heat is transferred from a cell in thermal
runaway to nearby cells that may not have been previously defective or damaged.
Understanding the rate of propagation is useful to characterize the rate at which the
system as a whole is releasing flammable gases.
Various experimental and modeling studies have been conducted to investigate ther-
mal runaway propagation in multi-cell cylindrical cell arrays. Studies on runaway
propagation in 18650 cylindrical cell arrays have shown that increased distance or in-
sulation between cells[27, 28, 29, 30, 31] and phase change material inhibit cell-to-cell
propagation [28]. Experiments on 18650 cell arrays have also shown that cells elec-
trically connected in series are less likely to propagate compared to cells connected
in parallel[29], and branched tabbing can reduce the chances of propagation for cells
in parallel [30]. Other experiments have shown that a higher state of charge (SOC)
and initiation near the center of a battery pack leads to faster propagation rates in
18650 arrays[32]. Experiments comparing different arrangements of 18650’s found
that cells arranged in a triangular array propagated runaway more slowly than those
in parallelogram or square arrays [33]. Although cells with lower states of charge can
reduce the severity of runaway, rapid discharging of surrounding cells while others
are going into runaway has been found to increase the rate of propagation[33]. Huang
et al. conducted experiments exposing large cylindrical 50 Ah LTO cells to flame
and observed that runaway propagation can cause cells to explode[34]. Said et al.
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performed experiments measuring the heat released by each cell in an 18650 array
and found that an air environment significantly increased the rate of propagation
when compared to nitrogen[35].
Fewer experiments on pouch cell thermal runaway propagation are documented
in published literature. These experiments have shown that unlike 18650 arrays,
changing cell electrical connections does not prevent propagation[29]. This is be-
cause pouch cells have strong heat conduction from cell to cell due to being in full
contact and clamped together. Heat dissipation and increased thermal resistance
between pouch cells are shown to be effective at preventing propagation in pouch
cell arrays[36, 37]. Feng et al. conducted a pouch cell propagation experiment using
pouch cells in an aluminum battery pack and developed a model to predict TR prop-
agation. They show that a 1 mm thick insulating layer between cells can prevent
propagation[36]. Li et al. developed a 3D model to predict runaway propagation as
well and validate it against pouch cell array experiments. They show that an alu-
minum heatsink placed between cells can also stop runaway propagation[38]. Our
work on pouch cell arrays [39] builds on these studies and will be described in section
2.3. Since this work was completed, Kennedy has gone on to explore gas generation
associated with lithium cobalt oxide pouch arrays in detail[40].
2.2 5 Ah Pouch Single Cell Experiments
2.2.0.1 Purpose and Introduction
To understand the behavior of large systems comprised of tens, hundreds or thou-
sands of cells, it is important to first understand the thermal runaway failure process
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for a single cell. In these experiments the failure process of single 5 Ah pouch cells is
observed. During thermal runaway, observations are made of appearance, tempera-
ture, cell voltage and stress on a load cell.
2.2.0.2 Experimental Setup
A series of experiments were performed using single lithium-ion pouch cells. These
experiments were conducted using 3.7 V, 5 Ah lithium-ion pouch cells (Model PL-
896474-2C) from AA Portable Power Corp [41]. The cells have dimensions of 75.5
mm x 64.5 mm x 9.0mm and a mass of 90.2 grams. A photo of the cell and a
partially disassembled cell for mass composition measurement is shown in 2.1. The
mass composition of the cell was determined by discharging cell, evaporating the
electrolyte in a vacuum vessel and then dissembling the cell and measuring the mass
of each component. The cell composition is given in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Photos showing the cell during various stages of disassembly to measure
the mass composition of the cell.
The clamping, insulation and heating setup for these experiments is shown in Figure
2.2. In these tests, cells were heated slowly using custom fabricated aluminum block
heaters. The block heater consists of two 6.35 mm diameter 300W cartridge heaters
approximately 51 mm apart inserted into a 88.9 mm x 76.2 mm x 12.7 mm aluminum
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Component Composition Mass Percentage
Cathode and Current Collector Lithium Cobalt Oxide, Aluminum 49.1%
Anode and Current Collector Graphite, Copper 33.0%
Electrolyte LiPF6, EC, DEC, DMC 9.7%
Separator Polypropylene 5.1%
Pouch Aluminum, Nylon, Polypropylene 3.1%
Table 2.1: 5 Ah Pouch Cell Battery Components
block. A single cell is inserted between two block heaters and a constant ramp
heating profile at an approximate rate of 5 ◦C/min was applied using a programmable
temperature controller. This heating rate was selected because it is used in an
industry test standard (UL 9540A) for thermal runaway tests [42].The aluminum
block heaters are surrounded with rigid calcium silicate insulation (Johns Manville
Super Firetemp X). The entire apparatus is clamped together using four bolts which
run through the aluminum blocks. The bolts are tightened such that before the
experiment they apply a pressure of approximately 100 kPa to the cell. On one side
of the experimental setup an additional aluminum block is placed to secure a load
cell which is used to measure the clamping force being exerted on the battery. The
load cell is positioned here to measure the clamping force without being damaged
by the heat of thermal runaway. The exposed sides of the setup (not bordered by
calcium silicate insulation) are wrapped in ceramic fiber insulation. Temperatures at
several locations on the cell surface and between the aluminum blocks and insulation
were measured using 36 gauge K type thermocouples.
16
Figure 2.2: After-experiment photo and diagram of single cell test setup. Aluminum
blocks are clamped with bolts and insulation surrounds cell and heater blocks. A,
B,C,D is used to designate sides of test setup and corresponding thermocouple lo-
cations. Thermocouple locations are shown with filled in circles. The cell tabs are
pointed upwards. White circles in heater blocks indicate locations of cylindrical
cartridge heaters.
Prior to the experiment the batteries were cycled twice using a 5A discharge rate
to verify that their actual capacity is within 5 % of their rated capacity. Before
each experiment batteries were fully charged using a 1A constant current charge un-
til 4.2V and a constant voltage charge at 4.2V until the current was less than 250 mA.
Three experiments were run using this procedure. The first two were conducted
in ambient air underneath a vent hood. The third experiment was conducted in a
nitrogen environment inside a pressure vessel.
2.2.0.3 Results
Cell voltage and interface surface temperature were measured and recorded through-
out the tests. In addition to these measurements, force data from the load cell for all
three experiments was also recorded. Load cell force values are divided by cell area
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to calculate the clamping pressure on the cell. For testing in the pressure vessel, the
chamber gas pressure and temperature were recorded to estimate gas release rates
and volume. Temperatures and clamping stress from the load cell for the test in
the pressure vessel were similar to the hood experiments and results are considered
together. Figure 2.3 shows plots of heater temperature, load cell clamping stress,
and pressure vessel gas pressure for the three experiments. The test results show
good reproducibility. For convenience in comparing experiments, in Figure 2.3 and
Figure 2.4 the origin of the time axis is offset so that t=0 references the time at
which (dT/dt) for any thermocouple exceeds 100 ◦C/sec. In all three tests, the time
of this rapid temperature increase occurred when the cell / heater interface temper-
ature was between 185 ◦C and 196 ◦C. Results for Test 3 include the gas pressure
time history in the pressure vessel.
Figure 2.3: Temperature, load cell clamping stress and vessel gas pressure data
shown for three single cell experiments from the beginning of cell heating until after
runaway completion. Load cell clamping stress indicates cell pressure buildup and
venting approximately 1000 seconds before runaway.
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The load cell data provide additional insight into the events leading up to thermal
runaway. As previously noted, the load cell force measures the mechanical force
compressing the batteries. The initial stress measured by the load cell is due to the
clamping force applied by tightening the bolts on the apparatus. Initially, this stress
is largely resisted by the internal stresses in the battery solid materials. As the cell is
heated, gas is generated from electrolyte evaporation and chemical decomposition of
the active materials and electrolyte. The gas generation process increases the pres-
sure inside the cell, which in turn increases the measured clamping stress. Since the
clamping stress is resisted by internal stresses in the porous matrix (solids, liquid,
and gas) within the cell, the clamping stress measured by the load cell is not an
exact measure of cell internal gas pressure.
As the cell is steadily heated at 5◦C/min, the load cell clamping stress remains fairly
constant for about 10 minutes. The clamping stress gradually begins to increase at
approximately -1400 sec when the cell is at about 75◦C. This increase in stress aligns
with the beginning of SEI layer decomposition which ARC testing shows begins at
70◦C [43, 44]. The increase in pressure accelerates until the load cell pressure reaches
a peak at -1000 sec when the cell is at 110◦C. The increasing rate of pressure rise
from -1400 sec to -1000 sec could be due to the reaction of intercalated lithium with
the organic solvents which releases hydrocarbons. These reactions typically occur
at 100◦C[43]. At -1000 sec the pressure begins to fall because the pouch swells or
containment fails and the confined gases begin to vent. These vented gases are not
immediately visible to the naked eye but can be seen when the venting process is
viewed through a thermal infrared camera. Initially, this incipient venting process
does not release enough gas to cause a noticeable rise in gas pressure in the pressure
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vessel. As time goes on, the rate of gas venting increases and venting becomes
visible. Before the time the cell experiences rapid heating and intense venting at
t=0 s, the vessel chamber pressure and temperature are used to infer that about 15
% of the total gas has already been released. Looking at temperature data, an early
warning of thermal runaway is seen at -100 seconds where temperatures measured
on the cell surface begin to exceed those on the heater surface. At -20 seconds, the
load cell stress begins to increase at an increasing rate. This is indicative of higher
pressures inside the cell as gas is produced at an increasing rate. At t=0 the first
rapid temperature rise is recorded and the heater-cell temperature is between 185◦C
and 196◦C. At this time, the load cell pressure drops suddenly due to rapid gas
venting as a larger area of the cell pouch has burst. At this time the cell rapidly
vents gas, electrolyte as shown in 2.5.
Figure 2.4: Temperature and load cell pressure data shown for three single cell
experiments from 2 seconds before runaway until 10 seconds after.
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Figure 2.5: Cell during intense venting at approximately t=2 s
Figure 2.4 shows data from the same experiments as Figure 2.3, but focuses on tem-
peratures and load cell pressures just before and during thermal runaway for the
three experiments. For these experiments the A and C thermocouples are located
on the interfaces between the cell and the heaters while the B and D thermocouples
are located on the sides of the battery as shown in Figure 2.2. In this plot, runaway
is first observed as thermocouples on the B and D sides of the cell rapidly increase
in temperature. Although uniform heating was applied to both A and C sides of
the cell, the rapid temperature increase associated with thermal runaway did not
always occur simultaneously on the A and C sides or the B and D sides of the cell.
This suggests that thermal runaway did not initiate at the center of the cell. This
contrasts with the expectation that for a cell heated symmetrically on both sides,
the thermal runaway chemical reactions should occur first at the center of the cell.
This asymmetry will be seen again during battery teardowns.
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In the Figure 2.4 Test 3 subplot, the bottom thermocouple rises very rapidly to
900◦C. This very sudden increase in the thermocouple temperature to high temper-
atures is associated with a hot gas jet emerging from the side of the battery close
to the thermocouple location. For each test the time between the first temperature
rise which is seen on the B side, to the time of the temperature rise on the D side
is between 200 and 900 ms. The time from the first temperature rise until temper-
ature rise on the A and C sides is between 1.8 and 2.8 seconds. In total it takes
on average 4 seconds to travel through the thickness (A to C side) of the battery.
Using the dimensions of the battery, the speed at which the temperature disturbance
propagates in the plane of the battery (from B to D side) is significantly faster than
the disturbance speed in the through-thickness direction. Using array propagation
data, it will be shown that these differences can be explained with a relatively simple
convection-diffusion-reaction equation theory.
2.2.0.4 Post Experiment Teardown
After each experiment, all cells were dissected to observe the damage caused by run-
away. For the single cells put through uniform 5◦C/min heating, teardown results
looked similar. Figure 2.10 shows two layers from the Test 2 teardown that are
representative of what single cell experiment layers looked like. In Figure 2.10a a
layer with light damage is shown. Areas with light damage like this were seen in
layers closest to the A side and C side of the cell. On the left is the remains of the
copper foil and the anode. On the right is a thin layer of brittle material where
the cathode would have been. Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) and Energy
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Dispersive X-Ray (EDX) Analysis was performed in-house by an undergraduate re-
search assistant. Using SEM and EDX, it was seen that this layer contains a large
amount of carbon. This carbon may have come from any of several sources. These
sources include electrolyte reaction products, separator products, the anode which is
graphite, and the cathode which contains a large percentage of conductive carbon.
The aluminum current collector for the cathode does not remain intact.
Figure 2.10 shows a heavily damaged layer from the teardown of Test 2. This layer
shows a single location where it appears a localized, high heating rate event began
and then propagated outward. This location is marked by an area of severe damage
where a jet appears to have exited the battery. This location was generally close
to halfway between the A and C sides of the battery and towards the center of the
battery but never exactly in the center. This randomness in initiation location is
likely due to inherent variability in cell construction. In the area of the battery not
showing heavy damage, radial striations show the path of hot gases exiting the cell
in a less violent manner. For this test the first high temperature and the highest
temperature was measured on the B side, which is the side that the jet exits.
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(a) Carbon (b) Fluorine (c) Phosphorous (d) SEM
Figure 2.6: New Anode EDX and SEM Images
(a) Carbon (b) Fluorine (c) Phosphorous (d) SEM
Figure 2.7: Burned Anode EDX and SEM Images
(a) Carbon (b) Cobalt (c) Oxygen (d) SEM
Figure 2.8: New Cathode EDX and SEM Images
(a) Carbon (b) Cobalt (c) Oxygen (d) SEM
Figure 2.9: Burned Cathode EDX and SEM Images
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Figure 2.10: Layers from Single cell test 2 teardown.
Figure 2.11 shows a view of the B-side of the battery where the jet exited. From this
angle it is apparent that the battery is thinner in the jet region, where more material
was ejected than along the rest of the edge of the battery. Aluminum beads appear
on the sides of the battery where hot gases escaped fast enough to push the melted
aluminum, but slow enough to deposit it as it exited. In the jet region aluminum
beads are not present due to the violent ejection of the jet.
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Figure 2.11: Single cell test 2 jet region.
Figure 2.12: Single cell test 3 teardown.
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Figure 2.12 shows the teardown for Test 3. As discussed previously, the Test 3
Bottom thermocouple recorded the highest temperature seen in this series of tests.
This is because that thermocouple was located near the jet exit location on the
bottom of the cell. In both photos we can observe that there was a single location that
caused heavy damage and ejected not only decomposition products and electrolyte
but also cathode and anode material as well as the copper and aluminum current
collectors.
2.3 Study on Linear Array Propagation Process
To better understand the cell-to-cell propagation characteristics of multi-cell battery
modules in larger battery systems, propagation tests were conducted by testing lin-
ear arrays of 5 Ah and 10 Ah cells. In these experiments the cells have direct contact
with each other on the large faces of the cells, they do not have any electrical con-
nections between cells.
2.3.0.1 Experimental Setup
The 5 Ah cells are the same as those previously used in the single cell experiments.
The 10 Ah cells are lithium-cobalt oxide cathode cells with dimensions of 150 mm
x 58 mm x 10.4 mm and a mass of 208.9 grams. The test fixture used in the array
experiments is like the fixture used in the single cell experiments. Like the single cell
setup, the array setup uses aluminum blocks to clamp the apparatus together and
employs a load cell on one end to measure the clamping force exerted on the cells. In
any given experiment, either five or ten cells were placed in a linear array. Insulation
was placed in between the outermost cells and aluminum blocks. No insulation or
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spacing was placed in between cells.
In the array experiments, a localized heating system was used rather than the block
heaters used for single pouch cells in 2.2. In field failures caused by internal cell
shorts, thermal runaway begins at a single cell where heating is localized. Because
the heating is localized, the total amount of energy required to initiate thermal run-
away may not be large. Typically, the energy generated by a localized failure does
not significantly heat neighboring cells until thermal runaway of the initial cell oc-
curs. For the slow heating rates used in the single cell experiments, a large amount of
energy was required to initiate thermal runaway, which can preheat neighboring cells
prior to thermal runaway occurring. Preheating neighboring cells would likely result
in the preheated cells failing sooner compared to non-heated cells. To minimize this
preheating effect on neighboring cells, a 15.9 mm diameter copper cylinder with a
150 W cartridge heater is used to heat a small localized area at the center of the cell
at a high rate. The heater is turned on at full power and then turned off manually
when a sharp rise (approximately 100◦C/sec) in heater-cell interface temperature
is observed. A maximum heating rate of approximately 100◦C/min was measured
at the heater and initiating cell interface before its temperature levels off between
400◦C and 500◦C until thermal runaway occurs.
The array tests were conducted in a nitrogen environment within a pressure vessel
designed for battery testing. The pressure vessel remains sealed throughout the
duration of the test to maintain a constant volume. The volume of the vessel is
55 L when empty and 54.4 L when a typical experiment setup is placed inside, not
including the volume of the batteries. Figure 2.13 shows diagrams of the five-cell
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array configurations for both the 10 Ah and 5 Ah cells. Thermocouples are placed
along the centerline of the array at each interface between adjacent cells, the heater
and initiating cell, and the last cell and insulation. Thermocouples are also placed
in void spaces just above the setup and at the top and bottom of the pressure vessel.
Vessel gauge pressure is measured using a pressure transducer mounted on the wall
of the vessel. Figure 2.14 shows the 10-cell, 10 Ah array mounted in the vessel.
Figure 2.13: Diagram showing 5 cell array test setup with aluminum plates, clamping
bolts, insulation and cells. A, B, C, D labels are used to indicate sides of setup.
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Figure 2.14: 10-cell 10 Ah array test setup in vessel before an experiment.
2.3.0.2 5 Ah Array Results
In the 5 Ah cell array experiments, surface temperatures were measured at the in-
terface between two cells, or between a cell and boundary of the experimental setup,
i.e. heater and insulation. In addition, cell voltage, vessel pressure, and several gas
temperatures were measured, including the upper gas temperature at the highest
point in the vessel.
Figure 2.15 shows the vessel pressure and upper gas temperature, as well as surface
temperature measurements between cells from the 5-cell 5 Ah array test. Pressure
rose in the vessel from cell venting with an increase in the upper gas temperature
immediately following the first runaway event. The upper gas temperature trails the
pressure because of the slower process associated with mixing time in the vessel. For
the first cell the duration of the pressure increase is 6 seconds. For subsequent cells
the pressure increased for an average of 11 seconds and decreased for an average of
4 seconds until the next cell goes into runaway. The duration of pressure increase
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is indicative of thermal runaway causing intense venting. The period of pressure
decrease occurs when the venting rate is very small and the cooling and mixing of
hot gases causes the pressure to fall. In total, the average time between the initiation
of runaway in one cell and the propagation to the next is 15 seconds.
Figure 2.15: 5-cell 5 Ah array test data showing (a) pressure vessel gas temperature
and pressure and (b) interface temperatures between adjacent cells.
Thermal runaway in each cell can also be inferred by the steep temperature increase
at interfaces between cells. In the first cell, the steep increase occurs after a constant
power heating process from a local point source. In the later cells which are triggered
into runaway due to array propagation, the temperature initially increases due to
heating in the last layers of the previous cell. The interface temperature then levels
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off as the reacting (hot) cell preheats the unreacted (cooler) cell. Finally, another
temperature increase occurs approximately 4 seconds later as a result of thermal
runaway of the initially-unreacted cell. This is evident from the two sharp increases
in temperature for each TC separated by a period of slower temperature increase.
The pressure increase also begins with the second surface temperature increase fur-
ther showing thermal runaway. The cell interface temperature data also show that
the propagation time was 15 seconds, but were unclear as to what constituted a
starting or stopping point for thermal runaway, i.e. a critical temperature or time
derivative of the temperature. This is made more challenging due to the thermal
wave propagation marked by the first temperature increase which sometimes blends
very closely with the second temperature increase from thermal runaway.
Figure 2.16 shows the same results as Figure 2.15, but for the 10 cell 5 Ah array.
Very similar trends can be seen in both 5 Ah cell arrays. In this experiment, the
pressure increase for the first cell is much faster than the other cells, occurring over
only a 1.5 second interval. This is again followed by the upper gas temperature.
Based on the pressure data, the propagated cells still vent over the course of 11
seconds with a 4 second delay for a 15 second propagation time.
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Figure 2.16: 10-cell 5 Ah array test data showing (a) pressure vessel gas temperature
and pressure and (b) interface temperatures between adjacent cells.
The interface temperature data show a constant propagation time of 15 seconds.
The secondary temperature increase and pressure rise are still in agreement with
the start of the thermal runaway event for each cell. Overall there seems to be no
significant differences between the two arrays, suggesting that larger arrays need not
be tested for modeling propagation in a 1D array and that the first cell failure seems
not to have influenced the results once the cells began propagating. This should be
true as long as the heat released by already failed cells and runaway propagating to
additional cells does not significantly change the environment temperature, causing
preheating. However, more data are needed to confirm this trend. The thermocou-
ples which would have shown runaway at approximately 915 and 930 seconds failed
and are not shown. However, pressure data shows that these cells failed similarly to
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the others. The average maximum interface temperature for TC 2 through TC 7 is
991◦C.
2.3.0.3 10 Ah Array Results
The next experiments follow the same protocol as the previous but use 10 Ah cells.
In these experiments, the interface temperatures, gas temperatures, cell voltage and
vessel gas pressure were measured. In addition, the load cell as previously explained
was also used to measure the clamping stress due to expansion and contraction of
the cells.
Figure 2.17 shows data from the 10 cell array of 10Ah cells. As with the other array
tests, the cells were not connected electrically. The vessel pressure and upper gas
temperature show the same trends as the array of ten 5Ah cells, but with more vent
gas produced, resulting in higher pressure and gas temperature. Based on the pres-
sure data, the propagation time was approximately 22 seconds for the first 8 cells on
average. Of this, pressure increased for 14 seconds and decreased for 8 seconds, cor-
responding to cell venting and subsequent gas cooling, respectively. This indicates
that the venting time was 40 % longer than that of the 5 Ah cells while the delay
between venting and thermal runaway propagation was 60 % longer. One reason the
venting time is longer is because the 10 Ah cells are 18 % thicker than the 5 Ah cells
and it will take the thermal runaway process more time to propagate through that
thickness.
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Figure 2.17: 10-cell 10 Ah array test data showing (a) pressure vessel gas temperature
and pressure and (b) interface temperatures between cells and (c) voltages of cell 1,
cells 5 & 6 in series and cells 9 & 10 in series.
The interface temperatures also show the same feature of a two-step increase sepa-
rated by a short preheating time like the 5 Ah arrays. This feature can also be seen in
the cell interface temperature in both Feng’s and Li’s work on array propagation in
pouch cell arrays [37, 38]. Based on the interface temperature data, the propagation
time was also approximately 22 seconds for the first 8 cells. The preheating time, or
flat portion of the 2-zone increase, between the thermal wave propagation and the
thermal runaway of the next cell is substantially longer than that of the 5 Ah cell
arrays. The average maximum temperature for the cell interface temperatures (TC2
through TC10) is 876◦C.
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In this experiment, the cells seem to be propagating faster towards the end of the
array. The last two cells propagate failure in 14 seconds on average. However, this
trend was not seen in any other array test. This could be a result of higher chamber
gas temperatures which would preheat the unfailed cells prior to propagation from
the previous cell, thereby increasing the net heat flux into the cell. Higher chamber
gas temperature also decreases the heat losses out of the cells. The pressure can
also be seen increasing non-linearly for the last two cells as compared to other array
tests where the pressure tends to increase linearly with time during the test. This
could be a result of reduced cooling to the vessel walls as they increased linearly
in temperature over the course of the experiment, reaching a peak temperature of
approximately 120◦C. It could also be a result of the reduction of cooling due to
mixing with the initial cold gaseous nitrogen in the vessel as it becomes well mixed.
As observed in single cell tests, load cell peaks are markers of cell failure as the
cell pressure reaches a maximum and is released through venting. This was used to
calculate propagation time which was again found to be approximately 22 seconds.
The clamping stress spikes in the load cell data aligns almost exactly with the begin-
ning of the pressure rise and leads the second jump in each inter-cell temperature by
approximately 2 seconds on average. The load cell disturbances are less pronounced
in the 10 cell array due to the relaxation of the compression after the first cell fails.
Overall, the load cell and pressure are better methods for determining the start of
the event compared to temperature as they have faster response times and provide
more clear signals than temperature data.
The voltages were measured for the first cell, cells 5-6 in series, and 9-10 in series. For
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cell 6 at 325 seconds and cell 10 at 390 seconds, the voltage drops by a few volts and
quickly recovers about 10 seconds before the thermal runaway event. This had been
observed occurring 1 to 2 seconds before runaway in the 5 Ah tests. However, this
effect is not reliably repeated for every cell. In both array experiments the voltage
of a cell drops to zero approximately midway between the beginning and end of the
runaway venting period. Compared to gas pressure, load cell and temperature data,
the timing of voltage drop is less informative about the timing of the runaway process.
Figure 2.18 shows a zoomed in plot showing the failure of cells 5 and 6 from the 10-
cell 10 Ah array test. This plot shows that the load cell clamping stress spike occurs
at the same time the pressure vessel gas pressure measurement increase begins. This
occurs because the clamping stress spike is a marker of the sudden pressure rise due
to runaway reactions and the sudden pressure fall due to venting. The vessel pres-
sure increase is a result of those vented gases being released into the vessel. Unlike
the slowly heated single cell experiments where the clamping stress rises 20 seconds
prior to venting, for propagating arrays the clamping stress leads the temperature
rise by 2-3 seconds. Thus, the load cell and pressure are the most reliable ways of
determining the propagation rate, as they are clear indicators of the event start and
stop periods. The load cell spike and increase in gas pressure are good indicators
of the rapid rise in internal pressure in the cell at the initiation of runaway and the
subsequent release of gases.
The reason why the load cell and pressure gauge are more timely is due to the physics
of what they are measuring more than each instrument’s response time. The gas
pressure gauge has a natural frequency of at least 1000 hz and the load cell has a
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natural frequency of at least 100 hz. As the lithium-ion cell expands and contracts
due to the generation and venting of gases, the resulting stresses in the cell propagate
at the speed of sound in the battery cell. As these gases vent and are released into
the vessel, the vessel gas pressure increases with changes propagating at the speed
of sound through the gas. These processes are very fast and occur in much less than
the 100 ms sample rate used for this experiment. Although this experiment uses very
fine gauge (36 gauge) thermocouples which can respond very quickly to temperature
changes, they lag because of the slow nature of diffusive heat transfer. In this case
the heat must diffuse from the point at which the heat-generating reactions are oc-
curring and then travel through the layers of the battery to reach the center of the
end of the cell where the thermocouple is placed. The time it takes heat to diffuse
through the thickness of the cell, is also seen in the single cell experiments, where
temperature rises on the sides of the battery are seconds before the temperature rises
seen through the thickness of the cell.
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Figure 2.18: 10-cell 10 Ah array snapshot of failure of cells 5 and 6 showing (A)
pressure vessel gas temperature and pressure and (B) interface temperatures between
cells and (C) voltages of cells 5 and 6 in series and cells 9 and 10 in series.
Figure 2.18 also clearly shows the two-step temperature increase. This is shown
in cell 5 as marked by the secondary temperature increase of the blue line at 300
seconds. The temperature shown in orange shows the interface temperature between
cells 5 and 6. This temperature begins to rise as cell 5 runaway is nearly complete,
then the rise continues slowly until the thermocouple senses the runaway of cell 6
about 2 seconds after cell 6 runaway is initiated.
An interesting result from Figure 2.18 is the lag seen in the voltage data. The blue
trace in Figure 2.18 (C) shows the voltage of cells 5 and 6 cells in series. The first
large drop occurs during the failure of cell 5 and the second is for cell 6. At the first
spike in the load cell data, the voltage begins to waver. However, the voltage does not
drop significantly until 10 seconds after the temperature jumps. Additionally, the
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voltage does not fully fall for cell 5 until just before the gases stop venting as marked
by the pressure signal. This pattern is seen again in the voltage for cell 6 as the
voltage wavers again at the load cell spike, and only falling until well into the thermal
runaway event. Overall, this shows that the voltage data is a poor marker of start
and stop times, as well as propagation times. In this way, the voltage signal serves
only to show whether thermal runaway has occurred barring all other measurements.
A 5-cell 10 Ah array was also tested and showed similar results with no significant
differences to the first five cells in the 10 cell array. The final pressure and upper gas
temperatures for the 5-cell 10 Ah array were almost identical to the 10-cell 5 Ah ar-
ray, indicating that the volume of gas produced and heat released generally scales by
watt hour capacity. However, more testing with varying state of charge and cell types
is needed to confirm this trend and to measure precisely the amount of gas produced.
Figure 2.19 shows the propagated cell temperature profiles from the 10x 10 Ah cell
array overlaid on idealizations for the temperature and load cell profiles of a thermal
runaway propagating into a cell from a previous cell. The measured temperature
profiles were aligned in time by aligning the spikes in the load cell data. This figure
shows the stair step nature of interface temperature, where it first rises due to the
previous cell runaway and then after a period, the temperature jumps again due
to the next cell runaway. This stair step feature can be seen in the 10-cell 10 Ah,
5-cell 10 Ah and 5-cell 5Ah experiments here as well as in experiments by others
[37, 38]. In this experiment the rate of temperature increase greatly decreases at
about 660◦C. This occurs because the pouch material is made from aluminum which
melts at 660◦C. Teardowns of cell arrays showed that most of the pouch material
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between cells had been melted and ejected.
Figure 2.19: Temperature histories for 10 Ah cells, when aligned by time of runaway
initiation as indicated by load cell spike show a two-step temperature profile which
is idealized by the blue line.
Using the temperatures shown in Figure 2.19 along with pressure and load cell data,
an idealized representation of the propagation process was created. Figure 2.20
shows the idealization of the temperature, pressure and load cell profiles for thermal
runaway propagating from one cell to another. This shows the two components of
the total propagation time: preheat or induction time and venting time. For the 10
Ah arrays the cell is first preheated for approximately 7 seconds from the thermal
runaway of the previous cell as shown by the initial increase in temperature. During
this time the vessel pressure decreases as the gases released from the previous cell
mix and cool. Interface temperature then stagnates as the cell heats until it is ready
for runaway to occur. Runaway reactions generate gas, increasing cell pressure and
causing almost immediate venting as shown by the load cell which spikes and drops
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almost instantly. Vessel pressure also begins to increase at this point, another indica-
tor that thermal runaway has started and the cell is actively venting. The interface
temperature takes approximately 2 seconds to reflect the temperature increase. The
cell vents over the course of 13 seconds. As venting is concluding, one can see that
thermal runaway has propagated to the other side of the failing cell by the initial
rise in the next interface temperature, thus continuing the cycle.
Figure 2.20: Idealization of propagation process showing idealized, interface tem-
peratures on either side of the cell, pressure vessel gas pressure and load cell spike
timing. After a period of preheating from the previous cell failure, a load cell spike
(purple) indicates the beginning of thermal runaway and active venting. Vessel gas
pressure (red) begins to increase at the same time as the load cell spike as gases are
released. A decrease in vessel gas pressure indicates the end of the active venting pe-
riod. Thermocouple measurements between previous cell and current cell (T1) and
between the current cell and next cell (T2) are about 2 seconds behind in indicating
the beginning and the ending of the vent time due to thermal runaway.
Table 2.2 shows the average and 95 % confidence intervals for preheat, venting and
total propagation times for the 5 Ah and 10 Ah cells. These times are measured using
peak to trough and peak to peak pressure data as illustrated in Figure 2.20. Each
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Array Preheat (sec) 95% CI (sec) Vent (sec) 95% CI (sec) Total (sec) 95% CI (sec)
5 Ah 4.3 ± 1.4 11 ± 2.7 15.4 ± 2.5
10 Ah 7.4 ± 5.1 13.2 ± 4.1 20.6 ± 8.0
Table 2.2: Propagation time Statistics for 5 Ah and 10 Ah arrays.
set of statistics comes from a sample of 13 cells which consist of the 4 propagated
cells in the five cell array and the 9 propagated cells from the 10 cell array. The
spread on the 10 Ah cells is much larger than that of the 5 Ah cells. This is due to
the apparent acceleration at the end of the 10-cell 10 Ah array test.
One can infer a reaction propagation rate from these data using the vent time (See
Figure 2.20) and the characteristic length (cell thickness). As an example, for the
5 Ah cells, there is an average through-thickness propagation time of 11 seconds.
Using the thickness of the 5 Ah cells, the propagation rate is approximately 0.8
mm/s. For systems with convection-diffusion-reaction, one estimate for the reaction







Representative values for thermal diffusivity (α), unburned temperature (Tu), igni-
tion temperature (Tig), adiabatic cell temperature (Tb), and preheat thickness (δR),
can be used to find a propagation velocity (u) that is consistent with the measured
values. Assuming this fundamental propagation speed, the differences in vent time
between the 10 Ah and 5 Ah propagation cases are easily explained. The effects of
thermal conductivity in the in-plane and through-plane directions have significant
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effects on the rate at which the reaction wave propagates across the cell relative to
through the cell. these observations are also consistent with temperature measure-
ments made in the single cell failure cases in Section 2.2.
2.3.0.4 Cell Array Teardowns
In the cell array teardowns, the initiating cells are very different than the cells which
runaway by propagation. Even though the initiating cells are heated much faster
than the single cell experiments and are only heated at a single point, damage looks
very similar to the single cell experiments. Figure 2.21 shows the photo from the
post experiment teardown of the initial cell in the array of five 10 Ah cells. Figure
2.22 shows the teardown of the initial cell in the 10 cell 5Ah array. In the center a
circular indent is left where the heater was compressed against the cell. In the 10
Ah cell, two regions of heavy damage show where jets left the cell while for the 5 Ah
there is just one. On the 5 Ah cell, the single area of damage is more significant. Ra-
dial striations again mark the flow path for the vaporized electrolyte, vent gas, and
melted aluminum which is forced out of the cell and beads up as seen on the sides
of the pouch. One can also see where the jets of gas were strongest for the initiating
cell, as the beads of aluminum are absent from having been blown completely out
as seen in the middle of the pouch side in Figure 2.23.
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Figure 2.21: 5-cell 10 Ah array initiating cell teardown
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Figure 2.22: 10-cell 5 Ah array first cell teardown
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Figure 2.23: 10-cell 10 Ah initiating cell jet region.
Figure 2.24 shows 5 Ah cells that failed due to propagation. These cells have more
noticeable striations. Cells 2 and 3 show striations originating from very close to the
center. While in later cells the arrangement looks more random. The center pattern
may be because the initiating cell was initiated near the center and central initiation
passed on to the first few cells in propagation.
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Figure 2.24: 5-cell 5 Ah array teardown.
Figure 2.25 shows the teardown of the second cell in the array and is representative
of all of other 10 Ah cells failed by propagation. Propagated cells all lack regions of
heavy damage as seen before. Cells are roughly uniformly heated to failure in a mat-
ter of seconds. As a result, striations are more subtle and there are not strong jets to
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remove the aluminum beads from the perimeter of the cell. This indicates that the
propagated cells failed more uniformly, thereby releasing their contents more calmly
through multiple sides at once, instead of a rapid vent through a single point. Much
of the aluminum current collectors in each of the cells were melted and beaded up
on the sides of the pouch, or in fragments as a result of the measured temperatures
in excess of 750◦C melting the aluminum at 660◦C. Pouch material between cells in
every case was completely gone. However, the pouch material not directly between
adjacent cells typically remained intact.
Figure 2.25: 5-cell 10 Ah array, second cell teardown.
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2.3.0.5 Conclusions
This work compares the thermal runaway failures of pouch cells initiated by heaters
with those initiated by thermal runaway propagation from adjacent cells. These
differences are important for modeling cell failure in propagation, understanding the
hazards of propagation and conducting battery failure forensics. Cells which failed
after being slowly heated followed a slow process in which the cells gradually built up
internal pressure until the cell ruptures and light venting occurs. After further heat-
ing the cell reactions eventually become fast enough to build up internal pressure
rapidly, further rupture the cell and cause intense venting and rapid temperature
increase (self-heating). Damage from these cells show localized regions of heavy
damage where jets of hot material exit the cell. In contrast, cells initiated by prop-
agation have only a few seconds between the time they are at ambient temperature
and the time at which thermal runaway causes peak temperatures in the cell. This
causes them to fail differently. Since there is less time for them to heat up, these
cells do not have time to release gases by lightly venting before the intense runaway
event. Since the cell has not been fully preheated, the period of significant venting
and temperature increase lasts longer. Examination shows that the propagated cells
have less damage inside and gas is released out of a greater surface area. A much
great length of pouch seam failed in the propagated cells creating a larger vent area,
likely due to the speed and intensity of the runaway reactions. While the initiation of
runaway appears to occur at a random location near the center of the slowly heated
cell, in a propagated cell it appears to begin on the side being rapidly heated and
subsequently move across the cell to the other side.
These differences are important to notice for those who are trying to model and pre-
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dict the effects of thermal runaway in battery modules. Since the process of thermal
runaway is different for cells failing in propagation, it may be incorrect to apply single
cell experiment results to try to predict the response of arrays of many cells. From a
timing perspective, the single cell preheat period is much longer (which can be many
minutes) than the propagated cell preheat time period (only a few seconds). For
the period of intense venting, the single cell vents more quickly than a propagated
cell. In this experiment the single cell also vented gases before the intense runaway
venting period. Since the timing is different and the damage pattern is different, it
is likely that the species of the gases produced is also different. This is important to
note for safety designs. It may not be conservative or appropriate to design systems
to mitigate explosions using species data produced by single cell tests as the volume
and species produced by an array of cells is likely different.
The observation of major differences in damage between propagated cells and slower
heated cells is important for those trying to understand forensics and can be used to
identify how different cells are initiated. This work has illustrated different failure
patterns for heater versus propagated cell failure characteristics. Heater failed cells
have localized regions of heavy damage, while cells failed due to propagation have
a more uniform damage throughout. When combined with work illustrating other
failure patterns, this can be used to help determine which cell initiated thermal run-
away and how a failure incident began.
This work is useful to experimentalists in battery research. A major contribution of
this work is demonstrating the utility of using load cell clamping stress and gas pres-
sure data to monitor thermal runaway of both individual cells and cell arrays. Load
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cell clamping stress data is interesting and useful because it allows the experimenter
to observe the initiation of runaway in multiple cells using only one sensor. It also has
a much faster response than thermocouples. The load cell data provide insight into
the pressure generation within the cell associated with the various reaction steps.
Rising clamping stress is an indication of increasing reactions producing gas while
falling load cell clamping stresses are indicative of venting. Vessel gas pressure data
can be used to determine the time period over which cells are actively venting as
they undergo thermal runaway. It is also useful to identify the time period between
when one cell ends venting and the next one begins. Together with temperature
data, these can be used to more clearly define the induction or preheat time needed
to initiate runaway and the time it takes for runaway to travel through the cell.
This work also compares different sizes of similar pouch cells. The 10 Ah cells
which are 18 % thicker than the 5 Ah cells, had a total cell to cell propagation time
which is on average 33 % longer. Two mechanisms are believed to affect this time
difference. The first is a fundamental propagation speed which is associated with
the venting process. A convection-diffusion-reaction formalism was used to describe
this process. The preheat process scales with the overall thermal diffusivity of the
system. The combined effects of the vent and preheat processes are believed to




within a Module inside a
Compartment
In Chapter 2, the propagation of thermal runaway was characterized for a simple
1D system. However, many real systems are much more complex and involve 3d
geometry and heat transfer via radiation, convection and conduction. The objective
of this work is to characterize the thermal runaway propagation process for a more
complex commercially available energy storage module. To accomplish this objective,
we first perform experiments. Next the experimental results are analyzed to observe
the thermal runaway propagation process and its effects on the compartment. Then
the timing of the thermal runaway propagation process will be used to generate an
estimate of the gas release rate and heat release rate time histories. To validate the
gas release rate time history, it is used in a CFDmodel and the resulting temperatures
are compared with the actual experiments.
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3.1 Introduction
Lithium-ion battery technology is being rapidly and widely adopted to provide en-
ergy sources for consumer devices, electric vehicles and fixed location energy storage
systems. With the widespread use of this technology, comes increased exposure to
hazards from lithium-ion battery thermal runaway failure which causes rapid heat-
ing and the release of flammable and toxic gases. This can be especially dangerous
for large systems such as battery energy storage systems (BESS) which are used to
store energy to meet residential, commercial, industrial or utility electricity needs.
There are many studies documenting abuse conditions which can lead to thermal
runaway as well as the reactions which cause thermal runaway, these are reviewed
in a number of articles [43, 45, 46]. The largest consequences of thermal runaway
generally happen when many individual lithium-ion cells go into thermal runaway
in quick succession, causing a much larger release of gases than a single cell.
There have been very few large experiments involving entire systems documented
in the published literature. One of the earliest studies was in 2017 when DNVGL
performed a study for Consolidated Edison and NYSERDA. This study examines
NMC, LFP and other chemistries in experiments ranging from single cell to module.
They measured concentrations of gases produced, but this data is of limited use
without knowing the ventilation conditions. They also tried different suppression
methods[47].
Exponent and FM Global in cooperation with the NFPA Fire Protection Research
Foundation conducted a study examining sprinkler protection of energy storage sys-
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tems. In these experiments they performed experiments using single modules, six
modules and racks of batteries. The LNO/LMO rack system tested consisted of 16
modules and had a capacity of 82 kWh. The LFP rack system tested consisted of 16
modules and had a capacity of 125 kWh. For each system they compared sprinklered
systems with those that are allowed to burn freely. These tests were performed in a
well ventilated environment and were used to measure peak heat release rate as well
as temperatures and heat fluxes in and around the system [48, 49].
In 2019, DNVGL released a report focused on energy storage fire and explosion risks
for the maritime battery industry. This report measures vent gas compositions from
various cells using FTIR. They also perform larger system experiments and test a
number of different fire suppression methods[50].
Although much work has been done to characterize the failure of individual cells and
small arrays of small cells, much less has been done to characterize the behavior of
full-scale systems. A major challenge for system designers is characterizing the fire
and explosion hazards from system thermal runaway without having to destroy large
systems in experiments. A major objective of this study is to take results about the
flammable gas release for a single cell and to apply them to predict thermal runaway
behavior for a module in a compartment.
3.2 Experimental Setup and Model Development
For this study, single cell experiments were performed both in a burn structure com-
partment as well as in an inerted pressure vessel to understand the behavior of a
single failing cell. Three experiments are then conducted to observe compartment
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conditions in response to propagating thermal runaway in a module comprising 14
cells. One of these experiments uses a module in the open and two of them use the
same module placed in a non-combustible steel rack enclosure. Finally, a computa-
tional fluid dynamics (CFD) model is presented to predict compartment conditions
based on the experimentally measured mass loss due to plastic burning and the
timing of lithium-ion cell intense gas venting observations.
3.2.1 Burn Structure Setup and Instrumentation
All of the compartment experiments for this work were conducted in a burn structure
facility. The burn structure has interior dimensions of 5.7 m x 4.6 m with a ceiling
height of 2.17 m. The interior of the burn structure is constructed using 5/8" fire
resistant gypsum board. For these experiments the only major vent opening was
the door which remained open for the experiments. The burn structure is instru-
mented with 8 thermocouple trees containing 36 type T thermocouples and 2 type K
thermocouples. The burn structure also contains 28 directional flame thermometers
(DFTs) which are used to measure heat flux on the ceiling and on a portion of the
walls. The burn structure also has bidirectional probes to measures flows into and
out of the door by measuring differential pressure. A more complete description of
the burn structure facility is provided by Kurzawski [15].
3.2.2 Single Cell Open Air Experiment Setup
The cell used in these experiments is a NMC (Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide)
prismatic cell with a nominal minimum capacity of 94 Ah and a nominal average
capacity of 95.6 Ah. The cell has a nominal voltage of 3.68 V and a maximum
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charge voltage of 4.15 V. The cell is rectangular shaped with dimensions 173 mm x
125 mm x 45mm as shown in Figure 3.1. The cell has a mass of 2.01 kg. For single
cell experiments the cells were charged using a constant current, constant voltage
scheme with a maximum current of 10 A and a maximum voltage of 4.2V. Charging
was terminated when the current at 4.2V was less than 0.01C. The modules were
charged to 51.8 V using a similar process for the 14 cells in series.
Figure 3.1: Single 94 Ah Cell Dimensions and Photograph
Three experiments were conducted in open air in the burn structure compartment.
In the first experiment, the cell was heated from below using cartridge heaters em-
bedded in an aluminum block. For the other two experiments, the cell was heated on
one of the large faces using electric heaters which are cycled such that the heater-cell
interface heats at 5 ◦C/min.
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3.2.3 Single Cell Pressure Vessel Experimental Setup
To measure the volume and species of gases produced during thermal runaway, the
last single cell experiment was conducted in the 53.5 L LIB-VeGA (Lithium-Ion Bat-
tery Vent Gas Apparatus) pressure vessel at the University of Texas at Austin. This
apparatus and instrumentation is described in more detail by Kennedy et al [40].
The vessel was also used for the array experiments in Chapter 2. The vessel was
initially filled to atmospheric pressure with nitrogen. The cell was failed thermally
by heating one side of it at 5 ◦C/min with an electric heater. The pressure vessel
setup is shown in Figure 3.2. During the experiment, cell surface temperatures along
with gas temperatures throughout the vessel and vessel gas pressure are recorded.
After the experiment, 3 samples of the gas were collected and analyzed using a gas
chromatography thermal conductivity detector (GC-TCD) to determine the major
components of the gas mixture released by the battery. Gas was collected approxi-
mately 24 hours after thermal runaway to allow gas temperatures to cool and vapors
to condense to measure the total dry gas volume of the release. The GC-TCD unit
is calibrated to measure H2, N2, CO, CH4, C2H2, C2H4, C2H6, C3H6, C3H8 and
H2O. The GC-TCD peaks for C3H6 and C3H8 overlap and the sensitivity to each is
similar, so they are reported together.
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Figure 3.2: Single 94 Ah Cell in Pressure Vessel Prior to Experiment
3.2.4 Module and Rack Experiments Setup
Three experiments were completed using a full commercially available ESS module.
The module consists of 14 of the previously described cells which are housed inside
a polycarbonate casing and connected in series with aluminum tabs. On the front
of the module is a circuit board for module management, this however was removed
prior to experiment. This leaves the polycarbonate housing and the cells as the only
flammable materials in the setup. Thermal runaway was initiated using a heater on
the large face of a single cell similar to the single cell experiments. Each module
was disassembled to insert the heater on cell 1 and to place thermocouples on each
cell. A photo of the module along with the heater and thermocouples on the inside
is shown in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Module shown before opening and open with thermocouples placed on
each cell and heater placed on cell 1 for experiment.
The module was reassembled and placed on a stand for the first experiment and
placed inside a rack for two rack experiments. These experiments were conducted in
the same burn structure facility as the single cell experiments. Figure 3.4 shows the
module placed on a stand in the burn structure for the first experiment.
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Figure 3.4: Burn Structure Setup for Open Air Module Experiment
Two experiments were conducted with the module inside of a steel rack enclosure.
These experiments follow the same process as described previously with the only
exception that for these experiments the module is placed in a steel rack. The steel
rack is enclosed on 4 sides and on the top. The front of the rack has areas at the top
and bottom which allow air to flow in and out of the rack. Two steel rack-mount
server cases were used as dummy modules and placed above the module to simulate
the presence of other equipment in the rack without adding to the fuel load. These
steel server cases contained thermocouples to measure the exposure of above equip-
ment to module failure.
61
Figure 3.5: Burn structure setup for rack experiments. The back of rack was removed
to show module placement inside. Before the experiment, a steel sheet was placed
to cover the entire back as shown by the red dotted line.
3.3 Experiment Results
3.3.1 Single Cell Open Air Results
Three experiments were conducted in which a single cell goes into thermal runaway
in the middle of the burn structure compartment. For the first experiment with
a single cell in open air, the cell was heated with constant power cartridge heaters
placed in an aluminum block beneath the cell. The heaters were turned on full power
to initiate thermal runaway. Due to the uncontrolled nature of the heating in this
experiment the aluminum heater blocks ended up melting. This experiment caused
the cell to rupture as it went into thermal runaway. The cell ruptured and the metal
cell casing was thrown 2.3 meters across the room at about 8.7 m/s. The current
collectors and active material were thrown 2.3 meters to the opposite side of the
room where they burned.
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Figure 3.6: In the first single cell experiment, the cell ruptured and was thrown
across the compartment.
Since the investigation of catastrophic cell rupture is not a primary objective of this
work, the heating protocol was changed for all subsequent tests to avoid this outcome.
In the other two single cell experiments, the vent on the top of the cell opens to
relieve pressure when the temperature of the bottom of the cell is approximately 150
◦C. Figure 3.7 shows data from a representative experiment during the time at which
the vent opens and when intense venting occurs. This figure shows the temperatures
as measured on various surfaces of the battery along with the cell mass.
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Figure 3.7: Single Cell Temperatures and Mass at Time of Vent Opening and Intense
Venting
In this experiment the vent opens at 3753 seconds after the beginning of the experi-
ment as shown in Figure 3.7. When the vent opens, a small cloud of liquids and gases
is released as shown in Figure 3.8. Immediately after the vent opens, the decrease
in internal cell pressure causes a small decrease in the cell temperature as measured
on the cell surfaces and a larger decrease in the temperature of the gas immediately
above the vent, which is now mixed with ambient air. This temperature decrease
is shown at approximately 3760 seconds in Figure 3.7. In this experiment the gases
exiting the battery ignited at 4105 seconds and the resulting flame can be seen at
4108 seconds in Figure 3.8. In the other very similar single cell experiment, ignition
did not occur until after intense venting due to thermal runaway.
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Figure 3.8: Single Cell Vent Opening Sequence
For the experiment in Figure 3.7, the vent opened at 3753 seconds and intense
venting occurred 368 seconds later at 4121 seconds into the experiment. The other
experiment had a similar response, with intense venting occurring 292 seconds after
vent opening. Visually the intense venting process begins as a black turbulent jet.
This jet contains both flammable gases as well as hot solid particles which at first
causes intermittent ignition and later develops into a sustained jet flame. The in-
tense venting sequence for this experiment is shown in Figure 3.9.
65
Figure 3.9: Single cell intense venting event is marked by the release of a turbulent
plume of hot gases and solids which eventually ignite and form a jet flame.
Looking at the cell after the experiment, the pressure relief vent is seen to be open.
The metal cell casing is still intact, however it is noticeably bulging by about 10 mm
due to the pressure as shown in Figure 3.10. This bulging is significant because it
could allow a hot cell to touch adjacent cells. This would allow heat to conduct into
adjacent cells and could propagate the thermal runaway into other cells.
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Figure 3.10: Single Cell Bulging After Experiment
3.3.2 Single Cell Pressure Vessel Results
The experiment in the pressure vessel allows for the measurement of the gases ob-
served in the open experiments. This experiment was conducted using the same
heating protocol as the used for the other two successful single cell experiments that
didn’t result in cell rupture. The pressure vessel gas temperature and pressure was
used to determine the gas release rate and total volume released. This was done
using the same techniques as described in [40]. The cell released 221.6 L of dry gas
at standard pressure and temperature. Normalized by the nominal energy capacity
of the cell, the cell produced 0.64 liters of gas per Watt-hour of energy stored. The
volume fraction of each of the major species was measured by analyzing 3 samples
with the GC-TCD instrument and then taking the average and normalizing while
excluding the volume of nitrogen. The volume percentage by species of the gas re-








Propane or Propylene 2.0%
Ethane 1.8%
Other 1.6%
Table 3.1: Species Volume Percentage for gases released by NMC cell
The gas release rate is estimated based on the pressure and temperature time his-












































Figure 3.11: 94 Ah Prismatic Gas Release Rate
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3.3.3 Open Air Module Experiment
In the open air module experiment, the cell 1 as shown in Figure 3.3 was heated at 5
◦C per minute until the cell went into thermal runaway. After the first cell went into
thermal runaway, thermal runaway naturally propagated into the remaining cells.
The runaway propagation process was observed in audio, video, module and room
temperature data, cell voltages and mass data. Generally, the failure of the cells
inside the module appears to be similar to those of individual cells. Some of the
clearest indications of vent opening and intense venting events are in the audio and
video data of the event. Audio and video data indicate when the first cell vent opens
allowing pressure to be released. After 77 seconds, reactions inside the cell reach a
critical point and intense venting occurs in which a large amount of flammable gas
and other materials are ejected from the cell at high speed in a period of several
seconds. Figure 3.12 shows the intense venting period for cell 1 of the module.
Figure 3.12: Image sequence from video of cell 1 venting
The failure of each cell is observed to produce a short period of intense venting. The
beginning of each intense venting event was determined by observing the audio and
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video for the duration of the experiment. The intense venting events are noticeable in
the audio data as short periods of loud squealing or hissing. Figure 3.13 shows that
the audio amplitude clips during periods of intense venting. In the video, these same
periods are characterized by large, bright jet flames extending to the ceiling. Figure
3.14 shows the percentage of the video image that exceeds a brightness threshold.
The brightness threshold is set as a HSV value greater than or equal to 254 out of
255. In both Figures 3.13 and 3.14, identified intense venting events are marked with
a dashed vertical line. For the first 5 cells to go into thermal runaway, the intense
venting events are very easy to identify with audio and video. As the intensity of
the fire increases and more cells become involved it becomes more difficult to iden-
tify exactly when an intense venting event is occurring. It is clear however, that all
remaining have gone through thermal runaway by 2900 seconds.
Figure 3.13: Audio amplitude shows clipping during periods of intense venting. Start
of intense venting events are identified with dashed lines.
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Figure 3.14: Plot of percent of video image exceeding brightness threshold of value
≥ 254. Intense venting events are identified with dashed lines.
The voltage data turned out to be of little use because shortly into the experiment
the voltage wires were burned and shorted. The thermocouples attached to individ-
ual cells provided in Figure 3.15 give another perspective on the thermal runaway
propagation process. Cell temperature data shows that runaway started with cell 1
at 1891 seconds into the experiment and then progressed to cell 2 at 2032 seconds.
After the runaway of cell 2, the adjacent cell 3 as well as nearby cells 7,8 and 9
begin to heat significantly. As more cells go into thermal runaway it becomes more
difficult to tell which cell is in runaway and by 2600 seconds, all of the cells are very
hot and intense venting events become very frequent.
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Figure 3.15: Cell temperatures for 14 cells show thermal runaway initiate in cell 1
and propagate to cell 2. By 2600 seconds all cells experience high temperatures and
cells are going into thermal runaway in rapid succession.
It is also worth noting that throughout the course of the experiment, the attachment
of the thermocouples on the cells changes. At the beginning of the experiment each
thermocouple is taped to bare metal on the sides of each cell and the cells are enclosed
in the polycarbonate module housing. Thus at the beginning of the experiment, the
thermocouples are considered to measure the temperature of individual cells. By the
end of the experiment, the thermocouples are in a pile of cell wreckage as most of
the metal casings from the cells has melted and all that remains of the cells is the
burned insides. Also by the end of the experiment, much of the polycarbonate has
been consumed. Figure 3.16 shows the remains of the module after the experiment.
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Figure 3.16: Module remains after experiment
Mass loss data of the event is also a useful means to understand the thermal run-
away propagation process and also to observe the burning of solid materials like
polycarbonate. Figure 3.17 shows the change in mass throughout the course of the
experiment and 3.18 shows the mass loss rate. Initially there is negligible mass
change until the first period of intense venting. Due to the downward thrust of the
jet, this briefly appears as a mass gain for a couple seconds, before the scale registers
that this period of intense venting caused the first cell to lose about 915 grams of
mass in a period of about ten seconds. After this initial event, the jet flame from
the venting event caused sustained burning of the polycarbonate module housing.
This sustained burning introduces another source of mass loss. Polycarbonate burn-
ing continues to cause mass loss at a slow rate until at 2032 seconds the next cell
experiences intense venting. This causes an additional 900 grams of mass loss and
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results in visibly more burning in the video which can be seen as a higher mass loss

































































































Experimentally Measured Mass Loss
Points Used to determine Mass Loss Rate
Polycarbonate Integrated Mass Loss
Expected Cell Mass Loss
Polycarbonate + Expected Cell Mass Loss
Figure 3.17: Cell mass loss over time shows 0.9 kg drops in mass at the time of each
intense venting event. Cell intense venting events based on audio/video observations
are labeled.
Analysis of this mass loss data can be used to inform computational fluid dynam-
ics (CFD) model development of similar situations in which cells go into thermal
runaway and module plastic material burns. Taking the first derivative of mass loss
with respect to time produces a very noisy function which can be seen as the light
blue line Figure 3.18. This function is very noisy due in part to measurement noise
and also due to both large downward thrust and very fast mass loss as each cell
undergoes a brief period of intense venting.
74
To model this process, it is important to distinguish lithium-ion cell mass loss due
to intense venting from the mass loss associated with the burning of polycarbonate.
This can be done by recognizing that the mass loss due to cell venting occurs in a
very small window. As seen in the single pressure vessel experiment (Figure 3.11),
the gas release associated with cell venting lasts about 7 seconds. As seen in the
single cell in the open experiments (Figure 3.7), the period where most the cell mass
loss occurs goes from about 5 seconds before runaway until 15 seconds after. To
isolate polycarbonate mass loss from cell mass loss, points 5 seconds before and 15
seconds after each intense venting event are identified by audio and video indicators.
Once these points are selected, the mass loss rate is linearized between each of these
points. This process is used to generate the blue line shown in Figure 3.18. From this
line it is evident that the mass loss rate due to cell thermal runaway is an order of
magnitude greater than the mass loss rate due to polycarbonate burning. The poly-
carbonate burning rate can be approximated by using the mass loss rate between
venting events and linearly interpolating between them for the periods of venting
events. The mass loss rate of polycarbonate burning between intense venting events
is useful to understand the heat release during the experiment and can be used in










































































































-/x(Load Cell Mass Difference)
Mass Loss Rate Linearized by Selected Points
PC Mass Loss Rate
Figure 3.18: Cell mass loss rate as a function of time is very noisy with large spikes
during cell intense venting. Linearizing mass loss rate using points before and after
each runaway allows for the calculation of an average mass loss rate.
Temperatures and heat fluxes within the burn structure compartment were also
measured. Figure 3.23a summarizes the compartment temperatures and heat fluxes
during the course of the experiment. More detailed information can be found in
the Appendix. Gas temperatures are reported at four levels (Ceiling, upper, mid
and lower) on eight thermocouple trees. Heat flux measurements are taken at 16
points near the ceiling and also at 12 locations on the walls of the compartment
facing the module. Generally, both temperature and heat flux see peaks each time
a cell goes through intense venting. As an increasing number of cells go through
intense venting in rapid succession, this leads to a buildup in temperature towards
the latter half of the experiment. Since 8 of the ceiling level thermocouples are type
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T, a number of thermocouples record maximum values at 400 ◦C. However, in two
locations type K thermocouples are provided at the ceiling which shows that the
temperature indeed exceeds 400 ◦C. From this data it is shown that the thermal
runaway of just a single module in a compartment poses a significant fire hazard to
the building. Temperatures in the upper gas layer reached at least 446 ◦C and the
peak heat flux on the ceiling was 54 kW/m2. The peak heat flux on the walls located




































































































Figure 3.19: Experiment Compartment Temperatures
3.3.4 Rack Experiments Results
Two experiments were conducted using the same module placed inside a non-combustible
steel rack. In these experiments, the module generally behaved in a similar fashion.
The main difference between these experiments and the module in the open air ex-
periment, is that due to the large amount of gas released, often the gases burn as the
leave the top of the rack instead of immediately when they exit the module. This
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causes the compartment gas temperatures to be more stratified.
In the first rack experiment, the runaway of the first cell caused a deflagration which
made a loud bang and kicked up dust but did not cause overpressure damage. This
event is shown in Figure 3.20
Figure 3.20: Sequence of images from deflagration following first cell runaway in first
rack experiment.
The thermal runaway propagation within the module does appear similar. Figure
3.21 shows how many cells had failed in each experiment as a function of time, where
the X-axis has been adjusted such that the intense venting of the first cell occurs
at time 0. In this figure it can be seen that for all three modules, the final cell
had intense venting between 959 and 995 seconds after the venting of the first cell.
For all three experiments there was a large delay between the first and second cell
intense venting. As more cells go through intense venting, the delay between events
decreases. In all three experiments the last 3 cells undergo intense venting in a pe-
riod between 20 and 38 seconds.
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Figure 3.21: Number of Cells failed over time comparison for three different Exper-
iments.
The first rack experiment featured very dense thermocouple instrumentation of the
cells. Each cell had 3 thermocouples. Cell temperatures were recorded for both short
sides (East and West) of each cell as well as the cell vent for each cell. Locations
of the thermocouples are presented in Figure A.11 in the Appendix. Figure 3.22
summarizes the temperature data collected from all the cells. The first seven cells
are shown above and the next seven are shown below.
From this detailed data, it is apparent that the side temperatures of each cell do not
necessarily mimic each other. For example, at about 2200 s, the Cell 2 East tem-
perature and the Cell 9 West temperature both peak. This peak is not registered
on the Cell 2 West and Cell 9 East thermocouples. Since cells 2 and 9 are next to
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Figure 3.22: First Rack Experiment Cell Temperatures
one another, they are apparently both responding to heating occurring between the
two of them. Since these are surface measurements, they are naturally influenced by
gases surrounding them and multiple surface temperatures of the same cell can vary
significantly.
Even with more densely instrumented cell temperatures it can be difficult to tell
which cell is undergoing intense venting. It is more clear for the first several cells to
undergo intense venting. However as time progresses, eventually the entire module
becomes full of hot gases and cell side temperatures and vent temperatures are not
only indicative of a particular cell venting, but also are responding to neighboring
cell venting as well as the burning of polycarbonate all around the cells.
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3.4 Computational Fluid Dynamics Model
3.4.1 Model Setup
Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models of the module in open air and the
module in a rack were created using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS). FDS is a
Large Eddy Simulation CFD code created by NIST to model fires[51]. The particu-
lar geometry and material properties in the CFD model were based off the models
developed by Kurzawski [15] who did extensive work developing the burn structure
facility and CFD models to model it.
The domain of the CFD model includes the interior of the entire burn structure and
a small region in front of the open door. The walls are modeled as obstructions with
the thermal properties of the walls and the external boundary conditions are open
on the sides outside the door. The model uses a grid size of 0.15 m.
The heat release rate in the model comes from the combination of flammable gases
released by cells in thermal runaway and burning of the polycarbonate module.
In the model, the heat release is represented by two different vents which release
flammable gas. One vent is used to represent the hot flammable gas release from the
lithium-ion cells in thermal runaway. This vent releases hot gases due to thermal
runaway based on the gas species, volume and release rate that are measured from
the single cell pressure vessel experiment. The temperature of the released gases is
based on measured temperatures at the vent during the single cell in burn structure
81
experiments. In the model, this gas release occurs at the time of each intense venting
event observed in the video and audio of the experiment.
The other vent releases gas corresponding to the heat release due to the polycarbon-
ate burning. The gas release rate for this vent is based on measured mass loss of the
module as described previously.
Once the polycarbonate mass loss rate and the heat release rate due to thermal
runaway of batteries was estimated, then it was possible to build a CFD model of
the event. Two different versions of the CFD model were created. In the Equivalent
HRR FDS Model the combustion of polycarbonate and lithium-ion battery vent gas
is approximated by using methane with the same heat release rate time history. In
the Battery Gas FDS Model, a more complex model is developed which models the
combustion of polycarbonate and battery vent gas using the properties of each ma-
terial. In this model the unique combustion characteristics of each type of fuel was
developed and used.
3.4.2 Model Results
3.4.2.1 Open Air Module Experiment
For temperature predictions inside the compartment both models perform fairly well.
Figure 3.23 compares the compartment temperatures for the CFD model with the
open air module experiment. In the models as well as the experiment, the temper-
ature time history shows the same trend, in which the temperature increase spikes
occur shortly after each runaway event. The increased frequency of runaway events
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later in the experiment lead to significant temperature increases. One notable differ-
ence between the experiment values and the model predictions is that in the model
each gas layer has largely the same temperature at any given time. In contrast, in the





















































































































































































































































































































(c) Equivalent HRR FDS Model Model Temperature and Heat Fluxes
Figure 3.23: Experiment and model results from open air module experiment
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Figure 3.24 compares the experimentally-measured and model-generated tempera-
tures in the compartment for the Battery Gas FDS model. In Figure 3.24a maximum
temperatures are compared for each thermocouple. In Figure 3.24b the entire time
history of temperatures is compared.
(a) Comparison of maximum compartment
gas temperatures for each location
(b) Comparison of all compartment gas tem-
peratures over time
Figure 3.24: Comparison of compartment gas temperatures for model and experi-
ment
The actual experiment exhibited greater spread in lower and mid level gas temper-
atures than the model. The model shows temperatures as generally more stratified.
In the model the thermocouples at each layer have values very close to one another.
In the experiment, temperatures near the module are higher even at lower elevations.
The contour plots in Figure 3.25 shows how in the model high temperatures stay up
high, while in the experiment higher temperatures exist at lower levels in the region
closest to the module. This difference seems to be due to greater mixing occurring
in the experiment than what is accounted for by the model.
Figure 3.26 compares experiment and model gas concentrations in the upper layer
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Figure 3.25: Contours of temperature for experiment and model for a slice taken
along thermocouple tree plane near door. Module location shown by black box.
away from the module. Generally, both models performed well at predicting gas
concentrations in the compartment. Since the Battery Gas Model takes into account
the fact that a significant fraction of the released gas is carbon dioxide, it provides
better predictions for carbon dioxide concentrations than the Equivalent HRR Model
which assumes that all heat release is due to burning methane. However, since they









































































































O2 - Battery Gas Model
O2 - Equivalent HRR Model
.
CO2 - Experiment
CO2 - Battery Gas Model
CO2 - Equivalent HRR Model
Figure 3.26: Comparison of experiment gas concentration measurement with con-
centrations predicted by battery gas CFD model and equivalent HRR model.
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3.4.2.2 Rack Experiments
The same technique used to produce the open module CFD model was used for the
rack experiments. These CFD models used the time of runaway data from the rack
experiments. However, they used the polycarbonate mass loss rate from the open
air module experiment because it was not measured for these experiments. Since the
Battery Gas FDS model performs better, only it will be presented here. Predicted
temperatures throughout the compartment are compared for the FDS model and the
experiment. Temperatures are shown in Figure 3.27 for the first rack experiment and
Figure A.20 for the second rack experiment. These temperature predictions show
the same trends as those for the open module experiment.
Figure 3.28 compares the experimentally-measured and model-generated tempera-
tures in the compartment. In Figure 3.28a maximum temperatures are compared
for each thermocouple. In Figure 3.28b the entire time history of temperatures is
compared. Temperature predictions are slightly better for the rack CFD models
than for the open air module CFD model. This can be seen in Figures 3.27 and
3.28b. For the rack experiments, the spread in the measured temperatures for the
mid and lower gas temperatures is greatly reduced. Since the rack chimneys most of
the flame directly onto the ceiling, the gas temperature of the compartment is more














































































































































































(b) FDS CFD Model Temperature and Heat Fluxes
Figure 3.27: Experiment and model results from first rack experiment
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(a) Comparison of maximum compartment
gas temperatures for each location
(b) Comparison of all compartment gas tem-
peratures over time




This chapter has examined thermal runaway propagation using commercially avail-
able ESS modules in a compartment. Multiple failure outcomes were observed for a
single cell exposed to heating. Under one heating condition, the cell ruptured and
was thrown across the room while in other circumstances the vent activates and
releases pressure. Single cells were failed to characterize the gas release rate, gas
species, temperature and mass changes associated with thermal runaway of a cell.
Cells were observed to bulge after thermal runaway. For cases in which air gaps
between cells is small (such as in the module tested), this bulging can allow failed
cells to come into contact with adjacent cells.
A commercially available ESS module was tested for thermal runaway propagation.
After heating a single cell to thermal runaway, thermal runaway propagated and
eventually caused all 14 cells to experience thermal runaway. Some of the clearest
indications of intense venting due to thermal runaway are through audio and video.
Visually, intense venting is observed as jet flames which can reach the ceiling and
cover a significant fraction of the image with nearly overexposed pixels due to high
brightness. The audio indicates cell intense venting through squealing, hissing and
roaring noises which are of sufficient amplitude to cause audio clipping. For these
cells and modules, intense venting due to runaway can be identified in mass data as
short periods (∼ 15 sec) in which approximately 0.9 kg is lost. Mass loss rate can
also be used to estimate module plastic material burning rates.
The same module was tested for thermal runaway propagation inside a rack en-
closure. Cell surface temperatures and cell vent temperatures provide additional
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information about the runaway propagation process but can be very difficult to in-
terpret. The same cells may have very different temperatures on opposite surfaces
and cell surface and vent temperatures may be strongly influenced by nearby cell
failures as well flaming combustion.
Single cell gas release, the timing of cell thermal runaway intense venting and plastic
mass loss rate can be used to develop a heat release or gas release time history for
a module. This time history can be used to develop a CFD model of the event and
to predict temperatures, heat fluxes and gas concentrations within a compartment.
The model performs well at predicting temperatures throughout the compartment
with the exception that near the module the model predicted more stratification
than occurred in the experiment. The model is also useful for prediction of heat
fluxes and gas concentrations in the compartment.
Future work is needed to develop models which will allow the prediction of the time of
thermal runaway for each cell. These models will need to account for heat transfer
to each cell and the runaway process in each cell. Based on these experiments,
there are many challenges to getting such models to behave properly. A major
challenge with such models is trying to characterize the geometry inside the module.
Throughout the course of the experiment the module changes significantly. At the
beginning, there are 14 cells each separated by about 8 mm air gap and surrounded
by a polycarbonate housing. At the end of the experiment the geometry has changed
significantly as the cells have swelled and melted and are all touching in the end.
The polycarbonate housing geometry also changes significantly as in the end much
of it has been consumed. These changes in geometry will make it more difficult to
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Although explosions of lithium-ion battery vent gas are very dangerous and are of
great interest, there have been very few published experiments involving battery gas
explosions. Larsson observed gas explosions after failing lithium-ion cells in thermal
runaway using an oven[52]. The FAA encountered some explosions unintentionally
during a number of fire tests involving batteries. In one experiment, 4800 123A small
lithium metal cells were exposed to fire in a compartment of an aircraft and the fire
was controlled with Halon. Initially thermal runaway propagated but explosion was
avoided due to Halon activation and low oxygen levels. Towards the end of the ex-
periment, Halon concentration approached zero and oxygen levels increased. Then
a single cell in thermal runaway ignited flammable gases and caused an explosion.
The explosion blew open the floorboards, damaged the cockpit bulkhead and threw
the cockpit door into the cockpit[53].
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In another experiment the FAA tested a fire resistant cargo container which con-
tained 5000 lithium-ion 18650 LCO cells packaged in boxes. They initiated thermal
runaway on a single cell and allowed runaway to propagate throughout. In this
experiment an aerosol fire-extinguishing agent was activated 20 minutes into the
experiment when smoke was first detected. At this time the oxygen in the room
dropped drastically. Over time oxygen levels increased in the container until at 45
minutes into the experiment, an explosion occurred and blew open the container’s
doors[53].
These two experiments demonstrate the danger of lithium-ion battery explosions.
Due to the added danger and complexity of lithium-ion explosion experiments, in-
tentional lithium-ion battery explosion experiments are largely absent from the lit-
erature. Engineers performing work for battery system manufacturers have observed
explosions, but manufacturers are not keen to share these publicly.
In this section a number of explosion experiments are described. The intent of these
experiments is to observe the process leading up to an explosion. One of the goals
of these experiments is to better understand the explosion hazard that firefighters
may face when confronting lithium-ion battery hazards in a small space such as a
closet. Since a closet is a small volume, it is possible for even a small amount of
lithium-ion batteries to produce an explosion. Battery systems ranging from laptops
to scooters, e-bikes and even home energy storage systems can be increasingly found
in home closets.
The end goal of this experiment series was to develop a closet-sized explosion exper-
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(a) 1 ft steel cube experi-
ment setup
(b) Cardboard box experi-
ment setup (c) Closet experiment setup
Figure 4.1: Three experiment setups used for various scales of explosion experiments.
iment. To accomplish this, several smaller explosion setups were built for various
scales of explosion experiment. A steel cube explosion setup was constructed which
measures 1 ft x 1 ft x 1 ft (0.31 m x 0.31 m x 0.31 m). A cardboard box explosion
setup was used as a low-cost intermediate scale setup and for field demonstrations
at fire departments in Hawaii and Arizona. The cardboard box has dimensions of
22 in x 22 in x 21 in (0.56 m x 0.56 m x 0.53 m). Finally, a full-size closet setup was
constructed with gypsum walls and wooden framing to conduct larger experiments.
Figure 4.1 shows the three experiment setups used for this series of experiments.
4.2 Experiment Support Systems
Ignition, gas measurement, gas collection, and control systems were developed.
These systems were used at every scale of experiment. The execution of the smaller
experiments gave opportunities to test and improve these systems in preparation for
the larger closet experiment.
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4.2.1 Ignition System
A simple ignition system was built to allow the remote ignition of the battery gases
for explosion experiments. The ignition system is based on a Beckett 5177U trans-
former which has a 20 kV peak rating and a 35 mA RMS current. The arc is formed
with Beckett 5780 electrodes separated by a gap of about 10 mm. The connection
from the transformer to the electrodes uses 18 gauge high voltage wire with a 42 kV
rating. The system is shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Igniter system consists of electrodes, high voltage wire and high voltage
transformer.
4.2.2 Gas Measurement Systems
4.2.2.1 Gas Filtration, Pumping and Collection Systems
Gas filtration, pumping and collection systems were designed and built to allow the
capture and measurement of gases during explosion experiments. These systems ex-
tract gas from the explosion compartment, filter out particulate matter and pump
the gas into gas sensors and/or a foil bag for collection.
To accomplish this, the gases must first be pumped out and filtered. A series of four
filters are used to remove particulates from the gases. The first level of filtering is
done using a steel mesh over the gas intake and steel wool inside the intake. This
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removes the largest particles and helps to prevent deflagrations from propagating
into the sensor and collection systems. A series of 3 filters then removes the smaller
particles. The first filter is a 51 micron fuel filter, the second filter is a 0.5 micron
air filter and the final filter is a multipurpose filter that removes particles down to
0.01 microns in air. The filters and pumps are connected with 1/4" ID, 3/8" OD
soft PVC tubing. The first two filters are extremely low cost and rapidly accumulate
material so they are replaced after each experiment. The final filter is a higher
quality filter that provides the level of filtration needed to protect the gas sensors
and GC instrument. After the gases are filtered, they are clean enough and cool
enough to pass through the pump. The 12V DC pump used is shown in Figure 4.4.
After passing through the pump, the gases pass through the custom BlastDAQ gas
sensor box described in Section 4.2.2.3. After passing through the gas sensors, the
gas is either exhausted or pushed into gas bags for collection.
Figure 4.3: Filtering is accomplished by connecting low-cost disposable 51 micron
and 0.5 micron filters in series with a 0.01 micron filter
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Figure 4.4: Pump used to extract gas samples
After passing through the sensors, the gas can be saved in a gas bag for later analysis
with a gas chromatograph. This is accomplished by using a manifold and a series of
solenoids which are operated to control whether the gas enters a designated bag or
is exhausted. Manifold and solenoid setups were built to allow for three gas bags to
be collected on one sensor line and a single gas bag to be collected for another. For
the three-bag manifold, three normally-closed solenoids are used to control gas entry
to each of the the bags. At the end of the manifold is a normally-open solenoid that
allows the exhaust of gas when gas bags are not filling. In normal operation, the
pump runs continuously and the exhaust solenoid is open to allow gas to flush the
sampling line and filters. When a sample is taken, the exhaust solenoid is closed and
the appropriate gas bag is opened to fill the bag. After between 8 and 15 seconds,
the 0.5 L gas bag is full and the gas bag solenoid is closed and the exhaust solenoid
is opened again. The manifold is designed such that the continuous flushing out
the exhaust solenoid avoids the dilution of gas samples. The single bag manifold
operates with one normally-closed valve which operates the gas bag along with one
normally-open valve which allows for exhaust flushing. In the single bag configura-
tion the two solenoids are wired together in parallel for easy control.
The gas bags are 0.5 liter multi-layer foil bags which are designed to contain gas
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Figure 4.5: Manifold and solenoids used to control flow into gas bags.
samples. A concern with gas bags is the ability to hold gas samples over a long
period without the escape of light gases such as hydrogen. Testing with a sample of
battery gas showed that over the course of three days the hydrogen concentration
changed by less than 1 % volume when taking repeated samples from the same bag.
This gives confidence the bags can be used to analyze samples taken the previous day.
4.2.2.2 Gas Chromatography
After the gases are collected in the foil gas bags, their composition is analyzed (in
the laboratory) using a Shimadzu GC-204 gas chromatograph thermal conductiv-
ity detector (GC-TCD). The gas chromatograph is calibrated to measure hydrogen,
oxygen, methane, ethylene, ethane, propane, methane, carbon monoxide, carbon
dioxide, oxygen, nitrogen and water. For the cells analyzed, this provides informa-
tion for about 98% of the gas generated by the cell. When battery vent gas is mixed
with air in an explosion compartment, the percentage of known gases is even greater.
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4.2.2.3 BlastDAQ - NDIR and Electrochemical Sensor System
A custom internet of things (IOT) enabled sensor system was developed to facilitate
the collection of gas concentration data. The system is built around a circuit board
that I designed for this specific application. The circuit board features two ADCs
(analog-digital converters), 4 thermocouple reading circuits and 3 circuits to control
on-off operation of DC powered accessories. The circuit board design and final man-
ufactured product are shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7.
Figure 4.6: Custom designed printed circuit board can control DC powered devices
and measure temperature and gas concentration.
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Figure 4.7: Custom designed printed circuit board to measure temperature, gas
concentration and to control DC power devices.
To create a complete system, the custom printed circuit board was combined with
other components and placed in a steel housing. The system uses a Raspberry Pi
single board computer running Raspbian as the central control unit for the system.
The final system also includes the oxygen sensor, NDIR sensor, a power supply and
hardware and tubing to direct the gas flow across the sensors.
Figure 4.8: Gas Sensor Box with ports for gas sensing, thermocouples and power
control.
102
Oxygen concentration is measured using a MaxTec Max-13 electrochemical sensor as
shown in Figure 4.9a. The custom-built circuit board contains the circuitry and an
analog-digital converter to measure the voltage on the sensor. Since electrochemical
sensors are known to drift, each time the Raspberry Pi boots up it automatically
calibrates the oxygen sensors for ambient oxygen concentration. This automatic
calibration proved to be very effective for providing accurate oxygen measurements
during experiments.
(a) Electrochemical Oxygen Sensor (b) IR15TT-R NDIR Sensor
Figure 4.9: Gas sensors used in BlastDAQ System
The flammable gases and carbon dioxide in the battery vent gas are measured with a
SGX SensorTech IR15TT-R non-dispersive infrared sensor attached to a SGX Sen-
sorTech EK-2 breakout board. This sensor is designed to measure methane and
carbon dioxide gases by measuring changes in infrared absorbance of the gas. The
sensor contains a lamp which is pulsed. The infrared absorbance of the gas is then
measured using three detectors. The reference detector is not sensitive to any specific
gas and responds in a sinusoidal pattern at the same frequency as the lamp. The
active detector for carbon dioxide responds similarly with the exception that in the
presence of carbon dioxide it will have decreased amplitude. The active detector for
methane also works in the same manner. However, since many hydrocarbons have
similar to absorbance to methane, the methane sensor will respond to any hydrocar-
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bon gas.
The NDIR gas sensors were calibrated by flowing 99% purity methane, carbon-
dioxide and nitrogen over the sensors and following the manufacturer recommended
process to calibrate both zero and span (100 %) values.
When the system is plugged in, a custom python program running on the Raspberry
Pi first checks for updates and then begins running the data collection process. The
script saves the gas sensor data as a CSV and also publishes the data using the
Thingsboard IOT protocol. A laptop is used as server to receive the data and is
used to store and analyze the data from all the gas sensors. The laptop hosts a web
interface which allows users to view data in real-time as well process and analyze
data afterwards. The Thingsboard interface is shown in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10: Internet of Things Dashboard for Real-time Data Collection System.
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4.2.2.4 Gas Sensor System Testing Experiments
Seven gas sensor measurements from 2 steel cube experiments and 2 cardboard box
experiments were used to test gas sensor performance and compare it against the
gas chromatograph. For this process cells were put into thermal runaway in either
the steel cube or the cardboard explosion apparatus as previously described. Gases
were continuously pumped through the filters and into the NDIR and electrochemi-
cal sensors. For each experiment at one or two points in time a sample was collected
by diverting the sensor vent flow into a gas bag. This was done at various points in
time including immediately after runaway, 20 seconds after runaway, minutes after
runaway and also after the explosion event. Gas samples were then analyzed using
gas chromatography.
Figure 4.11 compares the results from the NDIR and electrochemical sensors when
compared against the same samples later analyzed using gas chromatograph. For
this comparison the electrochemical measurement of oxygen and the NDIR measure-
ment of carbon dioxide are compared directly against the gas chromatograph values
from the gas bag samples. Since the NDIR methane sensor is sensitive to wide ar-
ray of hydrocarbons, the NDIR methane value is compared against the sum of all
flammable gases measured using GC.
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of NDIR and electrochemical sensor measurements with
GC analysis performed on gas bag samples.
In Figure 4.11 it can be seen that the electrochemical oxygen sensor values were very
close to those measured by GC. The NDIR carbon-dioxide sensor also performed rea-
sonably well. The methane sensor gives readings exceeding 100 % methane because
it is sensitive to a broad array of hydrocarbons. The intent is to use it as a proxy for
the flammable gases released by a cell. The measured methane concentration does
correlate with the sum of flammable gases measured by the GC although it does
not perform nearly as well as the oxygen and carbon dioxide sensors. When used
together these three sensors can provide insight into the mixture of gases present
inside the explosion compartment. The oxygen value is informative as to how much
air is present. The methane value is correlated with the amount of flammable gas
released by the lithium-ion cell. And the carbon dioxide measurement is due to
both carbon dioxide released directly by the cell as well as carbon dioxide formed by
combustion.
4.2.3 Control System
A remotely-operated control system was developed to control the experiments. The
system allows for manual control of the system as well as scripts and automatic PID
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control. The system provides control to AC and DC outputs which control every
aspect of the experiment. The first version of the control box contained seven 12V
DC outputs and four 120V AC outputs and is shown in Figure 4.12.
Figure 4.12: First version of control box used to control AC and DC outputs to run
experiment.
The final version of the control box contains eleven DC outputs operating at 12V
and five AC outputs operating at 120V. Each output is individually fused at 10A to
ensure that the overload of any single circuit due to melting or fire would not trip
breakers causing the entire system to go down.
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Figure 4.13: The control box consists of a single board computer, relays and power
supplies needed to remotely control AC and DC systems used in the operation of an
experiment.
The processing in the control box is done by a Raspberry Pi 4 single board com-
puter. The Raspberry Pi GPIO ports are connected to 16 relays which can be used
to control the AC and DC outputs. A 12V power supply provides DC power to the
DC outputs. A 5V DC-DC voltage regulator is used to power the Raspberry Pi.
The Raspberry Pi runs the Raspbian operating system and uses Mycodo software.
Mycodo is an open source software project that provides a web interface and frame-
work for the Raspberry Pi to interact with inputs and outputs[54]. For this project
Mycodo is configured to operate all of the AC and DC outputs connected to the
relays which are connected to the Raspberry Pi’s GPIO pins.
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Figure 4.14: Mycodo web interface which allows for remote control of AC and DC
outputs.
The AC and DC outputs in Mycodo can be controlled manually, controlled using
a PID process or controlled automatically using scripts. For experiments that were
highly repeated such as the cardboard box experiments, scripts were used to au-
tomate the collection of gas samples. For most other experiments the system was
operated manually. Even when manually operated, the Mycodo system allows for
the logging of output actions.
4.2.4 Small Steel Cube Setup
Early experiments were conducted in the 1 ft x 1 ft x 1 ft (0.31 m x 0.31 m x 0.31 m)
steel cube. This cube has steel walls on all sides except for one which is a window.
The top of the cube is made of plastic and fastened only on one edge, allowing it to
open up to release pressure during an explosion. The explosion cube with a battery
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setup inside of it is shown in Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.15: 1’ x 1’ x 1’ (0.31 m x 0.31 m x 0.31 m) Explosion cube enclosure with
cell clamping and heating setup
High speed video of the explosion process is recorded using a GoPro video camera.
Gas temperatures are measured at two locations, just above the cells and in the
center of the box.
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4.2.5 Cardboard Box Experiment Setup
A low-cost, disposable explosion setup was devised to perform intermediate experi-
ments and also to be able to perform explosion demonstrations to help firefighters
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understand lithium-ion battery hazards. The disposable setup is made using a heavy-
duty extra large cardboard box with dimensions of 22 in x 22 in x 21 in (0.56 m x
0.56 m x 0.53 m). The cardboard box was closed off on one side with a clear shower
curtain that allowed us to see into the box. When the explosion occurs, the shower
curtain is ruptured.
Figure 4.16 shows the cardboard box with various systems connected inside. The
cardboard box experiments made use of the gas measurement, ignition and control
systems previously described. Cardboard box experiments also used 120mm 12V
DC computer fans to promote mixing inside the box. In these experiments arrays of
18.5 Ah cells were failed using a similar setup as that used for the 5 Ah cells.
Figure 4.16: Cardboard Box explosion enclosure with fan, gas sampling, igniter and
cell and heater setup.
4.2.6 Closet Experiment Setup
Two full-scale experiments were done using a commercially available lithium-ion cell
in a closet. The experiment is demonstrative of the types of issues faced when ana-
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lyzing explosion hazards of lithium-ion battery systems. In these experiments a cell
is heated until runaway. After sufficient gas has accumulated for an explosion, the
mixture can be ignited manually and the resulting pressure and impulse are mea-
sured. Temperature is measured throughout the compartment using thermocouples.
This setup uses a full-size closet which was constructed for full-scale explosion ex-
periments. The closet is built out of 2x4 and 2x6 lumber and the walls are covered
in 5/8" (16mm) fire resistant drywall. The closet is located inside of a steel shipping
container, as shown in Figure 4.17. The closet is 1.11 m wide, 1.19 m deep and 2.13
m tall and has a volume of 2800 L. The door to the closet is 0.61 m wide and made
from 1/2" (13mm) drywall which fails and opens during an explosion event.
Figure 4.17: Image showing the size, position and appearance of the closet in the
shipping container.
A number of systems support the closet experiments. An Omega PX-309 pressure
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transducer is installed in the north wall of the structure to measure the pressure-time
history inside the closet. Pressure data is recorded at 1000 Hz using a MC Measure-
ment Computing USB-204 12-Bit, 500 kS/s USB DAQ device. Temperatures are
recorded at 5 hz with a Graphtec DAQ system. The closet has 11 thermocouples
inside of it to measure gas temperatures at various points within the closet. Thermo-
couples trees are created by attaching thermocouples to cables which are anchored
to the floor and ceiling. Additional thermocouples are attached to the battery cell.
The two thermocouple trees and the positions of each thermocouple are shown in
Figure 4.18.
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Figure 4.18: Closet thermocouples are hung off a wire near the center and a wire
offset from a corner.
Two igniter systems use high voltage transformers to produce an arc to cause igni-
tion inside the closet. One igniter system uses fixed electrodes from an oil-burning
heater. The other igniter uses a Jacob’s ladder which is hanging from the ceiling.
The Jacob’s ladder consists of two wires which hang close to each other. The wires
support a brick which ensures that they are under a constant amount of tension.
The wires vary in distance from each other. The high voltage from the igniter trans-
former is applied to the wires. An arc forms at the location where the wires are
closest together. This arc causes heating in the air immediately above it, which then
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(a) Spark Igniter (b) Jacob’s Ladder Igniter
Figure 4.19: Closet igniter system uses both a fixed gap spark igniter and a Jacob’s
ladder igniter
weakens its dielectric strength. Since the dielectric strength is now less in the air
above, the arc moves upwards. This allows for an arc to begin at a set location and
then move upwards a foot (0.3 m) or so depending on the arrangement of the wires.
This ignition setup makes it possible to provide ignition sources at multiple locations
along a line using a single device.
Multiple cameras are used to monitor and record the experiment. Four security
cameras provide live views on the inside and outside of the structure. In addition,
two GoPro cameras placed in windows in the walls of the closet are used to record
the explosion at 120 fps. Since the experiment is contained in a closed closet, lighting
is also provided by a light on the floor of the closet and another pointing in through
one of the camera windows. Figure 4.20 shows some of the systems installed in the
closet.
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Figure 4.20: Equipment inside of closet experiment includes thermocouples, gas
sampling pipes, cameras and igniter systems
The control of systems is performed using the custom-developed control box de-
scribed in section 4.2.3. For this experiment, the control box controls 2 lights, 2
igniters, the cell heater as well as 4 pumps and 6 solenoids used for the NDIR gas
measurement and gas bag sample systems. The control box is accessed remotely
using a web browser and Wi-Fi during the experiment.
Gas composition in the compartment is measured using continuously running NDIR
(Non-Dispersive Infrared) and electrochemical gas sensors as described in Section
4.2.2.3. The NDIR sensors are used to measure carbon dioxide and hydrocarbon
volume fractions as a function of time at various fixed locations in the compartment.
The electrochemical sensor is used to measure oxygen volume fraction as a function
of time at those same locations. The NDIR and electrochemical sensors are useful
for getting an approximate composition and seeing how it varies over space and time.
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4.3 Experiment Results
4.3.1 Steel Cube Experiment Results
In total, five experiments were done in the small steel explosion box. These ex-
periments were useful in understanding the nature of the explosion process. They
were also useful in testing the gas bag sampling system, the NDIR gas measure-
ment system, the ignition system and the control system. These experiments were
also important in gaining experience preparing and running an explosion experiment.
This section describes in detail the results of one of these experiments. In this
experiment a clamping setup with heater is placed to fail pouch cells. This setup is
the same as the setup used in Section 2.3.0.1 with the five 5 Ah pouch cells placed
inside. The setup consists of a heater, calcium silicate insulation and aluminum
blocks used to clamp the five cells as shown in Figure 4.21. In an attempt to block
immediate ignition, the setup is surrounded in steel mesh.
Figure 4.21: Aluminum blocks clamping calcium silicate insulation and 5 pouch cells
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In the experiment, the heater is turned on and heats the first pouch cell until it is
turned off manually when the first cell goes into thermal runaway. Figure 4.22 shows
the sequence of images captured as the cell goes into thermal runaway and causes
a gas explosion in the box. In the first image, the first cell can be seen venting a
grey cloud. Less than 100 ms after the beginning of venting, the cell begins to eject
hot particles. The steel mesh was not effective in blocking these particles. Less than
100 ms after the ejection of hot material, the hot material ignites released gases.
From this point the flame propagates until eventually the flame travels throughout
the entire cube, creating an overpressure sufficient to open the lid on the top of
the cube. This entire process occurred in less than 1 second from the beginning of
thermal runaway intense venting.
Figure 4.22: Sequence of images from first second after thermal runaway
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A graph of the temperatures from the experiment and images at key times in the
experiment are shown in Figures 4.23 and 4.24. As the first cell vents and causes
the gas in the cube to burn, the heat propagates into the next cell causing it to go
into thermal runaway. The runaway of the second cell did not trigger an explosion.
An igniter was manually activated 18 seconds after the first runaway. In this case
the ignition didn’t cause a deflagration inside the cube sufficient to open the lid,
but instead ignited a diffusion flame on the top of the cube. This diffusion flame
was extinguished manually with nitrogen gas at about 65 seconds. At 156 seconds
a lighter was used to try to attempt to light the vapors coming out of the top of
the cube, to check if the mixture was still flammable. The mixture was still fuel-
rich, and once again a diffusion flame burned on the top surface of the cube. This
shows that at this point the mixture inside still had enough fuel to be flammable
but not enough air to burn inside the cube. This diffusion flame was extinguished
using nitrogen again at 175 seconds. At 206 seconds a lighter was used for igni-
tion again and this time the mixture inside the cube had enough fuel and oxygen
for a flame to propagate inside the cube. A slow flame crawled through the cube
but did not burn fast enough to cause the lid to open like it did for the first explosion.
Figure 4.23: Temperature of gas in cube just above cells and near the top of the box.
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Figure 4.24: Sequence of images for events after explosion
This experiment demonstrates the complexity of the lithium-ion battery fire and ex-
plosion hazard. The batteries provide both a flammable gas source and an ignition
source. However, in this case the ignition source was not observed to be reliable.
This could be because the later cells failed differently than the first cell. It could
also be because parts of the cube may have become oxygen deficient. It is also
possible the the steel mesh intended to prevent ignition became more effective as it
became clogged with particles. The cells did each vent flammable gas with about the
same time delay between cells as observed in the 5 Ah array experiments in Section 2.
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It is useful to keep track of the flammability of the gases in the compartment. Initially
as the first cell goes into thermal runaway there was a localized region of flammable
gas that was mixed appropriately with air to produce an explosion. The explosion
consumed some of the fuel and produced a large volume of inert products. Shortly
after the second cell releases gas, the activation of the igniter and the resulting
diffusion flame is evidence that the gas mixture still contains fuel but is oxygen
deficient except near the top where it has mixed with air. The later part of the
experiment with repeated extinction and re-ignition demonstrates that even after
minutes and repeated extinguishment with inert gas, the mixture has enough fuel to
propagate a flame when mixed with air. The final ignition event that causes a slow
flame to burn throughout the container is evidence that there is still enough fuel
to burn and that it has finally been mixed with enough air to burn throughout the
entire container. The slow propagation of this flame is evidence that at this point
the mixture is suboptimal and results in a lower flame speed.
4.3.2 Cardboard Experiment Results
Eleven explosion experiments were conducted using a cardboard box setup. The
cardboard box was also used for explosion demonstrations to educate firefighters in
Hawaii and Arizona of battery system explosion hazards. These experiments allowed
us to further test the gas bag sampling, NDIR and ignition systems and also gave
us a chance to scale up to larger cells.
These experiments were conducted using 18.5 Ah LCO cells. Prior to these exper-
iments, an array of five such cells was tested in the pressure vessel. The pressure
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vessel experiment was used to measure the quantity and species of gases produced.
The runaway of five 18.5Ah cells produced 118.2 L of gas, which is 23.6 L per cell or







Propane or Propylene 2.4
Ethane 1.3
Other 1.8
Table 4.1: Species Volume Percentage for gases released by 18.5 Ah LCO cell
Models for flammability and flame speed that will be described in Chapter 5 were
run. This gas composition has a lower flammability limit (LFL) of 10% and an upper
flammability limit (UFL) of 48%. Python scripts were used to run models to gener-
ate ternary plots of flammability and laminar flame speed as shown in Figures 4.25
and 4.26. In these figures the title identifies the person who analyzed the gas com-
position along with the date, chemistry and state of charge. This gas composition
was measured in-house using cells from the same shipment as those used in these
experiments. The ternary plots consist of three gas mixtures: fuel, air and inert. In
this case the fuel is the gases released by the battery (which includes carbon diox-
ide). The inert gas mixture used is the products of this gas when burned in air at an
equivalence ratio of 1. This was used because in instances without an inert gas sup-
pression system, the mixture may become outside of flammability limits due to the
mixture of burned products with the fuel and air mixture. These burned products
may be produced in an initial diffusion flame or premixed flame. This construction
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allows users of the ternary plot to follow the process of fuel being added through
runaway, inert products being added through burning and air leaking in from the
outside.
Figure 4.25: Ternary plot for Flammability of Battery Gas, Air and Burned Products
Mixture
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Figure 4.26: Ternary plot for Laminar Flame Speed of Battery Gas, Air and Burned
Products Mixture
Many different experiments were carried out in the cardboard box setup. Some of
the experiments used two 18.5 Ah cells while others used only one. For experiments
that used two 18.5 Ah cells, thermal runaway did not spontaneously cause ignition.
Instead an igniter would be triggered manually shortly after the gas release. However,
the igniter was not successful at igniting the mixture at this time because the mixture
was too rich. For these experiments, ignition would not occur until about 7 to 10
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minutes after intense venting due to thermal runaway. At this point, enough air
would mix in to allow an explosion to occur. The data for one such experiment is
shown in Figure 4.27. In this experiment, intense venting due to thermal runaway
occurs at 13:45 and causes increases in CH4 and CO2 concentrations immediately
afterwards. As discussed in Section 4.2.2.4, the O2 and CO2 accurately represent the
gas concentrations in the experiment. However, the CH4 measurement is sensitive to
a broad array of hydrocarbons and as such a reading of 80 % CH4 is not indicative
of exactly this much methane, but instead is correlated with increased amounts of
battery gas hydrocarbons. After intense venting due to thermal runaway, the mixture
is too rich and activation of the arc igniter will not cause a deflagration. After several
minutes of leakage and mixing, ignition is possible as fuel concentration declines and
oxygen concentration increases. In this experiment, ignition is triggered with an arc
igniter at 13:53. At this time in Figure 4.27, oxygen and hydrocarbons rapidly drop
as they are consumed while carbon dioxide is produced.
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Figure 4.27: O2, CO2 and CH4 sensor readings for inside box during experiment.
Intense venting due to thermal runaway occurs at 13:45 and the deflagration is
triggered by the igniter at 13:53
In experiments with a single cell, the amount of fuel released was more closely bal-
anced with the amount of air inside the box. In these experiments activating the
igniter shortly after runaway would cause a deflagration. A plot of gas data for one
of these experiments is shown in Figure 4.28 and a sequence of photos showing the
deflagration at 11:23:46 is provided in Figure 4.29.
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Figure 4.28: O2, CO2 and CH4 sensor readings for inside box during experiment.
Intense venting due to thermal runaway occurs at 11:23:25 and a deflagration is
triggered by the igniter at 11:23:46
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Figure 4.29: Cardboard Box Explosion Sequence in Laboratory
In this series of experiments we made a lot of observations about how different condi-
tions affect outcomes. When multiple cells are used, enough gas is produced to cause
the environment to be too rich to burn. This was observed on multiple experiments
where activating the igniter soon after runaway did not trigger an explosion. In these
experiments an explosion would occur when the igniter was activated after waiting
several minutes until there was a sufficient quantity of air in the mixture. We also
observed that the intensity of the explosion can widely vary. This is caused by the
fact that mixtures with either too much or too little air and fuel have a much lower
flame speed. These experiments also provided us with observations of the influence
of venting conditions. If the integrity of the cardboard box or shower curtain is com-
promised before an explosion, then the severity of the explosion is greatly reduced
and the outcome is a much less intense fire ball or in some cases just a fire. This
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observation shows how deflagration vents that fail easily at a low pressure prevent
the buildup of significant pressures inside. Another observation is that the instances
that led to fires were ones in which air was more freely allowed to enter the box
before ignition.
These experiments were very useful to better understand the conditions leading to
explosions. These experiments were also instrumental in providing opportunities to
test and improve control and gas measurement systems. Finally, the experiments
were also beneficial in helping firefighters better understand the hazards posed by
lithium-ion batteries. Figure 4.30 shows an outdoor demonstration of a cardboard
box explosion.
Figure 4.30: Cardboard Box Explosion Sequence Outdoor Demonstration
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4.3.3 Closet Experiment Results
Two explosion experiments were conducted in the closet. In each experiment a sin-
gle 94 Ah cell was put into thermal runaway using a heater. These experiments
used the same 94 Ah cell described in section 3.3.2. The original intent of these
experiments was to study the mixing of gases before the explosion event and then
subsequently ignite the gas with an electric arc igniter. However in both cases an
explosion occurred only a few seconds after the beginning of the gas release. This
occurred because of the large amount of hot solid material being ejected by the cell.
Even in the second experiment where insulation and steel mesh were placed to block
hot material, this was not sufficient to prevent the ignition of the gases. Figure 4.31
shows the runaway and explosion inside the closet for the first experiment. In the
first closet experiment, the cell first began to release a cloud of vapor and then after
about 2 seconds began to release hot particles. After another 2 seconds, the particles
ignite a flammable cloud which expands and eventually results in an overpressure
which fails the drywall door panel.
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Figure 4.31: Sequence of video images shows the interior of the closet during the
first explosion experiment. At 8:06.443 the first visible cloud of white material is
ejected. The cloud rapidly turns black and begins to limit visibility in the closet.
Hot material is ejected at 8:09 and causes ignition of flammable gases by 8:10.478.
Figure 4.32 shows the thermal runaway intense venting and subsequent explosion
for the second experiment. In this experiment the cell was covered in ceramic fiber
insulation and steel mesh in an attempt to prevent the ignition of gases. Despite the
attempts to prevent ignition, the gases were ignited causing an explosion and failing
the door drywall panel.
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Figure 4.32: Sequence of video images showing the interior of the closet during the
second explosion experiment with a single 94Ah cell.
Gas temperatures were recorded in the compartment for both experiments and are
shown in 4.33. In both graphs, the x axis is offset such that time 0 is the time at
which cell temperatures begin rapid rise due to thermal runaway self-heating. In the
first closet experiment, top and upper gas temperatures in the center of the compart-
ment begin to rise immediately after cell temperature begins rapid rise. This occurs
because the vent was unobstructed in the first experiment and the intense venting of
the cell was able to push hot flammable gases to the top of the compartment before
the explosion. The dramatic temperature increase at about 2 seconds is due to the
deflagration within the compartment. In this experiment, the highest temperatures
are observed at the top and upper thermocouples. This is consistent with the video
which shows burning initiating towards the top of the closet.
In the second closet experiment shown in Figure 4.33b, there is no thermocouple re-
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(a) First Closet Experiment (b) Second Closet Experiment
Figure 4.33: Gas temperatures in closet
sponse until after the deflagration at about 2 seconds. This likely occurred because
in this experiment the vent is covered in multiple layers of mineral wool insulation
and steel mesh which serves to reduce the jet velocity and cause the hot gases to
diffuse more quickly. This effect is evident in the gas temperatures after the explo-
sion. When the explosion occurs, peak temperatures are seen at the mid and lower
layers. This suggests that much of the flammable gases involved in the deflagration
were located closer to the mid and lower thermocouples in the compartment. This
can also be seen in Figure 4.32 where the visible flames are much lower than they
are in Figure 4.31 for the first experiment.
In both tests, small explosions were observed and sufficient overpressure was devel-
oped inside of the closet to fail the drywall door panel. Figure 4.34 contains a series
of images taken during the second test showing the exterior of the closet during and
immediately after the explosion.
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Figure 4.34: Sequence of photographs showing an explosion and fire after a single
94 Ah cell fails within the closet. The mannequin was used to visualize the safety
hazards to firefighters working in the vicinity.
For the second experiment, pressure time history data was recorded at 1000 hz, this
data is shown in Figure 4.35. The pressure peaked at 1.2 kPa (0.17 psi). The du-
ration of the pressure rise is approximately 200 ms. Integrating the pressure over
time, the impulse is 140 kPa-ms (20.4 psi-ms). It is expected that this pressure time
history is a function of both the fuel involved and the time and pressure at which
the door failed and relieved the pressure.
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Figure 4.35: Pressure Time history inside closet for second experiment
Figure 3.3.1 also overlays the gas release time history obtained from the pressure
vessel experiment in Section 3.3.2. In the second experiment, the hot particles ignite
the hot gases and cause the pressure rise only 2 seconds after the onset of venting.
Based on the release rate time history, this means that the explosion happened after
the battery had released less than 50 L of the 221 L expected to be released. This
volume of gas is less than 2% of the room volume. This value is well below the
9% required to reach LFL in a well mixed room. However, this deflagration was
able to occur because it there was a localized region with a gas mixture within
the flammability limits. This type of event is called a partial volume deflagration.
Even though this gas mixture was much smaller than the room, it still produced an
overpressure sufficient to break the drywall door off of the compartment. Although
partial volume deflagration hazards are known in the literature [55], many people
are either unaware of the hazard, or assume that partial volume deflagrations are
unlikely or not significantly damaging. This experiment is evidence that partial
volume deflagrations are quite possible for battery systems and can be very damaging
even when the gas release is not sufficient to reach LFL in a well-mixed room.
135
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, systems were developed to perform lithium-ion battery gas explosion
experiments. In particular, a low cost gas sensor system was developed to measure
oxygen, carbon dioxide and hydrocarbons at multiple locations in real-time during
an experiment. This system is useful to be able to estimate how much of a mixture
is fuel, air and inert during an experiment. A gas collection system was developed
to collect gas samples for later analysis. High voltage arc igniter systems including
both fixed electrodes and a Jacob’s ladder were employed to ignite gases.
A number of different explosion scenarios were observed experimentally. Both pouch
cells and prismatic cells were observed to eject hot solid particles capable of igniting
a deflagration. Pouch cells were capable of causing ignition, but do not reliably
cause ignition. In contrast, even when covered in insulation and steel mesh, the
prismatic cell was able to ignite a deflagration. It appears as though the ejection
of hot particles occurs at a specific time during the intense venting process and for
ignition to occur, the area surrounding the vent must have a flammable mixture.
Explosions were observed immediately after cell venting due to the battery ejecting
hot material which ignited the gases. Explosions were also observed shortly after
cell venting when the cell failed to ignite the gases and the igniter system was used.
In situations with too much fuel, ignition was not possible until air had mixed in
and diluted the fuel. It was observed that even after a compartment has had an
explosion, it may contain enough fuel to cause further deflagrations. Finally, partial
volume deflagrations were observed. In the closet experiment, a damaging explosion
was observed when the volume of gas released was less than 2% of the volume of
the closet. This demonstrates the hazard that partial volume deflagrations are with
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lithium-ion battery systems even when the volume of fuel is very small compared to




In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 the thermal runaway propagation process was charac-
terized for simple 1-D arrays of pouch cells as well as a more complex commercially
available module. Once the time of thermal runaway for each cell is determined, a gas
release time history can be developed. This information combined with gas species
and compartment properties can be put into models to determine if an explosion can
occur and what the consequences may be. This chapter focuses on developing a set
of models which can be used to evaluate the explosion hazard.
This work is a continuation of the work described in in Explosion hazards from
lithium-ion battery vent gas which was published in the Journal of Power Sources
in January 2020 [56]. This chapter covers many of the models in the original paper
as well as some which are not included. This chapter uses the vent gas composition
database developed in the original paper and builds upon it by adding more recent
entries from literature. Finally, this chapter goes beyond the original paper, and de-
scribes a sensitivity analysis on the explosion model using ranges of possible values
138
from the vent gas composition literature review.
5.1 Explosion Hazard
Before looking into how to model the explosion hazard from lithium-ion battery sys-
tems, it is important to first consider what factors lead to explosions. Like any fire
or explosion, a lithium-ion involved explosion requires an appropriate mixture of fuel
and oxidizer as well as an ignition source. The fuel source provided by lithium-ion
batteries is the flammable gas mixture ejected by the cell during thermal runaway.
Fuel release for a thermal runaway event continues as long as cells are going into ther-
mal runaway and venting flammable gases. Depending on the design of the system,
this may continue until cells are sufficiently separated to avoid runaway propagation
or until all the cells have gone into runaway and vented. Although lithium-ion bat-
teries can produce a small amount of oxygen during thermal runaway, the majority
of the oxygen used in an explosion comes from the air.
The ignition source for a lithium-ion battery explosion could be hot particles which
are ejected from the battery such as those seen in Figure 4.31. Since these systems
are always energized, electrical arcing is another possible ignition source as seen in
Figure 3.8. Finally, explosions may be ignited by a smaller pilot flame that may
already be burning.
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Figure 5.1: Sequence of events leading to a lithium-ion battery explosions
Figure 5.1 shows two sequences of events that can lead to an explosion. For ev-
ery lithium-ion battery involved explosion, the first requirement is for a lithium-ion
cell to go into thermal runaway. The thermal runaway process will release heat,
flammable gases and sometimes hot material that can provide an ignition source. If
the cell is large enough and the containing compartment is small enough, a single cell
may be capable of causing an explosion. For typical cells in typical rooms, multiple
cells must go into thermal runaway for a damaging explosion to occur. To make this
possible, thermal runaway must progress from cell to cell as heat is transferred as
shown in Chapters 2 and 3.
After flammable gases have been released, it is possible that they do not ignite.
This could be due to a lack of ignition sources, oxygen deficient atmosphere, fire
suppression systems or high velocity gases that cannot propagate a flame. With-
out adequate ventilation, these gases may accumulate. If later an ignition source
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is provided, it can cause an explosion. Depending on the volume of gas released
and the geometry of the enclosures, this could cause an explosion either inside the
module, inside the rack or within the entire compartment. In some cases flammable
gases may even accumulate and cause an explosion outside the battery compartment.
Another sequence of events that can lead to an explosion occurs when there is an
ignition and an initial fire. While a flame is present, it is unlikely that enough gas
can accumulate to cause an explosion. However, this initial fire may be extinguished
due to fire suppression or oxygen deficiency. Once the fire is extinguished, remaining
gases may still be capable of forming an explosive mixture. Once these gases are
mixed with a sufficient quantity of air and are provided an ignition source they may
cause an explosion.
These two pathways to an explosion may also be represented as a fault tree as shown
in Figure 5.2 or an event tree as shown in Figure 5.3. The benefit of the fault tree is
that it shows the events which lead up to an explosion and can be used to calculate
the probability of an explosion. The fault tree is useful to see the relationships
between events leading to an explosion[57]. The and and or gate structure of the
fault tree makes it clear what events need to happen to produce an explosion. The
nature of the fault tree also makes it more natural to consider what events may cause
ignition or lead to the formation of a flammable mixture. The event tree is useful
to see the sequence of events which can lead to an explosion [57]. An advantage
of the event tree is that it allows the user to follow each event to other possible
consequences such as fire and toxicity hazards.
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Figure 5.2: Fault tree showing factors leading to lithium-ion battery explosions
Figure 5.3: Event tree showing factors leading to lithium-ion battery explosions
When an explosion occurs, it presents a variety of different hazards to building occu-
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pants, outside personnel and especially firefighters who have been called to respond
to the fire. Historical events demonstrate the severity of the hazard to firefighters.
In April 2013, ten firefighters were killed in an explosion when they were attempting
to extinguish a fire at an ammonium nitrate storage facility in West, Texas. Fire-
fighters are especially at risk with explosions since they are often the only people
nearby as they carry out fire suppression activities. This can be a problem with bat-
tery incidents as these may first present as a fire or toxicity hazard with no obvious
connection to batteries and then may result in an explosion later on.
There are several different hazards due to explosions. The rapidly expanding flame
of the explosion can burn anyone in its path and even people farther away with
thermal radiation. The rapidly expanding flame generates an overpressure inside of
a compartment. This overpressure can cause a blast wave to propagate outside of
the compartment as well. The increased pressure may cause hearing damage. The
pressure over time creates an impulse which can act on people and debris and throw
them large distances. The overpressure can also fail building components and injure
people with missiles or fragments of building materials. Finally, the overpressure
may cause a structural collapse which can injure occupants.
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Figure 5.4: Firefighter hazards during an explosion.
5.2 Gas Composition
The first step to understanding the hazard is to characterize what flammable gases
are produced by thermal runaway. Many experiments have been performed to mea-
sure the species of vent gas from lithium-ion cells in thermal runaway. In our paper
[56] we reviewed all the data on vent gas compositions for lithium-ion cells in thermal
runaway up until 2019. In this section, more recently available studies are added
along with additional measurements which have been performed more recently by
the University of Texas Fire Research Group. Figure 5.5 shows all the species com-
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Figure 5.5: Battery Vent Gas Species Compositions from Literature [8]
Somandepalli et al. [58] failed a lithium cobalt-oxide (LCO) pouch cell in an argon
filled test chamber and used gas chromatography to determine composition. Gol-
ubkov et al. [59, 60] performs similar tests for different cell chemistries at different
states of charge (SOC) using 18650 cylindrical cells. The 2016 FAA study by Mal-
oney et al. [61] was done at 10 psia in an inert environment. They test LCO cells at
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various SOC. One problem with this data is that the sum of the gas compositions
does not add up to 100 % and this changes with SOC. Lammer et al. [62] conducted
experiments with 18650 cells from different manufacturers which provided different
results.
In the literature, some of the experiments fail cells by overcharging. The first of
which was Kumai et al. [63] in 1999, where an 18650 was overcharged and overdis-
charged until failure. In 2005, Ohaski et al. [64] failed a prismatic LCO cell using
overcharging at 1 C until failure. Gas compositions were determined with gas chro-
matography. In 2015 Yuan et al. [65] failed overcharged prismatic LFP cells. They
reported between 5% to 18% air, which we normalized out in Figure 5.5. In 2016,
Zheng et al. [66] failed over-discharged LFP pouch cells and provided the gas com-
position. In 2018 Fernandes et al. [67] overcharge cylindrical LFP cells. Kennedy
et al. provides gas compositions for both single lithium cobalt oxide (LCO) pouch
cells as well as arrays [40]. Essl et al. compares NMC cell failures for pouch cells
and prismatic cells when failed by heating, overcharging and nail penetration. They
find that the initiating event causes variation in both the quantity and species of
gas produced [1, 68]. In many areas of the United States, energy storage systems
must be tested according to UL 9540A. This testing requires the characterization of
gas composition for cells failing in thermal runaway. Most of these experiments are
confidential, however Viswanathan and Paiss provide UL 9540 A data for LFP and
NMC cells from an unspecified manufacturer [2].
In addition to the literature values, gas composition was also measured as part of
this work. In Section 3.2.3 the species, volume and release rate was measured for a
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prismatic 94 Ah cell which is used in both ESS and EVs. In Appendix 7 species and
volume were measured for an LFP module consisting of cylindrical cells.
Although none of the studies produce nearly identical results, it can be seen that for
cells that are charged to more than 50 % SOC, both thermally failed and overcharged
lithium-ion cells produce mostly hydrogen, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and an
assortment of hydrocarbons. When burned these gases pose a fire hazard, when un-
burned and released into a confined space, these mixtures pose an explosion hazard.
5.3 Models
Once the gas composition is known, models can be used to provide information about
explosion hazards. The purpose of this effort is to create a set of simple models that
when used together can be used to estimate if an explosion is possible and what
worst-case explosion consequences could be. There are several sub-models which
when used together make this possible. Figure 5.6 shows the relationships between
the inputs and outputs of each model.
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Figure 5.6: A combination of several simple models makes it possible to estimate
possible explosion consequences based on compartment properties and ESS proper-
ties
The inputs for the entire set of models consist of ESS properties and compartment
properties. For ESS properties, the inputs are the gas release rate, volume and dura-
tion along with the gas species. Compartment properties include the compartment
dimensions, deflagration vent areas, deflagration vent failure pressure and the venti-
lation rate which will be expressed in ACH (air changes per hour).
5.3.1 Gas Mixing Models
A number of models can be implemented to calculate possible mixture conditions
for explosion scenarios. A CFD model of flammable battery gas mixing with air in
a closet is shown in Figure 5.7. The domain for this model is 1.12 m wide, 1.19 m
deep and 2.13 m tall and uses a grid of 1 cm, 2 cm and 4 cm. The smaller grid
sizes are used within the turbulent plume region. The mass release is 2.6 kg of
battery vent gas released in 8 seconds. The gas released is the 100 % SOC NMC
148
composition described in Table 3.1 released at 700 ◦C from an orifice of 4 cm x 8 cm.
A 1.12m long and 0.08 cm tall crack has an open condition to ambient pressure to
represent a crack under a door. The distribution of gases in the compartment varies
over time. Early on, gases within the flammability limits exist only in a small jet
immediately above the battery. Since these gases are hot and directed upward, they
start to form a layer at the top of the compartment which then folds down into the
compartment. Since the velocity of the release jet is quite high and the volume of
the room is small, enough mixing occurs such that towards the end of the simulation
there is a more homogeneous mixture of gas in the flammable range throughout the
entire compartment. In the last image, although the gas release has stopped, the
concentrations begin to slowly change as air leaks in the bottom of the door and into
the compartment. This mechanism makes it possible that even if there wasn’t an
explosion initially and the compartment is too rich, later on air can be introduced
to produce a flammable mixture.
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Figure 5.7: CFD Model results for battery vent gas concentration for thermal run-
away gas release in a closet
For the purposes of many explosion analyses, the use of CFD models may be too
detailed for the application. In accidental explosions there are often numerous ways
in which gas can be released, mixed and ignited to cause a deflagration. The intent of
explosion hazard analysis is to identify what conditions can cause an explosion and
what the worst-case consequences might be. To accomplish this there are a number
of simple models that can be used to approximate possible conditions leading to an
explosion and worst-case mixtures leading to worst-case explosions.
Figure 5.8 represents three idealized mixing models. In the premixed or well-mixed
case it is assumed that the gases are well mixed such that the same concentration
of fuel exists throughout the entire compartment. The partial volume deflagration
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case assumes that the fuel released forms a sphere or layer which is a homogenous
stoichiometric flammable mixture. The partially premixed model assumes that there
is a gaussian distribution of concentrations in which not all of the released flammable
gas lies within the flammable region.
Figure 5.8: Idealized mixing models include assuming that the entire mixture is ho-
mogenous, assuming that a partial volume of flammable mixture exists and assuming
that the mixture is partially premixed.
5.3.1.1 Perfectly Mixed Model
The perfectly mixed model is useful for developing an estimate of the worst case
explosion consequences when a large amount of gas is released. As seen late in time
in the closet mixing model (Figure 5.7), conditions can become well mixed when
there has been sufficient velocity driving the mixing and enough time has elapsed to
allow this to occur. The motion of gas due to thermal runaway or forced ventilation
systems may cause a well-mixed condition. If the compartment is well-mixed then
the concentration (X) at any point equals the average concentration (Xave) of the
compartment which can be calculated by dividing the volume of fuel (Vf ) by the
volume of the compartment (Vcompartment), Xave = Vfuel/Vcompartment. For such a
uniform concentration, an explosion can only occur when Xave ≥ XLFL
. The worst case explosion will occur when the average concentration is such that
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the laminar burning velocity is a maximum. When the well-mixed assumption is
appropriate this mixture condition is used for NFPA 69 analysis to prevent a defla-
gration by ensuring that the average concentration is less than 25% of LFL[69]
5.3.1.2 Partial Volume Deflagration Model
In some cases not enough gas is released to form a well-mixed flammable mixture
throughout the entire compartment. However, even though the average concentra-
tion in the compartment may be less than LFL, it is still possible for a damaging
explosion to occur. In this case explosions may occur when a localized region of gas
forms a flammable mixture. This partial volume may be considered to be either a
volume of gas surrounding the release location, trapped gas in a rack or a layer of
gas accumulated at the top or bottom of the compartment. Partial volume mixing
is used by Ogle to determine the minimum concentration of gas to cause a damaging
explosion [70].
To evaluate the hazards associated with partial volume deflagrations, it is assumed
that there is some limited volume of perfectly mixed flammable mixture and the re-
mainder of the compartment is filled with air. In this case the average concentration
remains Xave = Vfuel/Vcompartment while for the flammable volume the concentra-
tion is generally assumed to be mixed to a stoichiometric volume fraction (Xst) or
the volume fraction associated with the highest adiabatic explosion pressure (Pmax).
This model is described in detail by Ogle [70]. In this model the minimum volume of
fuel capable of causing a damaging explosion with a pressure exceeding (Pdam) can
be found using the stoichiometric volume fraction (Xst) and the maximum pressure









5.3.1.3 Partially Premixed Model
In reality, many explosions are caused by non-homogenous mixtures with concentra-
tions at different locations ranging anywhere from nearly 100 % air to 100 % fuel.
One way to approximate these concentrations is by assuming that they are layered
at the floor or ceiling according to a Gaussian profile. This Gaussian profile will have
layers of varying concentrations ranging from Xfuel = 0 up to some maximum con-
centration Xfuel = Xmax. In this idealization there exists a flammable region where
XLFL ≤ X ≤ XUFL. The flammable volume is maximized where Xmax = XUFL
This model is described in detail by Jo and Park [72]. One challenge associated with
implementing this model is the determination of the parameter that describes the
Gaussian distribution.
5.3.2 Gas Flammability Characteristics Models
The explosion potential of a gas mixture is a function of a number of flammability
properties of the mixture. Gas flammability properties depend on the mixture of
flammable gases as well as their mixture with air. Mixtures which have too little
air or too much air cannot cause an explosion. The amount of air mixed with the
battery vent gas can be quantified with the equivalence ratio (φ). The battery gases
coming off the cell consist of mostly hydrogen, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and
various hydrocarbon gases. This mixture can be specified using volume fractions.
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There are a number of important flammability characteristics. The first of which
are the lower and upper flammability limits. The flammability limits define the
maximum and minimum concentrations of fuel that will propagate a flame when
mixed with air. The flammability limits are used to determine if a given fuel and
air mixture can produce a deflagration. If a deflagration can occur, the overpressure
generated inside a constant volume is defined thermodynamically by the maximum
pressure. This is an important input to explosion overpressure models. In practice,
almost all confined explosions become vented through either existing openings, the
activation of deflagration vents or the failure of building components. Overpressure
generation in a vented structure depends primarily upon the burning velocity of the
gases and the vent area through which pressure is relieved. There are a host of other
gas properties required to predict the pressure generated in an explosion. Although
overpressure calculations are not as sensitive to them, they have been computed and
tabulated to facilitate the calculation of overpressures for a variety of experimentally
measured battery vent gas mixtures.
5.3.2.1 Flammability Limits
The upper and lower flammability limits describe the maximum and minimum con-
centration of fuel that can propagate a flame. For this work, it will be assumed that
battery vent gas mixture is mixed with air at a temperature of 300 K and an absolute
pressure of 101.325 kPa. Upper and lower flammability limits are typically measured
experimentally using standard test methods such as those described in ASTM E681.
Unfortunately, battery gas mixture composition has significant variation and mea-
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sured flammability limits are not published for most battery gas mixtures. Because
of this, models will be used to estimate the flammability limits of these gas mixtures.
The most common approximation for flammability limits is Le Chatelier’s mixing
law [73], which is shown in Equation 5.2. This allows the calculation of LFL for a
mixture (XL) using the volume fraction (X i) and LFL of each of the components









Another method to estimate flammability limits is the calculated adiabatic flame
temperature method which has been described in various articles[74]. In this method
the adiabatic flame temperature is calculated for a mixture. The calculated flame
temperature is then compared against a critical temperature to determine if the
mixture is flammable or not. Different sources have different estimates of the critical
temperature for flammability with values ranging from 1000 K to 1600 K [75, 76, 74].
Instead of using a single value for critical adiabatic flame temperature, Bounaceur et
al. describe a method to calculate LFL and UFL for gas mixtures by using different
critical temperatures for each gas [77]. These critical temperatures can be found by
calculating the adiabatic flame temperature for a gas when it is mixed such that it
is at LFL.
The first step to accomplish this is to calculate the threshold adiabatic flame temper-
ature at which a flame will propagate. The threshold temperature for LFL depends
on the gas involved. For example, hydrogen reaches LFL at a concentration of 4%, at
which concentration the adiabatic flame temperature is 629 K. In contrast methane
reaches LFL at a concentration of 5% and at this concentration the mixture has an
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adiabatic flame temperature of 1480 K. The same process can be used to determine
a critical adiabatic flame temperature associated with UFL [77]. Using published
LFL and UFL values along with a software such as Cantera[78], it is possible to
determine critical adiabatic flame temperatures for LFL and UFL for any gas that
has published LFL and UFL volume fractions.
To find the critical temperature (TL,blend) at which LFL occurs for a mixture of
gases, a weighted average of critical temperature (TL,i) and volume fraction (Xi) of





In this equation volume fraction of each component (Xi) is calculated based on all
of the flammable gases and excludes any inert gases such as carbon dioxide which
may be in the mixture. For this project critical temperatures were tabulated for hy-
drogen, carbon-monoxide, methane, propane, and ethane. Any other hydrocarbons
are treated as propane. This assumption is used because most hydrocarbons will
generally be similar to propane. It is acceptable to use this assumption as long as
other hydrocarbons account for a relatively small concentration compared to the five
known gases. This assumption is reasonable in the case of battery vent gas which
is typically mostly hydrogen, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. This method is
implemented for both lower and upper flammability limits. This method will not be
validated here. Bounaceur et al. and Baird et al. provide validation for this method
[77, 8].
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5.3.2.2 Laminar Burning Velocity
The laminar burning velocity is an important property of gas mixtures when pre-
dicting deflagration hazards. The laminar burning velocity is the velocity at which a
flame propagates through a premixed fuel and oxidizer mixture relative to the veloc-
ity of the unburned mixture. Laminar burning velocity is primarily dependent on the
reactivity, diffusivity and exothermicity of the fuel and oxidizer mixture. Laminar
burning velocity is generally increased by increasing temperature and decreased with
increasing pressure. Since most explosions involving lithium-ion batteries generally
happen at approximately atmospheric pressure and much of the reactants are air at
ambient temperature, the effects of temperature and pressure will not be considered
here. There is not a single accepted method for measuring laminar burning velocity,
several have been used. Non-stationary methods measure the velocity of a flame
front in a spherical bomb or a tube while stationary methods may use a burner [79].
Lithium-ion battery thermal runaway produces a mixture of gases for which burning
velocity may not have been measured. In the absence of measured burning veloc-
ities, models can be used to estimate the burning velocity based on the properties
of the gases which comprise the mixture. For this work, three different methods are
utilized and compared against experimental data.
The first model used to estimate burning velocity uses Cantera which is an open-
source software package for solving chemical kinetics and thermodynamics problems[78].
Cantera uses the GRI-Mech 3.0 database which contains 53 species and 325 reactions
[80]. GRI-Mech has been used extensively for modeling problems involving natural
gas. Several others have investigated the burning velocity of lithium-ion battery
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vent gases using Cantera and GRI-Mech[8, 40, 81]. Others have used the GRI-Mech
database to model flame speed of syngas flammable gas mixtures [82, 83].
In Cantera burning velocity is calculated using a 1D premixed flame model. In this
model the mixture is defined by species mass fraction of the species (Yi), pressure
(P ) and temperature (T ) of the unburned mixture. For this work it is assumed that
gases are at a temperature of 298 K and an absolute pressure of 101.325 kPa.
There are also correlation models which can be used to estimate burning velocity.
Lapalme developed a correlation for burning velocity based on experimental data
with gases mixtures of hydrogen, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and methane
[10]. The Lapalme correlation equations are described as follows. The effect of CO2
dilution and temperature is reflected in the correlation similar to that from Turns
[84] as shown in equation 5.4.






The maximum burning velocity (SL,max) and the equivalence ratio at which this
occurs (φm) are described in Equations 5.5 and 5.6.
SLmax = 2.1 · exp(−5.9 ·XCH4) · (R− 0.5) + 1.4 · exp(−3.97 ·XCH4) + 0.4 (5.5)
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φm = −0.905 · exp(−13.4 ·XCH4) · (R− 0.5) + 1.05 · exp(−7 ·XCH4) + 1.07 (5.6)
The correlation assumes that the base fuel is a mixture of hydrogen and carbon
monoxide. The ratio of hydrogen to the total hydrogen and carbon monoxide (R) is





Other parameters are as follows:
a = (1.28 + 0.24 ·XCH4) + 0.54 · (φ− (1.85 − 3.45 ·XCH4))2 (5.8)
c = 0.028 · exp((2.5 ·X2CH4 + 1) · φ+ 0.5) + 1.23 (5.9)
B = (−10.5 · (XCH4 − 0.2)2 + 1.5) ·R+ 3.1 ·XCH4 + 0.035 (5.10)
The correlation is good for mixtures where the base fuel is a mixture of hydrogen and
carbon monoxide. For methane volume percentages less than 20% the correlation is
good for equivalence ratios from 0.7 to 2.0.
Laminar Burning Velocity Validation Unfortunately there are very few pub-
lished experiments in which the burning velocity of battery vent gases is measured.
The only published study found measures the vent gas composition from an LFP
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Source Name Max Su H2 CO CH4 CO2 C2H4 Data Points
Liu[11] LFP 0.46 29.6 22.3 6.9 35.5 5.7 9
Lapalame[10] H2-CO 1.90 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20
Zhou[9] Basis 0.93 40.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 18
Zhou[9] CH4-80 0.39 10.0 10.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 14
Zhou[9] CO-60 1.00 26.7 60.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 20
Zhou[9] CO-80 0.92 13.3 80.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 20
Zhou[9] H2-60 1.27 60.0 26.7 13.3 0.0 0.0 20
Zhou[9] H2-80 2.04 80.0 13.3 6.7 0.0 0.0 20
Lapalme[10] S50C10 1.53 45.0 45.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 20
Lapalme[10] S50C20 1.30 40.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 24
Lapalme[10] S50C30 0.98 35.0 35.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 20
Lapalme[10] S50C40 0.64 30.0 30.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 20
Lapalme[10] S50M20 1.03 40.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 18
Lapalme[10] S50M40 0.66 30.0 30.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 16
Lapalme[10] S50M5 1.70 47.5 47.5 5.0 0.0 0.0 26
.0
Table 5.1: 14 gas compositions were used to validate burning velocity models
cell and then produces a custom mixture of gases to match the measured values.
The flame speed of this gas mixture was then measured using a bunsen burner ap-
paratus at equivalence ratios from 0.7 up to 1.5[11]. To supplement this data and
expand the validation data set, models for laminar burning velocity can be validated
using experiments with similar syngas mixtures which are available in the published
literature. Like battery vent gas, these syngas mixtures consist of mostly H2, CO,
CO2 and CH4. Unlike these syngas mixtures, battery vent gas also consists of a
variety of other hydrocarbons in small amounts. However, this validation set should
be sufficient because it contains three most abundant species (H2, CO, CO2) and
because flame speed is more sensitive to hydrogen variation [85].
Each of these mixtures had the burning velocity experimentally measured at be-
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tween 9 and 26 different equivalence ratios. These experiments covered a range of
equivalence ratios such that the peak laminar flame speed would be measured. The
GRI-Mech based model in Cantera along with the Lapalme correlation were used
to calculate the burning velocity for each mixture at each equivalence ratio. The
Lapalme correlation was developed using the Lapalme data and so other data must
be added in for better validation. Data from Liu and Zhou are included to show
that the correlation works on other data. The results for the mixtures in the Zhou
paper[9] are shown in Figure 5.9.
Figure 5.9: Comparison of Burning Velocity values for GRI-Mech model and Lapalme
Model with experimental data from Zhou [9]
In total there were 14 different gas mixtures at various equivalence ratios used for
validation. Using all of the different equivalence ratios, there are a total of 147
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Model Mean Percent Error Percent Error Standard Deviation
Cantera/GRI 4.25% 10.57%
Lapalme Correlation 3.06% 8.77%
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics for Percent Error of Flame Speed Models
points that were used to compare measured burning velocities with those predicted
by GRI-mech and the Lapalme model. The percentage error for these predictions
was calculated and can be represented as a normal distribution. The mean and
standard deviation of the percent error for the Cantera/GRI Mech model and the
Lapalme correlation are presented in Table 5.2.
Figure 5.10: Distribution of Percent Error for 147 Burning Velocity predictions and
14 different fuel mixtures using GRI-Mech and the Lapalme model compared against
experimental values from Lapalme [10], Zhou [9] and Liu[11]
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5.3.2.3 Maximum Pressure
Pmax is the pressure that is generated when the gas is combusted in a perfectly adi-
abatic, constant volume process. This pressure defines the maximum possible pres-
sure that the gas could possibly generate. Cantera uses thermodynamic properties
of the mixture to calculate Pmax. Pmax depends on the composition of gas produced.
Maximum Pressure Validation The adiabatic constant volume maximum pres-
sure was calculated using Cantera to compare with experimental data. Experimental
data comes from Somandapelli et al.[58] where they mixed battery vent gas with air
at different equivalence ratios and measured the peak overpressure as well as the peak
rate of pressure rise in a 20L spherical vessel. The Cantera model was used to analyze
a variety of different fuel concentrations to evaluate the impact of different mixtures
with air. Figure 5.11 shows our (UTFRG) predicted values for maximum pressure
calculated using Cantera compared to experimental data. For lean concentrations
where the fuel concentration is less than about 20%, the calculated maximum pres-
sures are close to experimental values. However, for fuel rich concentrations, the
pressure is much lower in the experiment. The calculated values are the maximum
possible thermodynamic values, and the experimentally measured pressures should
be lower because of incomplete combustion and heat losses.
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Figure 5.11: Maximum Overpressure Model Data Compared against Experimental
Data
5.3.3 Vented Deflagration Models
The greatest pressure and impulse from a deflagration is generally experienced in-
side the compartment which confines the deflagration. Although it may be possible
for detonation of battery vent gases to occur, it is unlikely that gas mixtures, con-
finement and congestion conditions will lead to a detonation. In this analysis, it is
assumed that the combustion of battery vent gases leads to only deflagration events.
Since deflagrations are slower than detonations and the prediction of pressure is only
approximate, it is assumed that the pressure and impulse experienced throughout
the compartment is the same.
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If the deflagration occurs in a confined space and no vent is available to relieve
pressure, the pressure would theoretically rise to the adiabatic maximum explosion
pressure, Pmax which is an absolute pressure between 5 and 9 bar, depending on the
gas mixture. In reality, all typical structures fail at an absolute pressure well below
2 bar. To prevent structural failure and collapse, some facilities have deflagration
vents which allow gas venting to occur when the pressure rises beyond some activa-
tion pressure. When properly designed, these vents will vent the high pressure from
the compartment, greatly reducing the overpressure inside the compartment and
either eliminating or greatly reducing the structural damage from the deflagration.
If deflagration vent openings are not provided or are insufficient, the overpressure
inside the structure may make windows, doors and other openings into unintentional
vent openings. If the area of the intended or unintended vent openings is sufficient
and they fail at a low enough pressure, this may be effective in preventing structural
damage. If designed or unintentional vents openings are insufficient, then pressure
will continue to rise until it is relieved by the failure of structural components such
as walls, roof and floor systems. For compartments with no natural vent openings
such as ISO shipping containers, this can lead to catastrophic destruction of the
compartment and cause very high overpressure and structural collapse inside the
compartment as well as high-velocity missiles and significant overpressures outside
of the compartment. For the models presented in this section, it is assumed that
deflagrations are adequately vented to prevent catastrophic structural failure of the
compartment.
To determine the consequences of an indoor explosion in terms of maximum pressure
or pressure-time history, a deflagration model is needed. These models rely on both
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properties of the gas mixture and the geometry and venting of the enclosure. Key
gas property inputs are laminar burning velocity and maximum constant-volume
adiabatic pressure or Pmax. As the burning velocity increases due to turbulence, the
parameters β and R0 can be used to represent the exponential flame acceleration
and critical flame radius.
There are a number of models available to predict overpressures in vented gas de-
flagrations. These models range in complexity. There are several analytical models
available. In industry there are standards for vent sizing which can be used to solve
for the pressure due to a vented gas explosion. Standards for vent sizing include
NFPA 68 in the US and EN 14994 in Europe[86, 87]. In 2015 Molkov developed a
model for vented deflagrations of hydrogen in air[88]. In 2011 Bauwens and Chao
from FM global presented an analytical model and validated it with a series of
propane, methane and hydrogen experiments in the FM global 64 m3 explosion
facility[89, 90]. Sinha and Wen developed an analytical model and validated it using
methane, propane and hydrogen explosion data from the FM global facility as well
as others[91, 92, 93]. Sinha evaluated performance of NFPA 68, EN 14994, Molkov,
FM Global and their own model when compared against experimental data from
the literature[92]. They observed that for hydrogen EN-14994 underpredicts for low
concentrations and overpredicts for high concentrations and that NFPA 68 consis-
tently overpredicts pressure[92]. The behavior of NFPA 68 could stem from its use
as a design tool, which is intended to be conservative. The FM Global, Molkov and
Sinha models did better at predicting pressures.
The previously described analytical models only provide peak pressure information
166
for inside the compartment and cannot provide the impulse or a pressure-time his-
tory. To better predict structural response to blast, a time history is required. To
accomplish this the Mulpuru 0D vented deflagration model based on conservation
and burning rate is used. This model solves a system of ODEs to determine the
pressure time history[94].
More advanced models exist to model the pressure-time history of vented gas explo-
sions. There are a number of computational fluid dynamics tools which have been
used to predict pressure-time histories for vented deflagrations of flammable gases.
One common tool for the prediction of gas deflagrations is FLACS. FLACS is a CFD
software widely used in industry for the prediction of gas dispersion and gas explo-
sion pressure-time histories[95]. Another tool is CEBAM, which is a finite volume
CFD code used for detonations and deflagrations[96]. The open source CFD software
suite OpenFOAM has also been used to predict explosion pressures and has been
modified for the prediction of hydrogen gas deflagrations[97]. There are a number of
challenges that come with the use of these models. Firstly these models are much
more detailed than engineering models and as such require much more detailed in-
formation about the geometry and conditions of the case. Another challenge is that
they require more modeling time and computational time to produce results. This
increased time limits the number of cases that can be explored. This is problematic
for explosion modeling, since for any given facility there can be a very large number
of possible scenarios based on different release, ignition and ventilation conditions.
Recently there has been a renewed interest in gas explosion modeling with hydrogen
explosions. The hydrogen work demonstrates the wide range of engineering models
and CFD models that can be used and provides some insight into the performance of
167
these models. In a blind prediction versus experiments series, modellers used various
CFD models and engineering models to predict the maximum pressure and impulse
inside a 20 ft shipping container filled with a hydrogen-air mixture. Repetitions of
the same single experiment were found to vary by more than 30% while variations
between experiments and models often exceeded 100%. The ratio of the highest and
lowest predictions was about 23[98]. Blind studies using inhomogeneous hydrogen-
air mixtures also showed great variation in the results[99]. In this case, the models
had to first predict the stratification of gases and then the deflagration process. This
increases uncertainty, as many of the models did not capture the stratification pro-
cess correctly. Similar to the homogeneous study, the simplified engineering models
showed less variation [98, 99].
Going forward, this work will use two different models. The Sinha and Wen engi-
neering model is a very fast model which can be used to calculate only maximum
pressures. The Mulpuru 0D model will be used to determine pressure-time histories.
Advanced CFD models were avoided due to the level of detailed information needed
as well as the modelling and computational time demands that would make using
the model for many scenarios not feasible.
Both of these models rely on the turbulent burning velocity. As gases burn, a flame
front forms which moves into the unburned gases at some velocity. This velocity is
initially the laminar burning velocity. However after the flame reaches some critical
radius, then turbulence causes this velocity to increase. Bauwen’s work provides data
on the burning velocity acceleration for propane, methane and hydrogen vented gas
deflagrations [100, 101, 102]. This work will use the Bauwen’s equations and data
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to represent flame acceleration for both the Sinha and Mulpuru models.
5.3.3.1 0D Vented Deflagration Model
A vented enclosure explosion model was developed by Mulpuru et al. working with
the Atomic Energy of Canada [94] and has later been implemented and improved
by others [103, 104, 105]. The model is a 0D physics model based on burning rate
and conservation of momentum and energy. The model assumes that the gases are
premixed, homogeneous, ideal gases. The properties of the burnt and unburnt mix-
tures are assumed to be spatially uniform. The model assumes an infinitely thin,
smooth flame front. Burning is assumed to be slow such that the pressure in the
volume is spatially uniform but temporally evolving. Compression and expansion of
the unburnt mixture are isentropic. The model consists of three ordinary differential
equations which are solved simultaneously.
The first equation is the conservation of mass. In this equation mi is the initial mass
of unburned gas, mu is the mass of unburned gas, mv is the mass of the vented gas


















The conservation of energy equation is similar, where Eb is the energy of the burned




















The rate of burned gas production is based on the laminar burning velocity SL, and







For this work, the equations from Mulpuru [94] were coded in Python and solved
using the RK45 Explicit Runge-Kutta method with a maximum timestep of 0.001 s.
More details of the formulation of equations for use in the model can be found in the
original paper by Mulpuru et al. [94]. Two modifications were made to the original
equations. First, the code was altered such that the vent area can start out as zero
and then the vent area goes to the prescribed value when the pressure reaches some
threshold value. This allows for modeling the effects of vent opening on the pressure
time history. The second adjustment was for the turbulent burning velocity. The
turbulent burning velocity was modified to use the β and R0 values as well as the
equation provided by Bauwens for flame acceleration [100, 102, 101].
5.3.3.2 Vented Deflagration Model Validation
One validation case was performed by comparing model results against results from
experiments performed by Kumar et al. [106] using 20% and 29.5% hydrogen mixed
with air at a temperature of 373 K. For this validation, the burning velocity for hy-
drogen is calculated using equations provided in Mulpuru et al. [94] and the β and
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R0 parameters for flame acceleration are not used. In the experiments the pressure
time history was recorded for well-mixed, centrally ignited hydrogen-air mixtures in
a 6.37 m3 spherical vessel. Model results are compared against the experiment in
Figure 5.12. From this comparison, the maximum pressures are comparable (less
than 10% error), while the predicted rise rate is faster for the stoichiometric (29.5%)
mixture of hydrogen and slower for the 20% hydrogen case.
Figure 5.12: Comparison of vented deflagration model results with hydrogen exper-
iment.
Validation for the vented deflagration model described in 5.3.3.1 was performed us-
ing 31 data points from published explosion experiments. The experiments were
performed by Harrison & Eyre, Chao, and Bauwens. The 14 Harrison & Eyre ex-
periments are performed with near stoichiometric mixtures of propane or methane
in a 5.92m x 2.38m x 2.2m compartment with vent areas ranging from 0.58 m2 to
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2.74 m2[107]. The Bauwens and Chao experiments also use nearly stoichiometric
mixtures of propane or methane and are performed in the FM Global 4.6m x 4.6m x
3m explosion facility with vent areas of 2.7 m2 and 5.4 m2 [108, 90]. The experiments
include center and back ignitions and occur in rooms without obstructions. A graph
comparing the experimental max pressures with the model is shown in Figure 5.13.
The percent error was calculated for each experiment and the distribution of percent
error is shown in Figure 5.14.
Figure 5.13: Mulpuru 0D ODE Model and Sinha/Wen Model Results Compared
against Experimental Data
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Figure 5.14: Histogram of max pressure percent error for vented gas explosion models
compared against experimental data
5.3.4 Pressure at Standoff Model
Outside the explosion compartment, damaging overpressures can still exist. Once
the pressure and impulse has been calculated for the compartment, models can be
used to calculate the pressure for locations at standoff. For the purposes of this
model it is assumed that the explosion compartment is outdoors and that locations
at standoff are also outdoors and at ground level. It is also assumed that the explo-
sion is a vented gas deflagration as opposed to a vapor cloud explosion, detonation
or pressure vessel burst.
Forcier and Zalosh [109] review several models which can be used to determine the
external pressure experienced by structures outside after a vented gas explosion. In







This model will be used to calculate peak pressures for outdoor locations at a stand-
off from the vent. Validation of this model with experimental data can be found in
Forcier and Zalosh’s paper [109].
5.3.5 Damage Models
Once the pressure and impulse are known for both inside the explosion compartment
and for locations at standoff, damage models can be used to predict the consequences.
Damage to due to overpressure depends on the time-history of the pressure load on
the object. Summary measures of the pressure-time history include maximum pres-
sure and impulse. Impulse can be calculated as the integral of the pressure-time
history curve. There are several different ways to estimate damage. Simple methods
to estimate damage include tables of overpressure at failure and pressure-impulse
diagrams.
5.3.5.1 Simple Structural Damage Models
There are many tables available in the literature for damage due to overpressure.
These tables are often fairly generic and may not be specifically applicable to each
object of a certain type. Since these tables have been simplified to include only pres-
sure, they neglect to include the effect of the impulse or the shape of the pressure-time
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history. Since only pressure is included, this data is more applicable for quasi-static
loads for [111]. Quasi-static loading occurs when inertial effects are negligible, this
generally occurs when the duration of the blast event is long compared to the natural
period of the structure. In contrast, impulsive loading depends on the total impulse
delivered to the structure and occurs when the duration of the blast load is smaller
relative to the natural period of the structure.
A simple way to consider both the influence of pressure and impulse is through the
use of P-I (pressure-impulse) diagrams. These diagrams have pressure and impulse
on the X and Y axes with a curve representing the performance of a given structure
or component. The curve represents the pressure and impulse at which a certain
level of damage is achieved. Any pressure, impulse loading above the curve indicates
that the object will be loaded beyond that level of failure.
The main limitation of P-I diagrams is that there is not enough of a database of
them to be able to use to predict the performance of most systems. Additional P-I
diagrams may be developed by testing a system to failure repeatedly, but due to the
expense of many destructive experiments, are more commonly developed through
the use of models.
5.3.5.2 SDOF Models
A common modeling approach to develop P-I diagrams is the use of single of freedom
(SDOF) models. SDOF models are very commonly used in structural dynamics for
both blast and earthquake loadings. With the SDOF approach a real system such as
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a beam or a frame can be represented as an equivalent mass-spring-damper system
as shown in Figure 5.15. The response of a spring-mass-damper system is described
by the equation of motion which is derived from Newton’s second law of motion
[112, 113] as shown in Equation 5.15.
Figure 5.15: Actual structural systems such as a simply supported beam may be
approximated by a mass, spring, damper system
Meÿ + Ceẏ + key = Fe(t) (5.15)
The equation of motion is written such that the displacement, (y) of the actual sys-
tem equals the displacement in the equivalent system. In the equation of motion,
Me, Ce, ke are respectively the mass, viscous damping constant and spring constant
in the equivalent system. On the right hand side, Fe(t) is the load history on the
equivalent SDOF system which comes from the vented deflagration analysis. Factors
can be derived to represent the relationship between the mass, stiffness, and load in













Values for KL and KM depend on boundary conditions of the actual system (pinned,
fixed, pinned-fixed, cantilevered) as well as the loading (point load, uniform load,
etc.). Values for KL amd KM are tabulated in textbooks [112] or Department of
Defense manuals such as the SBEDS methodology manual [114] or UFC 3-340-02
[113].
In an SDOF system the spring force which tends to restore the element to its original
position is also known as the resistance. Using key as the resistance in the equation
of motion assumes that the structure exhibits a constant stiffness and remains elastic
during response. This assumption is not acceptable for most blast design problems
in which it is common for nonlinear stiffness due to the formation of hinges and
yielding. To account for changes in resistance as load is applied, resistance functions
are often developed. The resistance function relates the resistance of the structure
to the deflection. It is common to replace the term key in the equation of motion
using a term called resistance Re(y).
Resistance functions depend on the behavior of the actual system. Resistance func-
tions have been developed for various systems including metal panels, metal beams,
concrete members, masonry, pre-stressed concrete. For simplicity, this work will fo-
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cus on implementing the SDOF approach for analysis of one-way corrugated steel
panels, such as those which are used for walls and roofs of low-rise lightweight steel
buildings often used as warehouses and garages.
Metal panel wall systems subjected to blast loading are typically treated as a beam
which is loaded by a time-varying uniform load. The beam is analyzed on a unit
width basis. The time-varying uniform load on the actual system is the pressure-time
history of the blast load applied to the structure. For a beam subjected to a blast
load the resistance function for the actual system can be determined by dividing
the response into the elastic and plastic regions. During elastic response the spring
constant is equal to the equation for deflection divided by the applied load. For








Stiffness for Uniformly Loaded Simply Supported Beam (5.19)
For this simply supported beam, the elastic response continues until the moment
at the center of the beam exceeds the moment capacity of the beam. The moment
capacity of the beam can be written as Mp = fdy · Z where fdy is the dynamic
yield stress of the material and Z is the plastic section modulus. From statics, the
moment as a function of static loading is Mp = wL2/8. Knowing that the beam re-
sistance R = wL, this equation can be solved to determine the maximum resistance
Rm = 8Mp/L which occurs as beam yields at the center. This resistance occurs be-
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yond the yield deflection. The yield deflection can be calculated using the stiffness
and the maximum resistance which produces yyield = Rm/k. These values can be
assembled to produce a resistance function curve such as that shown in 5.16.
Figure 5.16: Resistance function characterizes the restoring force a structure will
apply as a function of displacement.
There are several tools available to perform SDOF analysis for structures subjected
to blast loads including SBEDS which is provided by the Protective Design Center
of the US Army Corps of Engineers[114] and DCMS which is developed by Applied
Research Associates (ARA). For the purposes of this research, a simple SDOF solver
was developed using the same approach as described by the SBEDS manual [114].
For simplicity, the SDOF solver was developed for only one-way metal panel systems.
SBEDS and DCMS provide a greater range of available materials that require more
effort to model the more complex resistance functions such as those of concrete, ma-
sonry and two-way systems.
Once the terms in the equation of motion (Equation 5.15) have been found, it then
can be solved as an ordinary differential equation. In the simple SDOF solver de-
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veloped for this work, it is solved using the odeint function of the Python package
Scipy which is a Python interface of the odepack FORTRAN library. The result of
integrating the equations is y(t), the displacement time history for the component.
From this time history the maximum displacement can be extracted and used to
calculate the maximum angle of rotation which is θ = tan−1(2 · ymax/L). The duc-
tility ratio can be calculated as the ratio of the maximum displacement to the yield
displacement, µ = ymax/yyield. Once the maximum deflection and angle of rotation
have been found they can be compared to response limits which defines different
levels of damage. Response limits for accidental explosions in the petrochemical
industry are found in the ASCE book [115] while response limits for antiterrorism
design are in PDC-TR 06-08 [116] and UFC 3-340-02 provides response limits for
accidental explosions for the US Department of Defense.
Figure 5.17: The angle of rotation of a member is a function of displacement and
member length.
5.3.5.3 SDOF Model Validation
Single-degree-of-freedom structural dynamics models have been used extensively for
blast response to both weapons and accidental explosions for structural response to
overpressures generated by both detonations and deflagrations. For the purposes of
this work, a code was developed which uses the same method as SBEDS to calculate
the response of one-way supported corrugated metal panels. SBEDS has already
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been extensively validated against experiments for corrugated steel panels, one-way
reinforced concrete walls, one-way reinforced masonry walls, two-way unreinforced
masonry walls, prestressed concrete panels and cold-formed steel beams[117, 118].
There is no need to repeat this validation, however here the results of the previously
performed validations will be analyzed to determine the error associated with SDOF
models. Analysis is conducted for two systems that had a large number of experi-
mental data points: corrugated steel panels and reinforced concrete walls. For these
systems, the validation data[117, 118] is analyzed to assess the modeling error asso-
ciated with SDOF structural damage models. Using these data the distribution of
percentage error was calculated for corrugated panels and reinforced concrete walls.
Figure 5.18 compares the experimental and model maximum displacements directly.
Figure 5.19 shows the distribution of the percent error for the measurements. Sum-
mary statistics are shown in Table 5.3.
Figure 5.18: SBEDS model predicted displacements compared to experimental dis-
placements for concrete wall and corrugated panel response to blast
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics for distribution of percent error for SBEDS SDOF
models of corrugated panels and reinforced concrete walls
Component Mean Standard Deviation Tests Test Series
Corrugated Steel Panels 23.7 % 46.7 % 22 3
Reinforced Concrete Walls 28.3 % 40.1 % 38 5
Figure 5.19: Distribution of percent error for SBEDS SDOF models of corrugated
panels and reinforced concrete walls
5.3.5.4 Other Damage Models
So far only simple structural damage models and SDOF models have been described
here. In practice, there exist more types of damage and additional models to estimate
damage. In addition to structural collapse, overpressures can throw structural and
non-structural debris creating missiles that can be a severe hazard to people nearby.
Missile hazards are examined in Lee’s process safety book [111]. People can also
be thrown due to overpressures as has occurred in the McMicken ESS incident,
the Houston train car incident and Griffith University ESS incident[5, 119, 120].
This phenomenon depends on peak dynamic pressure and impulse and is explained
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as whole body displacement in Lee’s process safety book[111]. Other damage could
include thermal damage both to structures as well as burn injuries to people. Damage
models are the final piece to estimating possible consequences for explosions involving
lithium-ion batteries.
5.4 Summary of Battery Vent Gas Fire and Explosion
Properties
There are many ways in which the various models can be employed to assess hazards
from lithium-ion battery vent gas. A knowledge of gas composition, combined with
gas flammability models, vented deflagration models and damage models makes it
possible to evaluate possible incidents. Before putting all of the models together,
first the battery vent gas composition data will be paired with the gas flammability
models to characterize the realm of battery vent gas properties relevant to fires and
explosions.
As shown in Section 5.2, the gas composition for cells failed in thermal runaway can
vary significantly. This variation in gas composition can lead to significant variations
in the gas properties as calculated using the models described in Section 5.3.2. This
section will summarize differences in flammability characteristics based on a dataset
of 43 published gas compositions described in Section 5.2.
5.4.1 Gas Properties as a Function of State of Charge
The upper and lower flammability limits were calculated using Bounaceur’s method
described previously[77]. Figure 5.20 shows flammability limits for the battery vent
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gas samples in the data set. Generally, the flammability range is smaller for lower
SOC.
Figure 5.20: Upper and lower flammability limits and stoichiometric volume fraction
as a function of state of charge.
The GRI-Mech model implemented in Cantera described in Section 5.3.2.2 was used
to estimate the laminar burning velocity of the various compositions of battery vent
gas. Laminar burning velocity is plotted against state of charge (SOC) in Figure
5.21. This data shows that the laminar flame speed of the produced gases generally
decreases for lower states of charge.
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Figure 5.21: Maximum Laminar Flame Speed generally increases with state of charge
The reasons for these variations in properties can be understood by looking at com-
positions of the gas mixtures. The volume fraction of hydrogen generally decreases
with decreasing SOC, while the volume fraction of carbon dioxide generally increases
with decreasing SOC as shown in Figure 5.22.
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Figure 5.22: Volume fraction of hydrogen and carbon dioxide as a function of state
of charge (SOC).
It can be seen in Figures 5.20 and 5.21 that 100 % SOC has the most observations.
This is because many in industry consider 100 % SOC to be the worst case fire or
explosion scenario. Although overcharge failures at above 100 % SOC can produce
a higher burning velocity as seen in Figure 5.21 and more gas[1], these are often not
considered because systems are designed to avoid overcharging cells. This may not
be appropriate considering that improperly operating systems was a major cause of
the ESS fires in Korea [19].
5.4.2 100 % SOC Gas Properties
Since there are the most experiments at 100 % SOC, and this is a commonly used
composition for safety design, further description of these results is warranted. Lower
flammability limits for the battery gas produced at 100 % SOC cells is shown in
Figure 5.24. From the limited amount of data available, there doesn’t appear to be
any trend by cell chemistry. Regardless of chemistry, LFL values range from 5 % to
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13%.
Figure 5.23: Lower flammability limits (LFL) for 100 % SOC battery gas composi-
tions using various chemistries.
Upper flammability limits for the battery gas produced by 100 % SOC cells is shown
in Figure 5.24.
Figure 5.24: Upper flammability limits (UFL) for 100 % SOC battery gas composi-
tions using various chemistries.
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Cantera was used to determine the stoichiometric volume fraction for each gas com-
position. The stoichiometric volume fraction is the amount of battery gas required to
evenly balance with oxygen. Worst-case burning velocities and explosion pressures
occur at slightly above the stoichiometric volume fraction. Figure 5.25 shows the
stoichiometric volume fraction for each gas.
Figure 5.25: Stoichiometric volume percent for 100 % SOC battery gas compositions
using various chemistries.
A key parameter for fire hazards is the heat of combustion. As shown in Chapter
3, the heat of combustion along with the release-rate profile for a set of cells can
be used to define the heat release rate for CFD models of fire involving thermal
runaway. Heat of combustion was calculated using Cantera to compute the differ-
ence in specific enthalpy between reactants and products. The heat of combustion
calculated corresponds to the lower heating value (LHV) of the gas mixtures. Heat
of combustion values are plotted in Figure 5.26. Although many consider LFP to be
"safer" than other chemistries, the heat of combustion of LFP cells ranges from the
lowest values to the highest values.
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Figure 5.26: Heat of combustion for 100 % SOC battery gas compositions using
various chemistries.
For many explosion models, the measure of the energy stored by the gas is the
maximum adiabatic explosion pressure (Pmax) which is calculated using Cantera as
described in 5.3.2.3. Values for maximum explosion pressure are shown in Figure
5.27.
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Figure 5.27: Maximum explosion pressure for 100 % SOC battery gas compositions
using various chemistries.
Another key input to some explosion models is the expansion ratio, σ which is defined
as the ratio of the unburned gas density divided by the burned gas density. This value
is important because this expansion is a major factor in driving the velocity of the
flame front and creating the overpressure. Expansion ratio is an input to the Sinha
Wen model as well as the FM Global model for vented gas explosions[93, 89]. The
Mulpuru and EVA models do not have expansion ratio as an input but instead use
the burned and unburned gas densities directly along with Pmax [94, 103, 104, 105].
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Figure 5.28: Expansion ratio for 100 % SOC battery gas compositions using various
chemistries.
Finally, the laminar burning velocity is a very important input to all explosion
models. Laminar burning velocity was calculated using the Cantera and GRI-Mech
as described previously. Results for laminar burning velocity are shown in Figure
5.29.
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Figure 5.29: Burning Velocity for 100 % SOC battery gas compositions using various
chemistries.
The properties above along with several other gas properties used in explosion models
were summarized based on the 21 100% SOC battery compositions. This summary
is useful to capture the range of values used in explosion models. Table 5.4 shows
the mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation for each gas property.
The battery vent gas composition database and the gas flammability models can be
used to summarize the range of fire and explosion properties possible for the experi-
ments available in the literature. This review includes battery vent gas composition
from the four most common chemistries: NMC, LFP, LCO and NCA. It also includes
data from the each major form factor: pouch, prismatic and cylindrical. Finally, it
includes data from various SOC. As others have noticed, the laminar burning veloc-
ity can vary with SOC [40, 81]. This analysis shows that burning velocity generally
increases with increasing SOC. This analysis also shows that flammability limits may
widen for increasing SOC as shown by Ma et al [121].
192
Table 5.4: Summary of fire and explosion properties for 100 % SOC battery vent
gas. Mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviations come from 21 published
gas compositions.
Parameter Mean Min Max Std Units
Gas Released per nominal capacity r 0.40 0.12 0.63 0.13 L/Wh
Lower Flammability Limit LFL 10% 5% 13% 3%
Upper Flammability Limit UFL 47% 27% 60% 11%
Stoichiometric Gas Volume Xst 21% 11% 30% 6%
Heat of Combustion ∆hc 14.3 7.8 23.7 4.88 kJ/g
Maximum Pressure Pmax 7.85 6.44 8.95 0.70 bar-g
Expansion Ratio σ 7.03 6.38 7.62 0.35
Burning Velocity Su 0.48 0.22 0.75 0.15 m/s
Unburned gas density ρu 1.16 1.12 1.21 0.03 kg/m3
Burned gas density ρb 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.01 kg/m3
Unburned Const Volume Specific Heat cv,u 779 765 794 8 J/kgK
Burned Const Volume Specific Heat cv,b 1189 1170 1208 11 J/kgK
Unburned Const Pressure Specific Heat cp,u 1072 1048 1093 14 J/kgK
Burned Const Pressure Specific Heat cp,b 1471 1444 1504 13 J/kgK
Unburned Ratio of Specific Heats γu 1.38 1.37 1.39 0.01
Burned Ratio of Specific Heats γb 1.24 1.23 1.25 0.00
Burned Gas Dynamic Viscosity µ 69.9 66.3 71.4 1.51 µPa · s
Unburned Gas Sound Speed au 347 339 355 5 m/s
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5.5 Explosion Model Sensitivity Analysis
There are many gas properties that are important inputs to vented gas explosion
models. And as can be seen in Section 5.4.1, these properties can vary greatly for
the various compositions of gas released by batteries in thermal runaway. In this
section a sensitivity analysis is conducted to determine the impact of these param-
eters on the explosion pressure generated. For this sensitivity analysis, a custom
implementation of the Mulpuru / EVA model described in Section 5.3.3.1 will be
used. The sensitivity of the Sinha/Wen model[93] is also compared. Ranges for
input values come from the range of gas properties for 100 % SOC cells described in
Section 5.4.
The sensitivity analysis was conducted using the Mulpuru and Sinha/Wen models
to calculate maximum pressure. The execution of the Monte Carlo runs and the de-
velopment of sampled inputs was performed using the Python package SALib [122].
The sensitivity analysis was used to determine global sensitivity indices using Monte
Carlo methods as described by Sobol [123]. The Saltelli method was used to gener-
ate input parameters for the Monte Carlo runs [124]. The inputs to the sensitivity
analysis consisted of ranges of gas properties. These ranges were taken from Table
5.4. Data for turbulent flame acceleration is not available for battery vent gas com-
positions. So, values for R0 were assumed to vary from 0.02 m to 0.20 m based on
Bauwens data for Hydrogen and Propane respectively [101, 102]. Values for β were
assumed to vary between 0.167 and 0.33 which corresponds to an α between 1.2 and
1.5 which is described as a typical range for hydrocarbon deflagrations as reported
by Bauwens [102]. Results from the sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 5.30.
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Figure 5.30: Sensitivity of modified Mulpuru vented deflagration model and
Sinha/Wen model maximum pressure to various gas properties
As expected, the vented gas deflagration is most sensitive to the laminar burning
velocity (Su). The deflagration is also very sensitive to the parameters describing
turbulent burning acceleration, β and R0. This is also expected. These parame-
ters increase the burning velocity when the flame radius exceeds the critical radius.
There is also a great deal of sensitivity to the variation in the parameters. The
parameters β and R0 have not been measured for battery gas and these values are
given wide ranges based on reported ranges for hydrocarbons and hydrogen. Other
parameters that were important are maximum pressure (Pmax) for the 0D Mulpuru
model and expansion ratio (σ) for the Sinha/Wen model. These two parameters are
different ways of capturing the same effect. The Sinha/Wen uses the ratio of burned
and unburned densities to capture the pressure increase due to the heated products




This chapter has shown how multiple models may be used together to estimate
the explosion hazards from lithium-ion battery systems. Furthermore, this section
has validated these models against real data and collected information on model
uncertainty. The distribution of percent error to represent model uncertainty was
collected for laminar burning velocity models, vented deflagration models and a single
degree of freedom (SDOF) structural damage model. To function, these models
require battery vent gas composition information. A library of publicly available gas
compositions was created. This library was used along with models to determine
flammability limits, laminar burning velocity, heat of combustion and other gas
properties for each composition of battery vent gas. A sensitivity analysis found
that the maximum explosion pressure is most sensitive to battery vent gas laminar
burning velocities and turbulent flame acceleration parameters.
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Chapter 6
Application of Explosion Hazard
Models
This chapter provides applications of the models described in Chapter 5. First, a
sensitivity analysis is conducted with the burning velocity, vented deflagration and
SDOF model. Next, case studies using the models are provided. Finally, some of
the models and the gas composition database is applied to determine the minimum
quantity of batteries in a given volume required to cause deflagrations.
6.1 Uncertainty Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis was completed using several of the models together to investi-
gate the effect of uncertainty on model results. For this exercise three models were
used in conjunction. This exercise starts with a range of laminar burning velocities
based on one standard deviation of burning velocities presented previously in Table
5.4. Uncertainty due to burning velocity model error is considered based on the per-
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cent error calculated for the GRI-Mech burning velocity model. The burning velocity
with error is an input to the Mulpuru vented deflagration model. The pressure-time
history results are then multiplied by an error coefficient and then used as an input
to calculate the maximum deflection of a metal panel using the SDOF model. Error
on the output of the SDOF model is then considered.
As discussed in Chapter 5, each model has some uncertainty associated with it. In
Chapter 5 the model uncertainty was summarized using the mean and standard
deviation for percent error. The percent error is simply 100 % times relative error
which is calculated as shown in Equation 6.1. The equation for relative error can
be rearranged to calculate the actual value of a parameter given a model prediction
for the parameter and a known relative error as shown in Equation 6.2. In Equation
6.2, the effect of the relative error can be rewritten as a coefficient, ε which can be
calculated from relative error as shown in Equation 6.3. For uncertainty analysis,
a range of possible ε values can be determined using plus or minus the standard
deviation of relative error (σδX ) as shown in Equations 6.4 and 6.5. The results for
the maximum and minimum ε for each model based on the standard deviation of






















Table 6.1: Standard deviation of percent error for models was used to calculate
maximum and minimum error terms (ε) to represent model errors in Monte Carlo
sensitivity analysis
Parameter % Error Std Min ε Max ε
Burning Velocity Model Error (εSu) 10.6% 0.904 1.118
Mulpuru Model Error (εP ) 60.3% 0.624 2.519
SDOF Model Error (εSDOF ) 46.7% 0.467 0.682
To propagate error through the models, appropriate coefficients (ε) are multiplied by
the results of each model as shown in Equations 6.7, 6.9 and 6.11. In addition to the
uncertainty due to model errors, this sensitivity analysis also considers uncertainty
due to an unknown gas composition. To account for uncertain gas composition, the
sensitivity analysis uses a range of laminar burning velocity values. The analysis uses
burning velocity values ranging from 0.33 m/s up to 0.63 m/s which are calculated
using Equation 6.6. These values were determined by taking one standard deviation
above and below the mean of burning velocity reported in Table 5.4.
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Sumodel = Sumean ± σSu Burning velocity input range (6.6)
Suactual = Sumodel · εSu Burning velocity with model error (6.7)
Pmodel (t) = f (Suactual) Pressure-time history from Mulpuru model (6.8)
Pactual (t) = Pmodel (t) · εP Pressure-time history with model error (6.9)
∆model (t) = f (Pactual (t)) Max displacement from SDOF model
(6.10)
∆actual (t) = ∆model (t) · εSDOF Max displacement with model error
(6.11)
This sensitivity analysis is based on single reference scenario. In this scenario the
compartment is 4.6m x 4.6m x 3.0m with a vent area of 5.4 m2. The flame accelera-
tion parameter β is fixed at 0.20 and R0 is set to 0.197 m. The SDOF model is run
using a corrugated panel as shown in Figure 6.1. Properties of the panel are shown
in Table 6.2.
Figure 6.1: Steel cross-section used for SDOF analysis.
The sensitivity analysis was conducted using the Sobol [123] method and Saltelli
[124] sampling. These calculations are performed by the SALib python package
[122]. Values reported are first-order global sensitivity indices as described by Sobol
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Table 6.2: Parameters used in SDOF model
Parameter Symbol Value Units
Moment of Inertia I 0.2976 in4
Section Modulus S 0.397 in3
Area A 0.9153 in2
Span L 118 in
Support Pin-Fixed
Tributary Width t 10.94 in
Dynamic Yield Strength Fdy 66550 psi
[123]. In total there were four uncertain parameters, laminar burning velocity (Su),
burning velocity model error (εSu), Mulpuru deflagration model error (εP ) and SDOF
model error(εSDOF ). A Monte Carlo approach was used to run the model 10,000
times using values sampled between the upper and lower bounds provided for each
input.
Figure 6.2: First-order global sensitivity indices from sensitivity analysis show that
the dominant sources of variation in pressure results and structural deflection is
uncertainty in the vented deflagration model and uncertainty associated with having
a deflagration caused by a battery gas mixture with an unknown gas composition.
The results of the sensitivity analysis are first-order global sensitivity indices for each
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uncertain input and are shown in Figure 6.2. These indices show that the dominant
sources of variation in pressure results and structural deflection is uncertainty in
the vented deflagration model and uncertainty associated with having an unknown
gas composition. As expected, uncertainty in the SDOF model does not affect the
maximum pressure. Uncertainty in the SDOF model plays a much smaller role
in the maximum deflection than the larger uncertainties coming from the vented
deflagration model. These results suggest that to reduce the uncertainty associated
with damage it is very important to know the gas composition for the particular cells
involved. These results also indicate that since the effect of burning velocity model
error is small, it may be appropriate to use models for burning velocity and avoid
the expense of conducting experiments. As expected, the uncertainty in vented gas
deflagration pressure is the largest source of uncertainty.
6.2 Case Studies
The explosion models previously described can be used to explore the explosion
incidents that have occurred.
6.2.1 Kona Electric Vehicle in Garage Case Study
In July 2019 in Montreal Canada the thermal runaway of a battery of a Hyundai
Kona resulted in an explosion that launched the garage door across the street, to-
taled the car and damaged the garage. This incident can be used as a case study to
demonstrate the usefulness of the explosion analysis approaches described previously.
The Hyundai Kona is a subcompact SUV which was released in 2017 with a gasoline
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engine and in 2018 as an electric vehicle. The Kona is available with two different
batteries, a short range version with a 39.2 kWh capacity and a long range version
with a 64 kWh capacity. These capacities are typical for modern electric vehicles.
The Tesla Model 3 for example has battery options ranging from 54 kWh to 82 kWh
while the BMW i3, which is smaller, has options for capacity between 18.2 kWh and
37.9 kWh. The 2019 Kona involved in the incident likely had a 64 kWh battery pack,
since this is the only battery pack available in North America[14]. Figure 6.3 shows
a 2019 Hyundai Kona EV.
Figure 6.3: 2019 Hyundai Kona EV[12]
The battery pack for the Kona is located in a metal housing underneath the floor of
the vehicle as shown in Figure 6.4. Inside the battery pack there are 5 modules as
shown in Figure 6.5. These modules sit on top of cooling channels which circulate
liquid coolant. The three modules side-by-side in the front of the vehicle each contain
20 cell groups. The two modules stacked towards the rear of the vehicle each contain
19 cell groups[14].
Each cell group consists of 3 pouch cells which are connected in parallel. The pouch
cells are mounted with brackets which hold them in place[14]. The pouch cells are
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Figure 6.4: Hyundai Kona battery pack is located inside a metal housing underneath
the floor of the vehicle[13]
packed closely together very similar to the cells used in the array experiments in
Chapter 2. This packing is needed to reduce the volume of the battery pack and also
serves to provide confinement to cells against swelling. However as seen in the array
experiments, this arrangement makes it very easy for thermal runaway to propagate
from one cell to the next. The cooling system, being located on the bottom surface
of the cells is almost certainly designed for regular use and it is doubtful that it
would provide much benefit in preventing runaway propagation.
In total there are 294 cells. Using the number of cells, a nominal voltage of 3.6 V
and the total energy stored, the cell capacity is calculated to be about 60 Ah. The
cells are LG Chem pouch cells with a NMC 622 chemistry and tabs on the two short
ends. NMC 622 means that the cathode chemistry is 60% Nickel, 20% manganese
and 20% cobalt [14]. A photograph of a similar cell is shown in Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.5: Hyundai battery pack consists of 5 modules, each module contains 19
or 20 cell groups (which are shown in alternating red and blue). Each cell group
consists of 3 pouch cells connected in parallel. [14]
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Figure 6.6: Cells are LG Chem Pouch Cells similar to this photo [14]
The cells described in the Kona [14] are very similar (or possibly the same) as the
cells that have been tested by Essl et al. [1]. Essl performed overheating, overcharge
and nail penetration runaway experiments on 60 Ah, NMC 622, automotive pouch
cells with graphite anodes and 1:1 ratio of EC:EMC electrolyte. For the purposes
of this analysis, it shall be assumed that the Kona cells failed similarly to the cell’s
Essl failed using overheating. In Essl’s experiments, the cells were put into thermal
runaway by heating and then the vent gases composition was measured using gas
chromatography. In these experiments the cells produced 1.56 L/Ah or 0.43 L/Wh
of gas when failed due to overheating [1]. This relation can be used to estimate the
total volume of gas that can be produced if all of the cells failed due to overheating.
The composition of this gas is shown in Table 6.3.
The models for laminar flame speed and flammability limits described in 5.3.2 were
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Table 6.3: Species Volume Percentage for gases released by 60 Ah NMC 622 Pouch










run with this gas composition to determine the relevant properties of this gas mix-
ture. For this gas mixture LFL is 8% and UFL is 35%. The stoichiometric volume
concentration of battery gas is 14 %. The maximum laminar flame speed is 0.45 m/s
and the maximum explosion pressure is 8.6 bar. Ternary plots can be used to visu-
alize the flammability limits and how laminar flame speed and maximum explosion
pressure vary with the amount of air, fuel and inert products in the mixture.
The owner reported that the vehicle was not charging at the time of the incident
[125]. Given that the vehicle was parked in the garage of the owner, it is reasonable
to assume that since the owner was not charging it, it must already be at or near
fully charged. Another evidence that the car was close to full charge is that the cells
did go into thermal runaway. Essl’s work on similar cells found that 30% SOC 60
Ah NMC 622 cells did not go into an intense thermal runaway when overheated[1].
Going forward in the review of this incident, it will be assumed for these reasons
that the cells were fully charged and therefore failed in a manner similarly to Essl’s
100% SOC overheating experiment.
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Using the battery capacity of 64 kWh and a gas release of 0.43 L/Wh, the total
volume of gas released is 27500 L or 972 ft3. This gas release occurred in a typical-
looking single car garage. Single car garage widths are typically 12 to 16 ft, typical
lengths are 20 to 24 ft and heights are between 7 ft and 10 ft[126]. The volume of
a 14 ft x 24 ft x 8 ft garage would be 2688 ft3 or 76116 L. If as the gas is released
only air is expelled from the garage the average concentration of battery gas in the
garage after all is gas is released would be 36%. This puts the mixture just barely
above the upper flammability limits of 35%. Since battery some gas escapes the
compartment and new air will enter, this mixture will likely always remain within
the flammability limits.
A vented gas explosion model can be used to approximate possible explosion scenar-
ios. To approximate worst-case conditions, a homogeneous stoichiometric mixture
of 14% battery vent gas is assumed. For comparison to a less than ideal mixture, a
lean homogenous mixture of 10% battery gas will be used. The modified version of
the Mupluru model described previously will be used. The model has been modified
to allow for the vent to open a specific pressure. For this scenario, garage door
dimensions of 7 ft x 12 ft will be used for the vent area. There is limited data as
to the blast resistance of garage doors. However, for wind load pressures, garage
doors have been found to be weaker than the rest of the structure. Based on data
for garage door failures under wind pressures, a failure pressure of 0.018 bar is used
[127]. Results of the model for the stoichiometric and lean mixtures are shown in
Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Pressure-time history for vented gas explosion in garage.
In Figure 6.7, it is apparent that the stoichiometric mixture produces a much higher
maximum pressure. For the stoichiometric mixture with a garage door is already
open, the pressure simply rises to a maximum value of 0.055 bar before rapidly drop-
ping as the event ends. When the garage door begins closed there is a rapid-build up
to 0.018 bar, which is then relieved when the garage door fails and becomes an open
vent. After the garage door fails the pressure rapidly drops and then continues to
increase to a maximum of 0.055 bar. For the stoichiometric case, having the garage
door already open serves only to reduce the impulse, while the peak pressure remains
about the same. For the lean mixture, whether or not the garage door starts open
has a large impact on both the impulse and peak pressure. Since the lean mixture
has a slower laminar burning velocity, the vent area of the garage door is sufficient
to keep pressures much lower. However, if the garage door starts out closed, then
the maximum pressure in the compartment is determined by the failure pressure of
the door.
In the actual event, the explosion launched the garage door across the street[7].
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The pressure reduction due to the venting likely made it possible for the rest of the
building to remain standing. It is unclear whether the damaged roof was caused by
the explosion, fire or firefighter intervention. As shown by the models, the failure of
the garage door serves to lower the pressure inside the garage and thus prevent the
structural collapse of the entire building.
Figure 6.8: Hyundai Kona on tow truck after incident (Mathiue Wagner - Radio
Canada) [7]
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Figure 6.9: Garage door thrown across the street after Hyundai Kona thermal run-
away caused explosion. (Mathiue Wagner - Radio Canada) [7]
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Figure 6.10: Garage after Hyundai Kona thermal runaway caused explosion which
threw garage door across the street. It is unclear whether the damaged roof was
caused by the explosion, fire or firefighter intervention. (Mathiue Wagner - Radio
Canada) [7]
6.2.2 Surprise Arizona ESS Explosion Case Study
In April 2019, a 2 MWh ESS system in Surprise, AZ exploded resulting in 8 fire-
fighters being injured [22, 23]. The explosion threw a firefighter 73 feet and another
firefighter 30 feet, causing serious trauma in addition to chemical burns and chemi-
cal inhalation exposure [5]. This incident comes after a 2012 fire involving the same
electric utility [24].
The ESS involved consisted of a 2 MW / 2 MWh system inside of a dedicated ESS
building near a substation in Surprise, AZ. The system is owned by the electric
utility APS, was integrated by Fluence and uses cells provided by LG-Chem. The
building measures 15.2m x 3.96m x 3.66m (50 ft x 13 ft x 12 ft). The building does
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not have any vents intended for deflagration venting[128]. In practice, the deflagra-
tion was vented by the failure of the two exterior doors. This produces a vent area
of approximately 3.9 m2.
The interior of the building is occupied by only the energy storage system and sup-
porting equipment. The ESS consists of 27 racks, each rack containing 14 modules.
Each module contains 28 cells arranged in a 2P14S configuration. The cells are LG
Chem JP3 pouch cells[128]. These cells are intended for high-power applications. At
the top of each rack are supporting electrical equipment including a battery protec-
tion unit (BPU), node controller and power conversion system (PCS).
On April 19, 2019 at 16:54:30 the first measured deviation occurred as the voltage
of rack 15, module 2, battery 7 dropped by 0.24V. Within eight seconds the voltage
dropped another 3.8V. At this time the total voltage drop is approximately equal
to the operating voltage of a single cell. At 16:54:40, temperature increases were
recorded at the rear of rack 15. Less than a minute after the first voltage drop,
at 16:55:20 smoke alarms were activated and circuit breakers were opened. As de-
signed, 30 seconds after activation at 16:55:50 the clean agent suppression system
discharged NOVEC 1230 agent. Fluence sent a field service engineer who eventually
called the fire department because of a suspected fire. Fire department personnel
arrived at 17:48 [128]. 911 callers had reported smoke in the area and a bad smell [5].
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Figure 6.11: ESS Building upon arrival of firefighters[5]
At 18:04, responding firefighters called for the HAZMAT (hazardous materials) team.
Between 18:37 and 19:15, the HAZMAT team conducted three 360 degree size-ups of
scene while taking gas measurements. During these size-ups, CO and HCN sensors
were out of range with measurements greater than 500 ppm and 50 ppm respectively
[5]. At approximately 19:50, the gas/vapor mixture was no longer observed to be
coming out of the building, CO and HCN levels were heading towards safe levels and
the firefighters made a plan to open the door.
214
Figure 6.12: Firefighters opening door a few minutes before explosion.[5]
The door was opened to the ESS at 20:00:54. A deflagration occurred which fire-
fighters described as a loud noise and a jet of flame extending 75 ft outward and 20
ft vertically from the open door. During this event, the two firefighters by the door
were thrown from their positions. One firefighter went through a chainlink fence and
ended up in a bush 73 ft from the door. The flame extended such that the bush
the firefighter landed in was burning after the deflagration. The other firefighter was
thrown 30 ft. All four firefighters that had been in the area of the deflagration lost
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consciousness. [5].
Figure 6.13: Rear door was blown off and wall was deformed after ESS explosion.
[5]
Figure 6.14: Green side door was blown off the building and into the fence. [5]
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Inside the ESS, it was found that only a single rack (rack 15) was involved in the
incident. This rack was blackened and melted aluminum was found on the floor
below it. Investigators determined that there was not evidence of significant flaming
combustion within the compartment [128].
The events of this incident generally align well with experimental and modeling re-
sults of lithium-ion battery thermal runaway incidents. The voltage drop of 4.08V
noticed at the beginning of the incident is consistent with observations of voltage
dropping by the cell voltage for each that fails as seen in the experiments in Chapter
2. The propagation of thermal runaway from a single pouch cell into adjacent pouch
cells was also observed in Chapter 2. In this incident runaway also propagated from
module to module within the rack.
Gas release and gas properties is not publicly available for these cells, so the closest
available data will be used. Viswanathan and Paiss report gas release data taken
from a UL 9540A report [2]. This data is for a 72.5 Ah NMC pouch cell that is
used for energy storage applications. The LG Chem JP3 pouch cells used in the
McMicken facility are NMC pouch cells with a capacity of 64 Ah. The models previ-
ously described were used to calculate gas properties for the mixture. The mixture
is given in Table 6.4 and the calculated properties used for explosion hazard analysis
are provided in Table 6.5.
Using r = 0.37L/Wh and the rack energy of 93.8 kWh, the volume of released gas is
estimated to be 34.7m3. With dimensions of 50 ft x 12 ft x 13 ft, the volume of the
building is 220 m3. The volume of gas is 15.7 % of the volume of the entire build-
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Table 6.4: Species Volume Percentage for gases released by 72.5 Ah NMC Pouch







Table 6.5: Gas Release Properties based on NMC Cell described by Viswanathan[2]
Parameter Symbol Value Units
Gas Released per nominal capacity r 0.37 L/Wh
Lower Flammability Limit LFL 6 %
Upper Flammability Limit UFL 36%
Stoichiometric Volume Concentration Xf 17%
Heat of Combustion (LHV) ∆hc 17.1 kJ/g
Maximum Pressure Pmax 8.54 bar
Expansion Ratio σ 7.30
Burning Velocity Su 0.53 m/s
Unburned gas density ρu 1.17 kg/m3
Burned gas density ρb 0.16 kg/m3
Unburned Ratio of Specific Heats γu 1.37
Burned Ratio of Specific Heats γb 1.24
Unburned Gas Sound Speed au 345 m/s
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ing. Given a LFL of 6 %, this means that it is possible for a well-mixed flammable
mixture to fill the entire structure.
The ternary plot shown in 6.15 was created to describe the sequence of events that
led to the explosion. The ternary plot represents the average composition of the air
in the structure as a mixture between battery gas (fuel), air and inert. This ternary
plot was created using combustion products of nitrogen, carbon dioxide and water
as inert. Using NOVEC 1230 as the inert would produce different flammable ranges
but follow the same general shape.
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Figure 6.15: Ternary plot showing flammability ranges for NMC vent gas, air and
inert products mixtures
The events of this incident are as follows:
1. Initially the compartment is full of air.
2. After thermal runaway of the first cell(s) a small amount of battery gas (fuel)
is introduced into an environment which is still mostly air.
3. After activation of the smoke alarm system, the inert clean agent (NOVEC-
1230) is released in an attempt to extinguish all combustion in the compart-
ment.
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4. As the cells continue in runaway, more flammable battery vent gas is released
into the room.
5. Air is introduced into the building through leakage and eventually through the
opening of the door by firefighters.
6. A flammable mixture now exists and can be ignited if put into contact with
hot surfaces (which may exist due to runaway) or to electrical arcing (which
may exist due to high voltage batteries and damage).
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Figure 6.16: Ternary plot showing laminar flame speed for mixtures of NMC vent
gas, air and inert products mixtures
6.3 Minimum Energy Storage to Produce Explosions
A common first step in explosion analysis is to determine whether or not an explo-
sion can occur. As discussed in section 5.1, there are several pathways that can lead
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to different explosion scenarios. There are three different explosion events that are
of interest:
1. Sufficient gas is released and good mixing does not occur, which makes it
possible for a partial volume deflagration to occur and cause damage greater
than a threshold pressure, Pdam.
2. Sufficient gas is released and mixing occurs such that the entire volume can
reach LFL. An explosion may occur when an ignition source is provided any-
where in the entire volume.
3. Sufficient gas, combustion products and suppression agents are released such
that combustion in the entire volume is oxygen limited. Given a source of
ignition, this makes it possible for an explosion to occur only after additional
air has been introduced. If only battery vent gas has been released, this occurs
at gas releases exceeding XUFL.
In a single incident, explosions may be possible from each of these scenarios. Par-
tial volume deflagrations are more likely early in an event before enough gas has
been released to fill the entire volume and before the gases have time to mix well
with surrounding air. As more gas is released it is possible to achieve an average
concentration exceeding LFL in the entire volume. This larger volume of gas may
reach any ignition source in the room. If the volume of released gases, combustion
products and suppression agents exceeds UFL in a compartment then the explosion
may be caused by the re-introduction of air. Generally, as the volume of released gas
increases, the chances of explosion increase as more means to an explosion become
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possible.
Three critical volumes of gas can be used to determine which types of explosion
are possible. These critical volumes can be expressed as average concentrations by




Xave ≥ Xpvd = Xst
Pdam − P0
Pmax − P0
Partial volume deflagration possible [71] (6.12)
Xave ≥ XLFL Full Volume deflagration possible (6.13)
Xave ≥ XUFL Oxygen-limited deflagration possible (6.14)
Using the library of gas compositions and gas properties it is possible to calculate the
minimum average concentration Xpvd required to produce an explosion exceeding
0.02 bar. This can be done for each gas composition. Results are shown in Figure
6.21.
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Figure 6.17: Minimum average concentration to cause a partial volume deflagration
for various gas compositions from literature.
These concentrations can be converted to energy storage density using the gas re-












Based on the gas composition data summarized in 5, the minimum amount of energy
stored per volume required to reach partial volume deflagration, LFL and UFL
concentrationsis summarized in Figures 6.21, 6.19 and 6.20.
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Figure 6.18: Minimum energy stored per unit volume required for partial volume
deflagration
Figure 6.19: Minimum energy stored per unit volume required to reach LFL in full
volume
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Figure 6.20: Minimum energy stored per unit volume required to exceed UFL in full
volume
These minimum energy stored per volume can be used to develop a graph showing
the limits for each type of explosion. This can be used to compare explosion hazards.
It can also be used to determine what types of explosions are possible for a given
energy stored and volume.
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Figure 6.21: Minimum energy stored per unit volume required for partial volume
deflagration
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter the models from Chapter 5 were applied in various ways. A sensi-
tivity analysis was used to determine the effect of unknown gas mixtures and model
error to structural displacement and damage of a steel panel wall system. The wall’s
displacement and damage is most sensitive to the error in the vented deflagration
model and the variation of burning velocity due to the range of possible battery vent
gas compositions.
A case study was performed based on the Hyundai Kona explosion in Montreal
Canada. This case study is evidence of how a typical car in a typical garage has
enough energy stored to cause a serious explosion. This case study showed how
effective the large garage door area was at reducing the overpressure in the garage
and preventing the complete collapse of the entire garage.
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The McMicken Arizona case study was useful to look at a series of events can lead
to an explosion. A ternary plot was used to demonstrate how the gas composition
in the compartment could have changed throughout the incident and made the ex-
plosion possible.
Finally, the concept of partial volume deflagrations is applied to battery systems to
determine the quantity of energy storage required per volume to cause a deflagration.
These values are compared against experiments and incidents to show how much fuel




This work has covered a broad range of topics spanning the breadth and depth of fire
and explosion hazards associated with lithium-ion battery thermal runaway propa-
gation.
Chapter 2 examined the thermal runaway process for both single pouch cells and
arrays of pouch cells in direct contact. These experiments show that the thermal
runaway process can be different in cells failed with heaters when compared to those
failed to due propagation from other cells. Cells which failed due to runaway propa-
gation exhibit less damage inside and fail more slowly. This chapter also highlighted
the usefulness of load cells to measure the change in clamping stress during the
course of thermal runaway experiments. The load cell clamping stress data is useful
because it provides insight into the buildup of pressure within a cell as it heats up
and goes into thermal runaway.
Chapter 3 looks at thermal runaway propagation in a more complex geometry. In
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this chapter single cells are failed to better understand the behavior of a 4.8 kWh
module during thermal runaway propagation. Three 4.8 kWh modules are put into
thermal runaway and temperatures are recorded inside the module and rack as well
as throughout the compartment. A CFD model is developed to be able to ap-
proximate the heat release from lithium-ion cell thermal runaway. An approach is
demonstrated to use CFD modeling to model fires with thermal runaway propagation
in a compartment. The model performs well at predicting temperatures throughout
the compartment, although the model seems to underpredict lower level tempera-
tures near the module. The model can also be used to predict heat fluxes and gas
concentrations. A key limitation of this model is that it requires knowledge of the
thermal runaway propagation times and the polycarbonate burning rate to be able
to estimate heat release rate.
Chapter 4 describes the development of systems to conduct explosion experiments
with lithium-ion batteries. These systems are used to conduct explosion experiments
in enclosures from small laboratory scale up to full-sized closet scale. These exper-
iments demonstrate the challenges associated with lithium-ion battery explosions.
Pouch cells and prismatic cells are both observed to be capable of ejecting hot parti-
cles and igniting deflagrations on their own. Oxygen-limited explosions are observed
in which ignition is not possible until after the gases have diluted with air. A partial
volume deflagration is observed in a closet, which causes a sufficient overpressure
to fail the closet door. This demonstrates the possibility of battery systems both
releasing the flammable gas and providing the ignition source to cause a deflagration
even before detection and ventilation systems can detect the hazard.
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Chapter 5 describes a number of models that can be used to determine whether an
explosion hazard exists and what consequences may occur. This chapter provides
a comprehensive review of gas compositions produced by lithium-ion cells in ther-
mal runaway. It uses models to determine a variety of properties for each vent gas
mixture. Models are described for determining flammability limits, laminar flame
speed maximum explosion pressure, heat of combustion and other gas properties.
Experimental data is used to validate and characterize model error for two laminar
flame speed models. Vent gas explosion models are also reviewed. A 0D ODE based
model is modified to be able to predict pressure time histories including the effects of
vent opening pressures and turbulent flame acceleration. Vented deflagration models
are validated against experimental data and a model error is characterized. A single
degree of freedom, structural response to blast model is also validated and its model
error is characterized. These models can be used together to understand possible
consequences due to a lithium-ion battery involved explosion.
Chapter 6 applies the models from Chapter 5. A sensitivity analysis shows that
structural damage is most sensitive to model error in the vented deflagration model.
Case studies of incidents are reviewed to understand how models can provide insight
into their outcomes. The Montreal garage explosion incident is used to demonstrate
the usefulness of the vented deflagration model. The incident and model show the
importance of having a large vent area available which serves to reduce the pressure
and reduce damage to other parts of the structure. The McMicken Arizona incident
is used to demonstrate the usefulness of ternary plots in determining the flamma-
bility of flammable gas mixtures for battery incidents. Partial volume deflagration
mixing models along with battery gas data is applied to determine the minimum
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amount of gas required to cause a deflagration. This analysis reveals that damaging
explosions are possible with rooms in which the volume of gas released is well less
than 1 % of the volume of the compartment.
The experiments in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 along with the models discussed in chapter
5 and 6 provide insight into the unique hazard of explosions involving lithium-ion
batteries. Unlike many flammable gas explosions, lithium-ion batteries are capable
of producing both a gaseous fuel and an ignition source. The location and timing
of these fuel and ignition sources along with the geometry of the system and its
surroundings can have very large effects on the outcome of the incident. Incident
outcomes can include gas release only (as seen in the LFP cells in Appendix B), fire
only (as seen in NMC modules in Chapter 3) and explosion as seen in Chapter 4. It
is also possible that in a single incident gas accumulation, explosion and fire can all
occur for the same compartment at different times as shown in Section 4.3.1.
Lithium-ion cells and systems can provide multiple ignition opportunities. As shown
in Figure 3.8, an ignition can occur due to an electric arc even before intense venting
due to thermal runaway. In this case the 4.2 V of just a single cell was sufficient to
ignite the flammable vapors coming from the cell. Later, as intense venting occurs,
ignition is possible due to the ejection of hot solid materials. These materials may
be glowing hot and can be seen in Figures 4.22 and 4.31. After a cell has gone
into thermal runaway and produced a flame, this flame can cause piloted ignition
to plastic housings and subsequent cells which in turn can pilot later gas releases
due to runaway. Piloted ignition is evident in the continued burning of the module
in open air described in 3.3.3. Although not observed in these experiments, it may
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be possible that cells themselves may be hot enough to cause ignition after thermal
runaway.
The flammable gas release profile for lithium-ion batteries is also unique. The release
of flammable gas in a lithium-ion battery system depends on the kinetics of thermal
runaway which drives the heat generation. As heat is generated, runaway reactions
occur which release flammable gases. This heat may transfer into other cells and
cause the propagation of thermal runaway as seen in Chapter 2 and 3. Having a gas
release driven by heat generation is similar to solid and liquid fires in which the heat
released by a fire causes vaporizaton or pyrolysis which produces more flammable
gases. Most conventional fires can be extinguished through cooling or oxygen reduc-
tion because the fire needs heat and oxygen to grow. Unlike conventional solid and
liquid fires, the reactions causing heat and gas generation in a lithium-ion cell are
inside the cell. This makes them very difficult to cool sufficiently to stop runaway.
Since the reactants for thermal runaway are all self-contained in the cell, the removal
of oxygen may not stop the thermal runaway process either. For example, in the
array experiments in Section 2.3, a single cell was failed in a nitrogen environment
and thermal runaway propagated to the remaining cells in the array. The ability
of lithium-ion cells to continue to produce flammable gases regardless of oxygen de-
privation or external cooling makes them a unique fire and explosion hazard. The
generation of gases is also different from most flammable gas explosions as well. Un-
like a flammable gas pipeline leak, the flow of flammable gases cannot be turned off.
Unlike the release of flammable gases from a container, it is usually not possible to
plug or cool a cell to stop the release of flammable gases. Another key difference in
fuel release for lithium-ion cells is the time profile. Lithium-ion cells often release no
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gas or only small amounts of gas while heating, but then release a very large amount
of gas in a short time period as they progress in thermal runaway. This unusual gas
release time profile can also influence the outcome.
A key factor in the outcome of a runaway event is the timing of the ignition source
and fuel release. For both the pouch cells and the prismatic cells used in this work,
the hot particle ejection ignition source occurs early in the intense venting process.
For the pouch cells, ignition may not have been reliable because the surrounding
mixture of gases wasn’t flammable. For the prismatic cells, ignition started out as
intermittent as initially there was either too much shear or only pockets of gas were
flammable. As thermal runaway propagates and more cells become involved, this
will generate more flammable gas and more ignition sources and, unless oxygen de-
prived, would be expected to increase the chances of ignition.
Another factor which determines the outcome of a runaway incident is the geome-
try of the battery system and the compartment. As shown with the 94 Ah cell, it
caused a jet flame when in a larger room (Figure 3.9), but caused an explosion with
an overpressure sufficient to break the drywall door panel when confined in a smaller
closet space. The same cell within a module inside a very leaky rack produced a
deflagration with a audible bang which kicked up dust but did not cause any over-
pressure damage.
Available deflagration venting area is another factor in the consequences of explo-
sions. This can be seen in real incidents. In the Houston rail car incident, the rail
car did not have any weak area which could fail and act as a deflagration vent. Since
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excess pressure could not vent, the car pressurized until the entire car ruptured
catastrophically. In contrast, for the Montreal Hyundai Kona explosion, pressure
vented through a large garage door, which reduced the pressure sufficiently to make
it possible for most of the rest of the garage to remain standing.
This work has investigated the fire and explosion hazards of lithium-ion battery
systems using a wide range of experiments and models. Thermal runaway of just a
single cell in lithium-ion systems can, unless mitigated, propagate to entire systems
and cause the release of large amounts of flammable gas. Depending on ventilation
conditions, ignition sources and fire suppression these flammable gases can either
cause a fire or an explosion. This work has demonstrated one way to develop a CFD
model to replicate an experiment featuring a battery system in a compartment fire.
This work has also described models that can be used to estimate possible explosion
consequences. Models developed to estimate the minimum quantity of energy storage
needed to cause an explosion show that even very small amounts of batteries when
put in a small space are capable of causing explosions.
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Appendix A
Module Experiments Supplemental Data
This appendix provides additional details from the module and rack experiments
described in Chapter 3.
Figure A.1: Location of thermocouples in burn structure compartment [15]
Experiment Setup
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Open Air Module Experiment
Cell Temperatures For the open module experiment, cell temperatures were
recorded for both short sides (East and West) of each cell as well as the cell vent for
each cell. Locations of the thermocouples are presented in Figure 3.3.
Figure A.2 summarizes the temperature data collected from all the cells. The first
seven cells are shown above and the next seven are shown below.
Figure A.2: Open Module Experiment Cell Temperatures
The temperatures for each cell are shown individually in Figures A.3, A.4 and A.5.
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(a) Cell 1 (b) Cell 2
(c) Cell 3 (d) Cell 4
(e) Cell 5 (f) Cell 6
Figure A.3: Open Module Experiment Cell Temperatures
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(a) Cell 7 (b) Cell 8
(c) Cell 9 (d) Cell 10
(e) Cell 11 (f) Cell 12
Figure A.4: Open Module Experiment Cell Temperatures
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(a) Cell 13 (b) Cell 14
Figure A.5: Open Module Experiment Cell Temperatures
241
Module Gas Temperatures Gas temperatures were also recorded within the
module.
Figure A.6: Open Module Experiment Module Gas Temperatures
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Compartment Gas Temperatures Gas temperatures were measured through-
out the compartment using 32 thermocouples placed on 8 trees as shown in Figure
A.1. Temperatures are measured at 4 different elevations, which are called ceiling,
upper, mid and lower. Figure A.7 shows all the compartment gas temperatures
over time from both the experiment and model. Figures A.8, A.9 and A.10 shows
the gas temperatures for each tree individually for comparison between model and
experiment.
Figure A.7: Open Module Experiment Compartment Gas Temperatures from Ex-
periment and Model
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(a) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 1-4 (b) Model Gas Temperatures TC 1-4
(c) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 5-8 (d) Model Gas Temperatures TC 5-8
(e) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 9-12 (f) Model Gas Temperatures TC 9-12
Figure A.8: Open Module experiment compartment gas temperatures from experi-
ment and model.
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(a) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 13-16 (b) Model Gas Temperatures TC 13-16
(c) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 17-20 (d) Model Gas Temperatures TC 17-20
(e) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 21-24 (f) Model Gas Temperatures TC 21-24
Figure A.9: Open Module experiment compartment gas temperatures from experi-
ment and model.
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(a) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 25-28 (b) Model Gas Temperatures TC 25-28
(c) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 29-32 (d) Model Gas Temperatures TC 29-32




Cell Temperatures For the first rack experiment, cell temperatures were recorded
for both short sides (East and West) of each cell as well as the cell vent for each cell.
Locations of the thermocouples are presented in Figure A.11.
Figure A.11: First Rack Experiment Cell TC Locations
Figure 3.22 summarizes the temperature data collected from all the cells. The tem-
peratures for each cell are shown individually in Figures A.12, A.13 and A.14.
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(a) Cell 1 (b) Cell 2
(c) Cell 3 (d) Cell 4
(e) Cell 5 (f) Cell 6
Figure A.12: First Rack Experiment Cell Temperatures
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(a) Cell 7 (b) Cell 8
(c) Cell 9 (d) Cell 10
(e) Cell 11 (f) Cell 12
Figure A.13: First Rack Experiment Cell Temperatures
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(a) Cell 13 (b) Cell 14
Figure A.14: First Rack Experiment Cell Temperatures
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Module Rack Gas Temperatures Gas temperatures were also recorded within
the module and within the rack.
Figure A.15: First Rack Experiment Module and Rack Gas Temperatures
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Compartment Gas Temperatures Gas temperatures were measured through-
out the compartment using 32 thermocouples placed on 8 trees as shown in Figure
A.1. Temperatures are measured at 4 different elevations, which are called ceiling,
upper, mid and lower. Figure A.16 shows all the compartment gas temperatures
over time from both the experiment and model. Figures A.17, A.18 and A.19 shows
the gas temperatures for each tree individually for comparison between model and
experiment.
Figure A.16: First Rack Experiment Compartment Gas Temperatures from Experi-
ment and Model
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(a) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 1-4 (b) Model Gas Temperatures TC 1-4
(c) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 5-8 (d) Model Gas Temperatures TC 5-8
(e) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 9-12 (f) Model Gas Temperatures TC 9-12
Figure A.17: First rack experiment compartment gas temperatures from experiment
and model.
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(a) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 13-16 (b) Model Gas Temperatures TC 13-16
(c) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 17-20 (d) Model Gas Temperatures TC 17-20
(e) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 21-24 (f) Model Gas Temperatures TC 21-24
Figure A.18: First rack experiment compartment gas temperatures from experiment
and model.
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(a) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 25-28 (b) Model Gas Temperatures TC 25-28
(c) Experiment Gas Temperatures TC 29-32 (d) Model Gas Temperatures TC 29-32




























































































































































(b) FDS CFD Model Temperature and Heat Fluxes




There are many different chemistries and form factors for battery systems. While
it is not possible to examine every combination of form factors and lithium-ion
chemistries, an effort was made to at least briefly examine common types of systems.
In this section thermal runaway, gas generation and thermal runaway propagation
behavior is examined experimentally for a system comprised of arrays of cylindrical
lithium-ion iron phosphate (LFP) cells.
These experiments are performed using commercially available LFP modules. The
modules measure 197mm x 132mm x 173mm and have a mass of 5.3 kg. Each mod-
ule contains 48 cylindrical 26650 cells. The cells are arranged 8s6p, meaning the
cells are connected in parallel in groups of 6 and 8 of these groups are connected
in series. Each cell has a nominal voltage of 3.2V and a nominal capacity of 11.84
Wh. As a whole the system has a nominal voltage of 25.6 V and a nominal capacity
of 22.2 Ah or 568.3 Wh. Figure B.1 shows the module along with a module that
has had sides cut off to show the cells inside of the module. Internally the cells are
arranged in an array which is 6 cells long (cells connected in parallel), 4 cells wide
and 2 cells high. Above the cell array is a circuit board which provides cell balanc-
ing, short circuit protection, high voltage cut off and low voltage cut off. On one
side of the cell array are plastic spacer grids which fill the excess space in the module.
The objective of these experiments is to quantify the composition and volume of gases
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Figure B.1: LFP module and cut-open LFP module showing cylindrical cells array
inside
produced when the cells go into thermal runaway. Another objective is to produce
initial observations of the thermal runaway propagation process for a commercially-
available LFP system. To accomplish these objectives, two experiments were ex-
ecuted. To observe how the thermal runaway propagation process could occur in
an installation, the first experiment thermally fails the cell on a stand inside of a
closet-sized test structure. To measure the volume and species of gas released dur-
ing thermal runaway, a second experiment was performed inside of a pressure vessel
which was inerted with nitrogen.
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Closet Experiment
Experiment Setup For the closet experiment, the module was heated by placing
it on top of heated aluminum blocks. The aluminum blocks measure 65 x 200 mm x
12 mm and each contain three 2 inch long, 0.25 inch diameter cylindrical cartridge
heaters. Each cartridge heater has an output of 200 W at 120V. The setup uses
two aluminum block heaters. Each aluminum block heater supports about half of
the module. For this experiment, only one of the aluminum blocks was heated. The
other was available as a backup in the event that thermal runaway did not propa-
gate. The module can be seen on top of the aluminum heater blocks in Figure B.2.
Figure B.2: Module on top of aluminum block heaters in closet before experiment.
The experiment was conducted in a closet constructed for the purposes of testing
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fire and explosion hazards of lithium-ion battery systems in small spaces. The closet
construction is described in Section 4.2.6.
During the experiment the module was heated using one of the aluminum block
heaters until thermal runaway initiated. Afterwards thermal runaway was allowed
to propagate from cell to cell. The heater was positioned such that half of the bot-
tom cells were directly above it. The other half of the bottom cells were positioned
on top of the other heater, which was not used since runaway propagated from one
side to the other from cell to cell.
The module is supported by aluminum block heaters and surrounded by aluminum
angle to prevent movement. This is mounted to stand which is placed on a load cell
towards one side of the closet. Inside the closet there are two windows for cameras,
two thermocouple trees, and two arc igniters to ignite flammable gases. The closet
is closed with a door for the duration of this experiment.
During the experiment the compartment temperature was measured using two trees
of 24 gauge type K thermocouples, one near the center of the compartment and
another offset from one corner. The temperature of the aluminum heater blocks is
also measured using thermocouples. The mass of the entire setup was also measured
throughout the experiment using the load cell.
Results Audio and video taken during the experiment show that it takes about
2036 seconds from the time of the first cell runaway until the last cell runaway. Dur-
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Figure B.3: LFP Module in closet before experiment.
ing this period, the thermal runaway propagation process through the cells results
in about 42 audible popping, hissing or squealing noises. Video shows that these
noises are associated with the release of a white cloud containing flammable gases,
particulate matter and electrolyte.
Before the first noticeable popping noise and white cloud, the module produces a
small amount of smoke. This could be due to melting and burning of the plastic
casing exposed to the aluminum block heater. The first noticeable visual and au-
dio cues of runaway occur at 1402 seconds when there are 5 popping noises in a 9
second period, each sound is accompanied by a release of a white cloud containing
gases, liquids and particulate. Figure B.4 shows the module before the first pop-
ping noise, at the time just after a popping noise and ten seconds later after the 5
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popping noises have occurred and a white cloud has been produced which mostly
obscures view of the far wall. After the first few thermal runaway events, the room
became obscured with the white/gray cloud caused by cell thermal runaway releases.
Figure B.4: LFP module before first popping noise, during first popping noise and
after 5 popping noises which occur in a 9 second period.
In addition to audio and visual cues of thermal runaway, the process can be seen in
the mass data. Figure B.5 shows the module mass as a function of time along with
the first derivative of module mass. The spikes in the first derivative of mass show
times when cells are rupturing and releasing clouds of gas and other material. In
total there are 26 spikes that produce a mass loss rate greater than 1 g/s. These
spikes vary in magnitude. Six of the mass loss spike events result in a mass loss of
more than 3 grams in one second. The remaining 20 mass loss spikes cause only a
little more than 1 gram of mass loss in one second. This is an indication that some
runaway and mass loss events are more severe than others.
The mass loss events appear to be grouped. The first 12 mass loss spikes occur in
918 seconds from 1413 s to 2331 s. Then there are no mass loss spikes for a period




























Figure B.5: Module mass and derivative of module mass as a function of time show
that 26 mass loss spike events with a mass loss of 1 g/s, of which 6 mass loss events
cause greater than 3 g/s of mass loss.
runaway was started by heating up 12 of the cells, it appears that the first 12 mass
loss events are the 12 cells above the heater going into runaway and that the delayed
mass loss events are the others.
Unlike the NMC experiments in Section 3.3 for this single module in thermal run-
away, there was not any visible flaming combustion. Because of this, temperatures
inside the compartment increased only slightly. Temperature increases do correlate
with mass loss spikes and audible hissing and popping noises. Figure B.6 shows
the closet temperatures alongside the mass loss rate (purple) and noticeable sounds
(black).
After the experiment, the module was examined for damage. In the end only 24
of the 48 cells went into thermal runaway. The lower 24 cells went into thermal
runaway while the 24 cells above did not. Even though only 12 of the bottom cells
were directly above the heater that was turned on, thermal runaway propagated
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Figure B.6: Closet compartment temperatures, mass loss rate and audible noises
(black lines).
from these 12 cells to the 12 cells next to them. However, thermal runaway did not
propagate into the 24 cells above these. This is surprising as the cells above are
separated from those below by only a thin plastic panel and thin foil current collec-
tors. However, this was enough to prevent runaway propagation. The cells above
appeared to be intact complete with the paper wrapping that they originally had.
Even after 2 weeks, the voltage of the upper battery pack was measured at 13.3 V,
which is indicative of still being nearly fully charged.
Pressure Vessel Experiment
Experiment Setup The pressure vessel experiment was conducted to provide
measurements of the quantity and species of gas released by the cells during ther-
mal runaway. Since in the closet experiment, the aluminum block heaters under the
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Figure B.7: LFP Module after experiment
module were unable to cause runaway to propagate into the upper cells, the module
was partially disassembled to allow for the testing of only the bottom 24 cells. For
this experiment only the bottom 24 cells were used. The plastic housing, wires and
circuit board were removed as shown in Figure B.10.
The experiment was conducted in the pressure vessel used for the pouch array exper-
iments described in 2.3. During the experiment the vessel gas pressure was measured
with a pressure transducer. Gas temperatures were measured at 9 locations through-
out the vessel.
265
Figure B.8: Lower 24 cells did go into thermal runaway during experiment with
several losing their top and and venting material.
Results The vessel gas pressure and gas temperature data can be used to observe
the thermal runaway propagation process. Figure B.11 shows the temperature and
pressure data along with the first derivative of the pressure data. From this data it
can be observed that the thermal runaway propagation process proceeded over the
course of 909 seconds from about 3401s to 4310s. Gas and temperature data were
used along with a model to determine the volume of gas released. This 24 cell array
generated 33.5 liters of gas at STP conditions.
Approximately 24 hours after the experiment, 3 gas samples were taken and ana-
lyzed using gas chromatography to determine composition. The composition of the
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Figure B.9: Top 24 cells did not go into thermal runaway during the experiment
is provided in the Table B.1.
A photograph of the cell array after the experiment is shown in Figure B.12. After
the experiment the mass of each cell was measured. Five of the cells had a mass
between 23 and 36 grams while the remaining 20 cells had a mass between 72 and 82
grams. Undamaged cells have a mass of 86.7 grams. This shows that there are two
different ways in which cells fail. The cells with a large mass loss have lost one of
267
Figure B.10: 24 cell array in pressure vessel before experiment
the ends of the cell and eject or partially eject large amounts of cathode, anode and
current collectors. Cells with smaller mass loss have their top and bottom in place
and have lost only gases, liquids and small particles through the vent on the end of
the cell. The five cells with a large amount of mass loss are also likely the five cells
that led to larger pressure spikes in the pressure data. These pressure spikes were
also accompanied by a clinking noise, which is likely the impact of the metal top on
the vessel walls.
Discussion There are a number of common behaviors seen in both experiments.
One major similarity is that in both experiments some of the cell failures were more
severe than others. In the case of the closet experiment, the more extreme cell fail-
ures are those in which a large amount of the inside of the cell is ejected. In the
video of the event the two most severe failures are obvious because they were the





















































Figure B.11: Gas temperatures in higher (TC2-TC9) and lower (TC10-12) regions







Propane or Propylene 3.7
Ethane 1.78
Other 8.62
Table B.1: Species Volume Percent for Gas Released by LFP Array
evident due to larger mass loss rates and total mass loss for these events. In the
pressure vessel experiment, the more extreme cell failures are seen by the five times
that there is a considerably larger pressure spike. These spikes also corresponded
with clinking noises, likely caused by the impact of the cell top onto the vessel walls.
Afterwards the cells that had more extreme failures were evident because they had
lost significantly more mass than the other cells.
These two experiments demonstrate a number of differences when compared against
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Figure B.12: 24 cell array in pressure vessel after experiment with mass in grams of
lightest cells annotated
the LCO and NMC pouch cell and prismatic systems. One major difference is that
the failing module never caught on fire. This is due to the fact that out of the 24
cells that went into thermal runaway, only one was observed to eject hot material
which might cause an ignition. In contrast, both the LCO pouch cells in Section
4.3.1 and the NMC prismatic cells in Section 4.2.6, both consistently released a jet
of glowing hot particles for a few seconds shortly after the beginning of the intense
venting period.
Another major difference between the LFP cells and the LCO and NMC cells is the
amount of gas generated. The LFP cells produced only produced 0.12 liters of gas
at STP for every Watt-hour of nominal energy storage capacity. This is significantly
lower than the 0.35 L/Wh for the 10 Ah pouch cell arrays and the 0.64 L/Wh pro-
duced by the 94 Ah prismatic NMC cell.
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Although these cells seem to be more difficult to propagate thermal runaway and
they produce less flammable gas than others, they are clearly still very hazardous.
A major danger is that if a large energy storage system has a thermal failure that
causes the thermal runaway of multiple cells and modules, it can still easily pro-
duce enough gas to cause a major fire or explosion, such as the Griffith University
explosion. The vent gas generated by thermal runaway consists of 42 % hydrogen,
which will cause it to have a high burning velocity and consequently makes it very
dangerous for explosions.
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Figure B.13: 24 cell array, removed cells with mass measurements
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